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ABSTRACT

Multiple analytic methods are used to provide an
analysis and evaluation of specific economic and neighborhood
development policies undertaken by and continued by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, the City of Louisville, and
Jefferson County since the early to mid-1980s.

Such policies

were initiated under the 1982 Kentucky Revised Statute 154.45
(KRS 154.45), which introduced enterprise zones to the
Commonwealth and its urban areas.

The policy goals of KRS

154.45 that are examined include:

1) the improvement of the

quality of life of individuals that reside within the
Louisville and Jefferson County Enterprise Zone (EZ); 2) the
encouragement of economic activity through business formation,
job creation, and job retention within the EZ; and 3) the
elimination of blighted and deteriorated areas within the EZ.
Several primary and general methods of analysis are
utilized:

direct comparisons of descriptive statistics,

surveys, shift-share analysis, cost-benefit analysis and
quasi-experimentation.

The politics and history surrounding

Louisville and Jefferson County's Enterprise Zone will also be
discussed and examined.

Political considerations appear to

have played a key role in the evolution of the EZ program.
The study shows that the EZ program cannot be considered
a total success based upon the goals and objectives of KRS
154.45.

It is estimated that nearly $218 million in foregone

tax revenues and fees were used to create jobs and investment
iv

that would probably have been generated regardless of
incentives.

In fact,

job and investment growth in the EZ did

not come close to the growth experienced in other parts of
Jefferson County that did not have EZ incentives as well as to
that experienced by Jefferson County as a whole during the
same time period. This is true even when controlling for
government incentives that may have existed in other parts of
Jefferson County.
This study addresses the issues of local economic
development policies and planning.

A lack of planning and

focus is identified as one reason why the EZ did not meet
expectations.

Other reasons why the EZ did not fully succeed

will be discussed as well as possible alternative economic
development programs that could have benefited the area
targeted by the EZ program.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction and Overview

This dissertation evaluates the efficacy of the
Louisville and Jefferson County Enterprise Zone since its
inception in 1983.

No previous comprehensive evaluation of

the Enterprise Zone (EZ hereafter) has been attempted despite
the fact that the program is now over 13 years old.

The

importance of doing such an evaluation is critical because of
the enormous potential costs and benefits of the EZ as a local
economic development tool.

The central questions that need to

be addressed are whether the program achieved its stated
goals, and whether the program had any other un-predicted or
unanticipated effects on the local economy.
The EZ evaluation is important because of the continuing
use of and emphasis on state and local initiatives to solve
urban problems, and to encourage local economic growth.

This

is a trend that was started in the 1980s and continues to this
day.

Despite the fact that the federal government has again

become a partner in urban and community development through
such initiatives as Empowerment Zones and Enterprise
Communities, these programs still leave much, if not most, of
local economic development planning and promotion in the hands
of local officials, with the federal government providing
mostly financial assistance.

This dissertation topic is a

timely one because localities are still trying to generate
solutions to their problems by promoting homegrown economic
1

growth and prosperity in order to solve urban problems and to
encourage local economic growth.
There have been previous evaluations of enterprise zones
throughout the nation.

This study is unique in that the

Louisville and Jefferson County EZ is the largest in the
nation, encompassing 45.7 square miles.

In 1983, the zone

originally only covered 3.75 square miles and was designed as
an urban economic development program for disadvantaged and
low income residents and the long-term unemployed.

However,

the zone grew twice over the next three years and took in many
residential and commercial areas that would not normally have
been considered distressed or economically depressed.

Why the

size of the zone was changed and why its focus changed will
also be addressed in this dissertation because of the impact
that such changes had on EZ goals as well as EZ benefits and
costs.
This dissertation includes a narrative history of the EZ
and will show the EZ's evolution in terms of both size and
goals.

National and local political and economic events

preceding the birth of the EZ are examined.

The history of

the EZ shows the motivation for its origin and growth.
Political factors are shown to be important in explaining the
expansion of the EZ.
This study discusses the theoretical underpinnings of
the EZ concept and the reasons why such programs were
conceived and implemented.

The frustration of national and

local policy makers with traditional economic development
2

programs is discussed along with the attractiveness of the EZ
concept to those in the economic development community as a
potential and viable alternative.
Since EZ programs and policies have varied from state to
state and from locality to locality (there was not a national
enterprise zone policy developed in the 1980s), no one program
evaluation stands out as the definitive study of EZ success or
failure.

Around 37 states and the District of Columbia have,

or have had, EZ programs.

Since each jurisdiction has used a

different mixture of tax and regulatory incentives in their
EZs, a national study of the effectiveness of EZs has
virtually been impossible because of a lack of comparability
among state and local programs.
This dissertation cites and uses findings from previous
EZ evaluations done throughout the nation.

This is helpful

since the dissertation takes a multi-method approach in
evaluating the Louisville-Jefferson County EZ.

There exists

an abundance of literature on EZ evaluation that dates back to
the early 1980s.

Most evaluations take different approaches

(surveys, shift-share analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis,
etc.).

All these methods are used to assess the performance

of the Louisville-Jefferson County EZ.
A multi-method approach is used to provide a policy
analysis and program evaluation of specific economic
development policies undertaken and continued by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and Jefferson County, Kentucky since
1983.

Such policies were initiated under the 1982 Kentucky
3

Revised Statute 154.45 (KRS 154.45), and thereby introduced
EZs to the Commonwealth's urban areas.

The policies examined

and evaluated include improvement of the quality of life of
individuals that reside within Louisville and Jefferson
County's EZ; encouragement of economic activity within the EZ;
and elimination of blighted and deteriorated areas within the
EZ.
The following methods of analysis are utilized to
evaluate the success of EZ policy interventions: direct
comparisons of descriptive statistics, survey results,
shift-share analysis, cost-benefit analysis and
quasi-experimentation.

The politics and history surrounding

Louisville and Jefferson County's Enterprise Zone is also
discussed and examined.

It is shown that political

considerations played a key role in the development, evolution
and implementation of Louisville's EZ program.
The evidence shows that the EZ program was at best
marginally successful.

It is estimated that nearly $218

million in foregone tax revenues and fees were used to create
jobs and investment that, for the most part, would probably
have been generated regardless of incentives.

In fact,

job

and investment growth in the EZ did not come close to the
growth experienced in other parts of Jefferson County that did
not have EZ incentives as well as to that experienced by
Jefferson County as a whole during the same time period (1983
to the present).
The dissertation concludes with an analysis of local

4

economic development policies and planning.

Why the EZ has

not been a full success will be discussed as well as possible
alternative economic development programs that could have
benefited the area targeted by the EZ program.

The

implications for future development policy are discussed.

A

central policy question that needs to be addressed is the
efficacy of placing economic development into the hands of
local government.

Finally, recommendations for future

research about EZs and their effectiveness is also discussed.

5

CHAPTER II

The Emergence of Enterprise Zones as an Urban Po1icy

1. Background

There is an abundance of literature on the fate of U.
cities after the end of World War II.

s.

The late 1940s

throughout the 1950s saw people leaving neighborhoods that
were close to central business districts in favor of newer
neighborhoods and homes that were some distance from downtown
areas.

As post-war prosperity and government legislation

(assisted by VA and FHA loans, and home mortgage interest tax
deductions) encouraged a housing boom on the outskirts of most
major cities, suburbanization swept across America.
With rising incomes, middle-class families could not
only afford newer and larger housing, but also the automobiles
that would allow them to travel back and forth to work.

New

federal and state highways as well as the beginning of the
federal interstate system facilitated the suburbanite's
ability to travel.

Because location was critical to retailing

success, shopping centers developed along the major
thoroughfares of most new suburban areas.
At the same time, because of a growing economy,
manufacturers needed more space in order to expand production.
The horizontal layout of assembly-line work and mass
production meant that larger parcels of land were needed.

6

Such land was not readily available in the already developed
inner cities.

Plant expansion was often hindered and made

impossible by a fixed and already built environment.

On the

other hand, the open and undeveloped land near suburban
locations was ideal.

The land was cheap, and many current

employees had already moved into the outlying areas, or new
employees could be recruited from nearby neighborhoods.
What happened to cities during this time period?
History points out that disinvestment on a deep and wide-scale
basis occurred (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Ames, Brown,
Callahan, Cummings, Smock, and Ziegler, 1992; and Wilson,
1966).

With manufacturers, retailers, and residents leaving

town, space and facilities that had at one time enjoyed
extensive and intensive use now became abandoned and
undesirable.

With the exception of professional and technical

jobs, many forms of work simply "disappeared" from the inner
city and there began a spatial mismatch between available
employment and those who wanted to work (Wilson, 1987, 1996).
Those who could not afford new housing and those without
transportation and/or certain skills and education would be
left behind in quickly deteriorating neighborhoods (Wilson,
1987).

Particularly hard-hit by these trends were minorities,

especially African-Americans.
The fiscal coffers of America's cities were also hardhit.

As more and more property owners left the city for

unincorporated areas around the city, property tax revenues
began to decline (Mikesell, 1982; Stiglitz, 1988; and Rosen,
7

1992, pp. 543-545).

The property tax had always been the

backbone of municipal finance.

As the revenues shrank, so did

the ability of cities to finance day-to-day operations and
services as well as big ticket projects such as infrastructure
improvements, maintenance and replacement.
In an attempt to remedy this situation, urban renewal
was started during the Eisenhower Administration.
Deteriorated neighborhoods with dilapidated housing were
replaced with new public housing facilities and roadways that
connected the inner city to interstate highways (Ames, et ai,
1992).

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, one blighted

neighborhood after another succumbed to massive rebuilding
projects that completely changed the urban landscape for
better or worse (Anderson, 1964).

Yet poverty still remained

a problem in America's urban areas.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government tried to
rehabilitate ailing cities through President Johnson's Great
Society programs and President Nixon's New Federalism.

The

expansion of the social safety net for the poor and the
elderly as well as federal revenue sharing were basically
redistribution programs aimed at providing relief for urban
poverty and their symptomatic problems-crime, crumbling
infrastructure, etc.

There were also attempts to provide job

training for inner city residents through the Comprehensive
Employment Training Act (CETA).

Presidents Ford and Carter

pretty much continued and maintained these policies despite
increasing political pressure for federal fiscal restraint.
8

The amelioration of economic hardship along with increasing
the skills of urban residents were seen as a two-pronged
strategy for revitalizing cities and their neighborhoods.
However, despite the support for various urban programs
throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, there were many critics
of American urban policy during this time period.

These

critics spanned the political and ideological spectrum.

They

observed that, despite best efforts, cities were still filled
with pockets of poverty and high unemployment.

In fact, some

claimed that a new "underclass" had developed within America's
urban areas (Wilson, 1987).

Most of all, according to Ames,

et al (1992):
Community development programs, many
contended, were implemented in an uncoordinated
and sporadic manner.
In the face of long-term
urban development trends, neither the Community
Development Block Grant program nor Urban Development Action Grant funds could alter the growing
polarization between city and suburb. Nor could
they reverse the outward migration of people and
capital to the suburbs.
Federal revitalization
programs were poorly oonceived in Washington,
badly coordinated between various governmental
jurisdictions, and inadequately monitored at the
local level (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1980). Funds
often were spent on questionable projects or
maneuvered into programs not initially authorized
by federal legislation (Tabb and Sawers, 1978).
(p. 208).
2. The Rise of Supp1y-Side Po1itics and Economics, and
the Emergence of Enterprise Zone Po1icy

During the 1970s, many local and national American
leaders were challenged by gloomy economic conditions:
periods of high unemployment and high inflation. Along with
the continuing problems of urban areas, many leaders felt that
9

something new had to be tried in order to solve declining

u.s.

economic growth, especially declining growth in American
cities.

It was believed by many that previous government

programs had failed to revive both national as well as local
economic vitality and that new policies were in order.

The

1980 elections seemed to confirm these sentiments as
conservative Republicans captured the White House and the

u.s.

Senate.
The 1970s saw Keynesian and activist government policies
fall into disfavor.

The federal government was seen as the

cause of U. S. economic problems, not the solution (Friedman,
1962; Feldstein, 1969 and 1977; and Laffer, 1979). This view
was also held by those who were critical of federal efforts to
help cities and the poor (Anderson, 1964; and Murray, 1984).
Like the U. S., Great Britain was also experiencing
economic hardship, especially in its older, urban centers.

In

the late 1970s, under the Thatcher regime, an attempt to
revive urban economic growth was already underway.

A British

planner, Peter Hall, put forth the idea that perhaps the only
way to revitalize deteriorating urban areas and to reduce
urban unemployment was to create urban "enterprise zones"
(Hall, 1977).

An urban enterprise zone would be a specific,

targeted area within a city where businesses would be exempt
from many taxes and regulations--"freeports" (Hall, 1977) of
trade in the inner city. In theory, these zones would be
attractive to new firms because the costs of doing business

10

would be greatly reduced. 1

According to Hall, much of the

success of Pacific-Rim countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore
and Malaysia was due to the fact that such nations had low
taxes and little business regulation.

The solution to urban

stagnation and decline was not more government programs, but
fewer government programs and less government interference in
both business and local government decision making.

However,

Hall did warn that such policies should only be relied upon as
a last resort (Hall, 1977).
Hall was well aware that what was applicable to far
eastern nations may not be applicable to western nations whose
people had experienced unionization and some form of welfare
state.

Advanced industrial nations had already gone through

the extreme laissez faire conditions of the 19th century that
now existed in 20th century Asian miracle economies.
However, because many inner city residents lacked the
skills and training for newly emerging high-tech and service
jobs, Hall's ideas did not seem too far-fetched to many
economists and politicians.

After all, many of the developing

economies of the far east had an ample number of low to
un-skilled workers.

Urban areas were desperate to replace

employers who had moved to suburbia (Hall, 1982).

Given the

severely depressed level of economic activity of the inner
city, Hall felt it unfeasible for cities to attempt economic
development that required a lot of high technology, such as
1 It should be noted that Hall had some initial reservations
about his ideas.
He later declared the implementation of his
theory to be insufficient for urban regeneration.

11

science based industries and research and development
facilities.

The costs of retraining un-skilled and

low-skilled inner city residents also seemed prohibitive given
the fiscal constraints that faced national, state and local
governments.

On-the-job training done by the private sector,

however, was feasible if businesses were given the right
incentives to provide it.
Hall (1982) envisioned the enterprise zone concept as
one way of possibly bringing inner-city residents into the new
world of technical jobs.

If taxes, tariffs, and government

regulation were removed from an area, entrepreneurs would
invest there.

The first employers to invest in the EZs would

need the services of

un-skilled workers.

One obstacle to

hiring such workers would be the minimum wage, so therefore,
these freeports would have to be exempt from minimum wage
laws.

The removal of the minimum wage would also make it much

cheaper to train these workers.
Hall's ideas were adopted by many British economic
development advocates who saw his proposal as an alternative
to the urban policies of that time period.

The British

experiment with EZs also did not go unnoticed by U.
proponents of supply-side economics.

s.

Even before Ronald

Reagan's election to the presidency, proposals for U. S. urban
enterprise zones had been introduced in the Congress (Butler,
1991).

The newly elected President made enterprise zones his

major, if not his only, urban initiative.

12

Traditional urban

programs, such as revenue sharing, Community Development Block
Grants (CDBGs) and Urban Development Action Grants (UDAGs)
would either be dramatically curtailed or eliminated.

Other

programs that affected urban constituencies--summer jobs for
youth, welfare and food stamps--were also targeted for
dramatic spending reductions.

Enterprise zones would then

have to provide employment and new sources of local government
revenues in order to mitigate the decline of federal programs
(Tabb, 1984).
Despite achieving victories in rolling back the role of
the federal government in urban areas, the Reagan
Administration was unsuccessful in getting a federal
enterprise zone program approved by the Congress.

Much of the

resistance was based upon doubts about how effective such a
program would be and about how much it would cost the federal
government in lost tax revenues.

The federal budget deficit

had increased dramatically after the 1981 tax cuts and the
1981-82 recession.

More importantly the fairness of the

program was questioned by Democrats and moderate Republicans
since the Administration proposed either abolishing the
minimum wage or creating a sUb-minimum wage in the zones so as
to make labor cheaper and more attractive to employers.
Congress and the public were not ready for such proposals
( Tabb , 1 98 4) .
Despite critics and reservations, Britain's experiment
with EZs would soon be imported into the U. S.

Given the

severity of the 1981-82 recession (the worse since the Great

13

Depression (Ruffin and Gregory, 1994, p. 104)) and the
inability of the Reagan administration to enact a national
enterprise zone policy, many states decided that something had
to be done to stem the decline of their urban areas.

The

1980s, whether by design or by default, saw the federal
government become more and more disengaged from urban policy.
Federal tax cuts, an increase in military expenditures and
business deregulation became the central pieces of the Reagan
administration's macroeconomic policies.

But as far as local

and regional policies were concerned there were really none in
existence (Ames, et ai, 1992; Gaffikin and Warf, 1993).
Because the Reagan enterprise zone proposals were never
enacted, many state governments decided to take independent
initiative on the enterprise zone concept.

With the nation

suffering a severe recession in 1981 and 1982, and with some
states not yet fully recovering from the recession's
aftermath, the 1980s saw many states trying to solve their own
economic and urban problems.

Since Washington had decided to

play a smaller role in local economic development and public
welfare (Ames, et ai, 1992; Gaffikin and Warf, 1993; and Tabb,
1984) most states decided to undertake these tasks.

By 1988,

over 37 states and the District of Columbia had implemented
some form of an enterprise zone program.
multiple EZ locations.

Many states had

EZ incentives varied widely across and

within these states (Green, 1991).
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3. Critics of Enterprise Zone Po1icy

Despite widespread implementation, the political and
economic criticisms of the EZ concept, both in the U. K. and
the U. S., were many.

The biggest issue was whether

development incentives would be effective in arresting and
reversing urban decay.

Proponents of EZs argued that such

development incentives were necessary to encourage investment
in areas perceived as poor risks

(Hall, 1977, 1982; Butler,

1981, 1992; U. S. Chamber of Commerce 1981; Kemp 1982, 1989,
1992; Weiner 1984; Congressional Digest 1985; and Cowden,
1992).

However, even Hall

(1982) admitted that deregulation,

low taxes and low wages would not by themselves solve urban
unemployment and underemployment.

Some type of public

reinvestment in blighted communities would also be necessary
to make EZs work (Gunther and Leathers, 1987).
Additionally, other critics pointed out, EZs would not
necessarily attract high-tech industries.

If Hall had

fashioned his model after emerging Asian economies, why would
sweatshops or other exploitative economic arrangements that
developed in these economies not arise in the inner cities of
the U. S. and Europe as well

(Harrison,

1982)?

In other

words, what guarantees were there that companies locating in
an EZ

would be high-tech?

What if EZs only attracted

low-tech, low-wage, dead-end jobs?
Also there was the potential problem of EZs creating a
zero-sum competitive climate among EZ-designated areas as well
15

as EZ versus non-EZ designated areas

(Peirce, Hagstrom and

Steinbach, 1979; Clarke, 1982; Massey, 1982; and Blair, 1995,
pp. 174-181).

That is, EZs could lead to the spatial

redistribution of existing jobs from one EZ to another or from
a non-EZ region to an EZ-designated area rather than create
new jobs and businesses.

EZs could place companies outside of

the designated area at a competitive disadvantage compared to
firms in the area through lower costs of production (cheaper
labor, tax breaks for capital investment, etc.).

Firms that

found themselves in direct competition with EZ firms could
decide to relocate into an EZ that offered them less
regulation and lower taxes than the jurisdiction in which they
were currently located.

Or a firm in an existing EZ could

still move to another EZ if the latter promised even better
tax incentives and deregulation for business firms.
The possible migration of firms could be from either one
location in a city to another location that had EZ status in
the same city, or firms could migrate into the EZ from even
greater distances.

Either way, although there could be the

potential for the creation of new jobs in an EZ, the potential
for the redistribution of existing jobs seemed to be stronger
because of cut-throat competition among regions (Massey,
1982).

As O'Sullivan (1993, pp. 68-69) and Bartik (1991)

point out, most new jobs created in metropolitan areas are
filled by newcomers to the region.

Therefore, if new job

creation did occur, there could be no guarantee that the
people for whom the EZ was to benefit would actually be helped
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in finding employment.
Another group of critics seriously questioned whether
incentives such as tax and regulatory relief would have any
impact at all on investment or business location decisions, as
well as job creation and retention efforts (Harrison and
Kanter, 1978; Peirce, Hagstrom and Steinbach, 1979; Vaughn,
1979; Jacobs and Wasylenko, 1981; Schmenner 1982; Hawkins,
1984; Rubin and Zorn, 1985).

These critics argued that the

limited savings provided by incentives were too small in
proportion to the overall costs of a firm in order for them to
affect employment and investment decisions.

According to this

line of thought, those jobs that would be created by EZs would
probably be low-paying and provide little job security
(Clarke, 1982; and Goldsmith, 1982).
Another school of thought on EZs focused upon the direct
and indirect costs associated with them.

It is argued that

their incentives in the form of foregone tax revenues and
possibly more public capital spending increase the tax burdens
for nonzone firms and residents by shifting these higher tax
burdens onto the non-EZ firms and residents (Armstrong, 1981;
Humberger, 1981; Mounts, 1981; Clarke, 1982; and Hawkins,
1984).

Also, according to critics, the zones might only tend

to transfer capital investment from one location to another,
rather than creating new investment (Peirce, Hagstrom and
Steinbach, 1979; Clarke, 1982; Massey, 1982; and Blair, 1995,
pp. 174-181).

Finally, some critics argued that EZs

indirectly lower government aid in distressed communities, and
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that more resources, not less, should be focused on programs
such as education and job training for urban residents
(Birdsong, 1989; Estes and Hamond, 1992; and Levitan and
Miller, 1992).
Additionally, political and economic arguments for and
against EZs were developed by critics centering around the
appropriate roles of the federal, state and local governments.
Public choice advocates generally argued that local
jurisdictions, not the federal government, should be the
driving force behind local economic development and quality of
life issues (Buchanan, 1960 and 1965; Tiebout, 1956; Butler
1991; and Peterson, 1981).

Federal programs that focused on

redistribution policies (e.g., UDAGS, CDBGS, and revenue
sharing) were seen as encouraging cities and other
underdeveloped regions not to change.

That is, similar to

conservative arguments made against AFDC, food stamps and
other forms of welfare to individuals and families,

these

programs did nothing to encourage localities to become selfsufficient.

If anything, these programs were seen as

encouraging cities not to promote economic development and
revitalization.
The alternative was to either cut back or end these
programs, and by doing so, promote competition among
localities and regions.

A competitive environment among local

jurisdictions, just as with a perfectly competitive
environment among business firms, would make cities stronger
and more self-reliant.

Otherwise, cities that did not strive
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to better themselves and "pull themselves up by the
bootstraps" would wither away.

According to this logic, by

competing against each other, state and local governments
would be forced to offer the appropriate levels of taxation
and services necessary to promote economic growth and a high
quality of life for their residents.

Local governments that

failed to satisfy local constituents--residents and businesses
alike--might suffer the consequences of constituents "voting
with their feet" and moving to another jurisdiction within the
same region.

No longer would the federal government subsidize

city and local government spending.

Local governments would

be forced to offer better services at lower costs (due to
having to lower their taxes) if they wanted to attract capital
and to bring back middle class residents.

Cities would have

to become leaner yet stronger when it carne to fiscal and
service delivery matters.

Lastly, it was believed that local

officials could better handle economic redevelopment because
they were in more direct contact with their constituencies
than the federal government.

It is easy then to see how EZs

could become the tools of local governments trying to enhance
their competitive advantage vis a vis other local governments.
In an age of federal fiscal austerity, the public choice view
became an attractive philosophy.
Nevertheless, there are still many who believe that
exclusively putting economic development into the hands of
local governments is still a bad idea and that the national
government can still best pursue policies that are in the
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interests of distressed urban and rural areas (Ladd and '
Doolittle, 1982; and Gaffikin and Warf, 1993).
Counter to public choice ideas, many advocates took the
view that economic development and economic growth for
depressed regions (whether urban or rural) is and always
should be a task for the federal government.

According to the

advocates of an activist federal government role, the
historical record of local governments trying to encourage
economic development and trying to help depressed and
impoverished areas was always substandard at best (Musgrave,
1959, pp. 181-182; Oates, 1977; and Hughes and Cain, Ch. 25,
1994).

Even some public choice advocates admitted that it was

not in the best interests of state and local governments to
help their poor (Peterson, 1981).

It was for this reason (and

others) that President Roosevelt's New Deal policies put
regional economic development and poverty relief into the
hands of the federal government (Brock, 1988; Spulber, 1989;
and Stein, 1996).

In an advanced industrial society, state

and local governments did not have the power, information,
capacity and in many cases the inclination to plan and produce
a national economic recovery much less the capability to
improve their most impoverished areas (Musgrave, 1959; Oates,
1977; Galbraith, 1976; Schlesinger, Jr., 1958, Ch. 16;
Stiglitz, 1988; Ladd and Doolittle, 1982; Gaffikin and Warf,
1993) .
At the heart of federal activist policies was the
influence of Keynesian economics.
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John Maynard Keynes (1936)

believed that economic growth and prosperity could best be
achieved by national economic policies.

It was felt by Keynes

and other "Keynesians" (Musgrave, 1959; Heller, 1966; Hicks,
1967; Solow, 1970; Samuelson, 1975; and Okun, 1981) that the
national government could stabilize the extreme "ups and
downs" of the national business cycle as well as provide
assistance to those areas of the nation that were structurally
depressed (e.g., the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Works
Program Administration, etc.) either through direct federal
programs or federal grants.

Local governmen'ts would have

input on local economic development, but the federal
government would provide leadership.
Those who held the belief that the federal government
should be the leader in assisting underdeveloped cities and
regions argued that EZ programs would lead to zero-sum
competition among localities (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982;
and Harrison, 1982).

Jurisdictions that were already poor to

begin with could not compete against wealthier ones no matter
how many incentives the poorer areas offered to potential new
residents and businesses.

Besides, these jurisdictions had

very little money to offer substantive incentives anyway.
Wealthier localities would continue to become wealthier while
poorer areas would continue to become poorer.

It was also

argued that many families and businesses made location
decisions based on more than just tax considerations.

The EZ

experiment was seen as a band-aid approach for cities that
needed intensive care because of their critical condition
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(Massey, 1982).
On a different front, some argued that it has never
been, and never should be, the job of local government to be
in the arena of economic development.

Instead, according to

some legal scholars (Rubin, 1993 and 1994), from a legal and
constitutional point of view, it has been the duty of states
and municipalities to offer basic government services (police
protection, sanitation, schooling, etc.) and not to embark on
what some policy critics label "smokestack-chasing" and
industry recruitment activities.

Such activities do not meet

the legal criteria of either a public purpose or public
benefit.

That is to say, tax dollars paid at the local level

have always been, from a traditional legal point of view,
solely for the purpose of carrying out basic and essential
public services--no more, no less.

4. The Performance of Enterprise Zones

In light of various criticisms of EZ policy, numerous
evaluations of their performance have been initiated.
Generally, the literature on U. S. EZs seems to show wide
variation as to whether EZs are successful (Rubin and Wilder,
1996).

The growth in employment and capital investment due to

EZs shows a record of uneven performance.

Among the most

important issues in the evaluation literature is whether
increases in the number of jobs created or retained as well as
the capital formation that takes place in an EZ can be
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ascribed to the incentives offered
within them or

to companies located

to companies considering the move into an EZ.

Unfortunately, the literature does not have as much to say
about the evaluation of EZs when it comes to private business
and capital formation as it does with regard to employment
(Rubin and Wilder, 1996).

Incentives that encourage capital

formation are not as carefully scrutinized as those that are
supposed to promote job creation.

Perhaps this is because it

is assumed by EZ proponents that capital formation leads to
job creation.

Therefore, evaluating the ability of EZs to

create jobs becomes an indirect way of evaluating capital
formation (Rubin and Wilder, 1996).

That is, if an EZ program

was successful in creating or retaining jobs, then it must
have been successful in creating or retaining capital in a
targeted area.
With regard to job creation, the provisions of the
Maryland statewide enterprise program, examined over the 1983
to 1984 period, were not seen as helpful to businesses hiring
new employees.

Because of the way the Maryland state

enterprise zone was written, there was a two year time delay
between the reporting of a business income tax credit for
hiring a new employee and the business receiving the tax
credit (Funkhouser and Lorenz, 1987, p. 68).

This made the

tax credit pretty much ineffective when it came to job
creation.

Moreover, the authors found that few workers

remained on the job permanently and that the cost per job
created was approximately $57,000 (Funkhouser and Lorenz,
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1987, p. 75).
In the same way, Dabney (1989, p. 135) found that
financial incentives in the Texas EZ program had very little
impact on job creation because the incentives did not address
the most important concerns of firms:

transportation,

insurance, and access to raw materials.

Any decrease in costs

from the EZs was offset by an increase in the costs of these
factors. Other research measures changes in employment through
the number of unemployment claims or the unemployment rate.
Some research indicates that enterprise zones actually lower
unemployment in EZ designated areas.

Papke (1994) found that

the business income tax credit incentive for hiring new
employees decreased the number of unemployment claims 19%, or
1500 claims, in Indiana over the 1981 to 1989 period.

Also,

Sridhar (1996) found that Illinois' EZ program helped to
reduce unemployment in moderate and high unemployment areas in
most EZ designated areas.
However, another article by Papke (1993) that compared
enterprise zones to similar non-enterprise zone control areas
found virtually no difference in changes in the unemployment
rates among the areas.

Data were presented on the differences

between zones (15) and non-zones (24) through an analysis of
1980 and 1990 Census block group data.

Though there was an

improvement in zones compared to non-zones with regard to
unemployment, the differences were very small.
Rubin and Wilder (1989) utilized the method of
shift-share analysis in order to assess the effectiveness of
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Evansville's (Indiana) EZ program in creating new jobs.

Their

study found that of the 1,430 jobs created in Evansville over
the 1983-1986 period, only 327 would not have been created
without the enterprise zone.

However, the authors note that

the remaining 1,193 jobs would have probably been created
somewhere in the Evansville metro area anyway, but not in the
enterprise zone.

Shift-share analysis is a tool which has

limitations, and these limits, as well as shift-share's
pluses, will be discussed later in the dissertation because it
is used in analyzing Louisville and Jefferson County's EZ.
An econometric study of EZs in Indiana (Seyfried 1990)
similarly found that the incentive packages of EZs had very
little impact on employment.

Seyfried found that the

elasticity of employment with respect to the tax credits of
EZs is highly inelastic, and hence have little impact on job
creation.
Two studies provide an analysis of the impact of EZs on
employment growth across the U. S.
Satterthwaite, 1992; Glover 1993).

(O'Huallachain and
Examining 100 EZs across

the country, Glover (1993, p. 98) found that EZs created or
retained an average of 559 jobs per zone.

In an examination

of job growth in some 264 MSAs over the 1977 to 1984 period,
O'Huallachain and Satterthwaite found that the presence of EZs
had very, very little impact on job growth.

Instead, results

indicated that localization economies, urbanization, and local
labor market conditions (how skilled is the local labor force)
are the most important determinants of job growth.
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One study that sought to isolate the impact of EZs by
asking businesses the primary or exclusive reason for their
new location or expansion decisions found mediocre results
(Rubin 1990).

In an examination of New Jersey EZs over the

1987 to 1988 period, Rubin found that 3,948 jobs were created
because of the characteristics of the EZs.

This was at a

total cost of $51.6 million, or $13,070 per job.

The

cost-effectiveness of this was that $0.70 "was generated in
New Jersey state and local taxes for every $1.00" in EZ
incentives received.

However, the study was done for an

entire state, and in addition to business income tax credits,
EZ incentives included a rebate on unemployment insurance
taxes.
Sridhar's (1996) study of Illinois EZs found that
program costs were greatly outweighed by program benefits.
Using a concept of a "reservation wage" for unemployed
workers, she found that even in cases where EZs had caused
firms to relocate from one locality to another (rather than
cause new firms to open in the EZ), tax incentive costs were
small in comparison to the net benefits yielded by EZ economic
development and job creation.

However, Sridhar's strict set

of assumptions could be said to bias her conclusions.

One of

her assumptions is "[I]t is assumed that employment generated
in these zones is attributable to zone incentives.

There is

also an assumption that jobs created in such zones will be
filled by the local unemployed, primarily to justify local
expenditure" (Sridhar, 1996, p. 70).
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Sridhar, therefore,

automatically assumes that all zone incentives would have a
direct and positive impact upon employment and investment.
An empirical study of Indiana's EZs showed that the
largest increase in jobs occurred in services, retailing,
wholesaling, finance, insurance and real estate and
transportation (Papke, 1993).

So far this is the only U. S.

study of the effects that EZ incentives have on types of
employment.

Papke noted that during the course of his

research, manufacturing employment declined considerably while
employment in these other sectors rose (as was the case
throughout most of the U. S. during the 1980s).

Despite the

fact that many proponents of EZs saw the programs as leading
to the revitalization of manufacturing within inner cities,
Indiana's EZ programs do not seem to have stemmed the decline
of manufacturing in the state.
Rubin and Wilder (1989) found that the largest increases
in employment in the Evansville, Indiana EZ were in
transportation, wholesaling, retailing and services.

There

was a decline or stagnation in each of eight categories of
manufacturing.

One common element among the sectors with the

greatest growth was the "presence of generally high levels of
finished product inventories" (Rubin and Wilder, 1989, p.
422).

Since the biggest incentive in the Evansville EZ

program was an inventory tax credit, this is not surprising.
In fact, much of the job growth in the zone was attributed to
the opening of a new warehouse and distribution center.
More recently, Dowall (1996) found that most of
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California's 13 Enterprise Zone programs did not even come
close to producing the jobs that state development officials
had hoped for.

Instead, most of the 13 EZs suffered job

losses between 1986 and 1990 even when controlling for
national and industry-specific economic trends.

Dowall's

method of using County Business Patterns data at the zip code
level was useful in his analysis and will be used in this
dissertation to assess the Louisville EZ.

Further elaboration

on this method will be provided in a later chapter.
What very little research there has been on EZs with
regard to capital formation, creation and/or retention seems
to be focused on whether EZs cause firms to relocate from one
area to another because of EZ incentives.

As mentioned

earlier, opponents of the EZ concept argue that EZs will
simply relocate businesses, either from within or outside a
local region with no new business expansion, in a zero-sum
manner.

An EZ located in one part of a city, it is argued,

will simply attract capital and jobs away from other parts of
the city.

There does seem to be some empirical evidence on

the impact of EZs in Great Britain that support this argument
(Bromley and Rees, 1988; Bromley and Morgan, 1985; Talbott,
1988).

According to this evidence, about half of the jobs

created were the result of relocation.

However, relocation

seemed to occur more because of abundant and cheap commercial
real estate in the zone area than because of financial
incentives.

Bartik (1991) also shows that firms in the U.

are less sensitive to the costs of intra-metropolitan
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s.

movements than to the costs of inter-metropolitan movements,
thereby giving some credence to the relocation argument.
Many critics (Jacobs and Wasylenko, 1981; Clarke, 1982;
Mier, 1982; Walton, 1982; Glickman, 1984; and Hawkins, 1984)
have argued that EZs would favor capital formation over job
creation, and that the biggest winners with regard to EZ
incentives would be large, national and/or multinational firms
with few loyalties to local communities.

Yet Erickson and

Friedman (1991) found that in 35 states EZs helped to create
many new jobs by encouraging the start-up and growth of many
small, newly formed, businesses.

Very few firms in their

study were large, capital-intensive establishments that had
located from outside of the zone because of zone incentives.
Jones (1985 and 1987) compared the number of property
transfers and building permits issued within the Bridgeport,
Connecticut and Decatur, Illinois EZs to those in similar but
non-EZ areas and found either marginal differences in transfer
and building activities between the EZ and non-EZ areas or
found that differences could easily be explained due to
factors other than EZ incentives.
In 1986, the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) conducted interviews with over 200 state and
local officials in an effort to gauge EZ effects on
communities in nine states.

Survey results revealed that 263

EZ firms were deemed to be responsible for the creation or
retention of 7,348 jobs and over $147 million in new
investment by new and expanding firms.
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EZ incentives had some

influence on the expansion decisions of existing firms, but
played less of a role in the location decisions of new firms.
However, HUD declared that it had had difficulty in getting
good data on EZ impact effects and concluded that the study's
outcomes for jobs and investment could not be attributed
solely to EZ incentives.

Critics of the HUD study also

maintain that simply relying upon interviews with state and
local officials who have a vested interest in EZ successes
potentially biased and diminished the results of the HUD
report.

Incidentally, one of the zones examined was

Louisville's EZ.
A 1985 study done by the state of Connecticut (done
independently of Jones (1985)) claimed that in addition to
4,300 new jobs created and 4,200 jobs retained due to the
state's 6 EZ areas, over $113 million in new investment was
brought into the EZs through mostly existing firms.
Nelson and Whelan (1988) found through surveying firms
that Louisiana's EZs were supposed to have created $27.4
million in investment and 1,036 new jobs.

In contrast to

previous studies, the majority of respondents said that
incentives were more important in location decisions than in
expansion or new capital investment decisions.
19 firms participated in the survey.

However, only

Erickson, Friedman and

McCluskey (1989) used data from the 1986 HUD study and found
that in 357 zones across 17 states, EZs created an average of
333 new jobs and $23.4 million in new investment per zone.
This was done mostly by new or existing firms.
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Also, Rubin

and Armstrong (1989) did a survey of EZ firms in 10 New Jersey
zones that claimed that 9,193 jobs had been created in the
zones between 1985 to 1988 and that $803 million of new
investment had taken place during the same time period.

The

majority of the 478 New Jersey firms surveyed said that
incentives had influenced location or expansion decisions
(approximately 70%) .
Litster (1990) did a survey of California businesses in
EZs from 1986 to 1988.

Of the 137 firms surveyed, Litster

estimated that 2,518 new jobs were created and that 54% of the
new jobs created were generated by new, start-up businesses.
However, 55% of business owners did not regard incentives as
important in making location decisions.

Two years later, a

report released by the Indiana Department of Commerce showed
that from 1989 to 1990, 12 Indiana EZs created 2,024 new jobs
and generated $199 million in investment and $272 million in
new state and local tax revenues for only $20.6 million in
program costs (Rubin, Brooks, and Buxbaum, 1992).
Overall, studies of EZ incentives with regard to job
creation or retention and capital formation and movement
appear incomplete and often contradictory.

As Rubin and

Wilder (1996) write in regard to the effectiveness of most
EZs:
... [P] rogram experience has made two realities
clear:
enterprise zones have not lived up to
the broad panacea-like imagery conjured up by
early federal proposals and rhetoric.; neither,
however, have they brought about the massive
dislocations and dominance of large industries
predicted by enterprise zone critics. The
answer to the enterprise zone riddle is far
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more complex than either its promoters or
detractors suggest. (pp. 473-474).
The authors believe that the conflicting evaluations of
EZ efficacy is due to the poor planning and oversight that
most states have done in creating and implementing EZs.

That

is, because state and local governments often failed a priori
to specify EZ goals and objectives as well as to put together
data bases to monitor the progress of EZs, it is not
surprising to find studies that when taken as a whole are
contradictory and inconclusive.
Kentucky's experience with EZs is similar to those of
other states.

The history of the Louisville zone is examined

in the following chapter.

Political issues and controversies

affected the design and implementation of the Louisville EZ
and significantly affected its overall impact on the local
economy.
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CHAPTER III
A Narrative History of Louisvi11e's Enterprise Zone

1. Louisvi11e's Urban Prob1ems

Prior to the national economic problems of the 1970s and
1980s, the Louisville area's economy was very robust.

Like

many other metro areas in its region of the country,
Louisville and its home county, Jefferson, had a high
concentration of jobs in manufacturing.

In fact, Louisville

probably had a higher than the national average percentage of
jobs concentrated in manufacturing--25 to 33% locally compared
to the nation's 22% (Massey, 1985).

Most of these jobs were

high paying and required very few skills.

A few

manufacturers were very large employers--General Electric's
Appliance Park, Ford Motor Company's two vehicle assembly
plants as well as International Harvester.

In fact, during

the early 1970s, General Electric at one time had over 22,000
employees (Ward, 1996).

It now only employs approximately

7,000 workers.
But there were also deep underlying problems that were
developing during these times.

The city and Jefferson County

had many residents who were labor union members.

Because of

frequent "wildcat strikes" (those not authorized by national
union headquarters) and because of continuous labor-management
conflicts, Louisville and Jefferson County became labeled
"Striketown USA," a nickname that stuck for quite some time
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(Koebel and Remington, 1988).

Because unions were so

prevalent in the area, many existing businesses either did not
expand or left town.

Many potential new businesses,

especially manufacturers like Toyota, decided against locating
in Louisville because of its reputation as a strike-prone city
(Shafer, 1985).
There were also tensions between the city and the
county.

These tensions were not just between the leaders of

each government, but among the people of each jurisdiction.
During the late 1950s and 1960s, western Louisville
experienced a massive amount of "white flight"

with many

residents moving out of the city and into various parts of the
county.

According to Cummings and Price (1990, p. 6), the

percentage of Louisville residents who were African American
remained fairly static from 1870 to 1950.

Then from 1950 to

1980, the percentage of blacks living in the city grew from
15.6% to 28.2% as the population of the city declined from
390,639 in 1960 to 298,451 in 1980.

Also from 1950 to 1960,

the percentage of whites living in the City of Louisville fell
from 84.3% to 71.1% whereas Jefferson County outside of
Louisville's boundaries saw its population increase from
220,308 in 1960 to 386,553 in 1980 (Cummings and Price, 1990,
p. 9).

During this time, one reason why the city's minority

population went up percentage wise as well as numerically was
because of the migration of Southern blacks into the community
who had hopes of finding better job opportunities. Such was
the case in many "border"

states and Midwestern states during
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this period (Hughes and Cain, 1994, Ch. 29).

Later in 1975,

racial hostilities exploded with the advent of forced busing
throughout Jefferson County.
Around the same time that racial realignments were
occurring within the city and county, many businesses left the
city in favor of other locations in the region.

New suburbs

and small incorporated cities also began to proliferate in the
county.

Large, new suburban shopping centers, industrial

parks and office complexes developed in Jefferson county.
These developments took income and sources of capital away
from many downtown Louisville businesses.
With many middle and upper income whites leaving the
city and taking their business elsewhere, the city's fiscal
health began to suffer.

Meanwhile, Louisville's minority

population could not find enough jobs, partially because of
discrimination and because many businesses were leaving the
city just at the time that the minority population was
increasing.

Since many blacks who had migrated to Louisville

were poor to begin with, their situation did not improve.

All

these events promoted conflict and competition between city
and county governments, an issue that continues at the present
time (Savitch and Vogel, 1996).
Many in the city began to blame the county for the
city's problems (Schulman, 1987).

City leaders saw the county

as draining its people and businesses away while at the same
time using its central business district as a major employer
and provider of governmental administrative services.
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In the

1960s and 1970s, the City of Louisville had some success in
annexing adjoining parts of the county. However, most attempts
at annexation were met with hostility and defeat.

Finally in

the early 1980s, city and county leaders decided that a merger
between city and county government should be attempted.
However, two referendums were narrowly defeated.

For the

city, the future did not look bright.
When "deindustrialization" hit the Louisville area, the
results were very harsh (Norman and Hershberg, 1984).
According to the Kentucky Department for Manpower Services,
plant closings and permanent layoffs contributed to a loss of
35,000 jobs in the metro area from 1974 to 1983 (Norman and
Hershberg, 1984).

In 1974, the Louisville area had around

120,000 manufacturing jobs.

By 1983, it was down to around

85,000, a level which has since fallen over the last 12 years.
For every heavy manufacturing job lost, probably 2 to 4 other
jobs were lost (Norman and Hershberg, 1984).

This meant that

the total number of jobs eliminated could have ranged from
105,000 to 175,000 throughout the metro area (which would
include surrounding Kentucky counties and counties in Southern
Indiana) .
Unemployment levels in the area were above those of the
national average throughout most of the 1980s, a period that
saw an outward migration of over 50,000 people from Jefferson
County (1980 and 1990 Census of Population and County-City
Data Book, 1983 and 1988 editions).

Overall employment for

Jefferson County reached a peak in 1979 (304,068 jobs).
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After

taking a tumble, that employment peak was not surpassed until
eight years later--in 1987 total employment reached 304,082
(County Business Patterns for Kentucky, 1970 to 1990

editions) .
Some factory jobs such as those at the Brown and
Williamson cigarette plant were moved out of town because of
the city's bad labor climate even though the company's
headquarters remained behind (Norman and Hershberg, 1984).
Millions of dollars in local tax revenues were lost thereby
straining the ability of the city to fund many services.
In summary, Louisville and Jefferson County suffered
from several maladies.

A fragmented government structure made

economic development decisions cumbersome and difficult.

The

local area was divided along class, geographical, and racial
lines.

Because of a high reliance upon manufacturing

employment, the Louisville economy was hit hard by recessions
and plant relocations.
problem.

Outward migration was becoming a

The challenge for local leaders was coming up with

local economic development tools to fix the problem.

2. Louisvi11e's EZ:

The Po1itics of EZ Deve10pment

Events in Kentucky mirrored national economic trends. In
1979, John Y. Brown, Jr. was elected Kentucky's Governor on a
platform of making the state more hospitable to business.
Since his administration coincided with the trough of the
recession, there was a feeling of urgency in the state capitol
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to do something about the state's suffering economy.

Governor

Brown appointed a task force to look into enterprise zone
ideas.

Other states had already started their own zones as an

economic development tool for urban areas, although some of
the targeted areas were not actually urban (Bartik, 1991).
In 1982, the Kentucky General Assembly passed House Bill
505 (which later became KRS 154.45), a law allowing for the
creation of enterprise zones in Louisville as well as other
cities throughout the state.

Zones were to be created

geographically by using contiguous census tracts.

Under the

law, the average unemployment rate in a proposed zone had to
be at least 1.5 times greater than the national average for an
18-month ·period.

Also, seventy percent of the people in the

zone were to have incomes below 80 percent of the city's
median income, or the area must have lost 10 percent of its
population between 1970 and 1980 (Stewart, 1983).
House Bill 505 allowed tax breaks for businesses in a
zone that met specific criteria.

To be certified as a "new to

the zone" EZ business and in order to qualify for tax breaks,
a new EZ firm had to draw at least 25% of its work force from:
1) residents in the zone,
2)

individuals unemployed for 90 days or more,

3) individuals receiving public assistance for
90 days or more, or
4) a combination of the above.
Firms already in the zone and conducting business in the
EZ prior to its designation could be certified by making
capital investments of at least 20% on net fixed assets (land,
38

buildings, machinery, equipment or lease hold improvements),
or by increasing its total number of employees by at least 20%
with 25% of those employees coming from the targeted
workforce-people falling into one or all of the categories
listed above.

Firms already in the zone were to complete any

"new activity" within 18 months after the date of filing an
application for certification.

The law also stated that

subsidiaries or franchises of a new or existing business may
be certified if their new site was within the zone and they
maintained separate bookkeeping for business activity
conducted within the zone.
In return, certified businesses were to be exempt from
paying state taxes on profits from the sale of property in the
zone, and exempted from all state taxes on interest payments
on loans to qualified businesses in a zone, including mortgage
loans.

This latter provision was designed to encourage

lending and capital formation.

Also certified businesses

would not have to pay motor-vehicle usage taxes, and they
would not have to pay sales or use taxes on building materials
if they remodeled.

Sales and use taxes were also exempt on

new and used equipment bought by businesses in a zone, and the
businesses could carry forward a "net operating loss" against
its current income for as long as the zone existed.

In

Louisville, many city fees and permits would be discounted
while some local regulations were streamlined.

Louisville's

zone was scheduled to start in June 1983 and would terminate
in July 2003 (House Bill 505 and Stewart, 1983).
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Mayor Harvey Sloane and the Louisville Board of Aldermen
ultimately decided that the EZ would initially cover only 3.75
square miles west and south of Louisville's central business
district.

The EZ would consist of nine census tracts based on

1980 census tract boundaries and would comprise western
Louisville's Station Park industrial complex, over 100
industrial employers, and 12,396 residents in about eight
neighborhoods where about half of the available housing was
public housing.

The area was bounded by the Ohio River to the

north and by portions of 15th and 21st streets as well as 18th
Street/Dixie Highway on the west.

The southern boundary was

composed of the Algonquin Parkway area (up to Shively),
Colorado Avenue and over to a portion of L & N railroad tracks
leading down to Dakota Avenue in south central Louisville.
Its eastern boundaries varied but included Crittenden Drive,
Interstate 65, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Streets and Roy Wilkins
Boulevard (Figure 1, next page, shows approximately the
geographic area initially included in the Louisville EZ using
1990 census tract boundaries).2

This area lost more than

18.8% of its population between 1970 and 1980, and its
unemployment rate between June 1981 and December 1982 was
estimated at 24.5% (Stewart, 1983).

2 Between 1980 and 1990 census tract boundaries changed with
some of the 1980 tracts being combined with others because
many parts of Louisville and Jefferson County lost population
between 1980 and 1990.
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According to Bendick and Rasmussen (1986), in an early
appraisal of the original EZ, the Louisville EZ had spent or
was committed to spending more than $57 million in physical
rehabilitation, land clearance and upgrading, and
infrastructure development in the zone.

The city was also to

create a $30 million investment pool of long-term financing in
order to help businesses located within the zone (Bendick and
Rasmussen, 1986, pp. 115-116).
Clearly, under the definitions of the law, and according
to the original intentions of enterprise zone advocates,
this part of the City of Louisville would seem to have been a
good candidate for enterprise zone designation. It was clearly
an economically disadvantaged area in need of help. But
concentration on this area would only last until 1985.
Ironically, the praise that Bendick and Rasmussen gave to
Louisville's EZ was based on the compactness of its size and
its focus on a blighted area (Bendick and Rasmussen, 1986).
The initial focus, however, shifted radically as the
geographic area encompassed by the zone changed twice over the
next few years.
In February 1984, Louisville officials received
permission from the Kentucky Enterprise Zone Authority to
expand the zone

(Davidson, 1992).

The new EZ would take in

the previous 9 census tracts but also add enough new tracts so
that roughly 10 percent of the entire city's land would be in
the new EZ (Shafer, 1984).

The size of the EZ went from 3.75

square miles to 6.7 square miles as more of western Louisville
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and Standiford Field (now Louisville International Airport)
were included.

The only businesses that would absolutely not

be allowed to obtain EZ certification would be junkyards,
hazardous waste operations such as refineries, and
adult-entertainment establishments. The Kentucky General
Assembly approved the expansion, and preliminary plans for the
new zone were released in October 1984.
would be finalized in early 1985.

The full EZ expansion

Figure 2 on the next page

shows a fairly accurate map of the expanded and modified EZ.3
After County Judge-Executive Mitch McConnel became a U.
S. Senator in January 1985, Governor Martha Layne Collins
appointed County Clerk Bremer Ehrler to take McConnel's place
until the Fall 1985 election.

Ehrler was expected to be a

caretaker of the EZ until the next county-judge assumed
office.

He was not the caretaker everyone assumed, and

apparently had an EZ agenda of his own.
To the dismay of city leadership and at the urging of
state legislators whose districts did not participate in the
initial Louisville EZ, Ehrler proposed creating a separate
enterprise zone in southern and southwestern Jefferson County
(Shafer, 1985). Along with several local banks,
Ehrler also put together a $5.5 million package to buy and
develop land in eastern Jefferson County that would later

3 Figures 1 to 3 come very close to replicating EZ boundaries.
There may be some error in these maps due to the fact that EZ
boundaries were often drawn at a level below census tract
boundaries, such as block groups and actual blocks. Because of
the limitations of the mapping system utilized, 1990 census
tract boundaries had to be used without further detail being
possible.
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2

become Anchorage Industrial Park (Shafer, 1985).

Ehrler'

wanted enterprise zone designation for this area as well.
Both moves were considered a threat to the growth and survival
of Louisville's EZ, and much political infighting occurred
over attempts to create a County EZ.

If Jefferson County

created its own separate EZ, then having two EZs in the same
county would violate state law.

The City of Louisville would

lose its EZ and Jefferson County would not
be able to establish one on its own. 4
Around the same time

~n

1985, the City of Shively, after

suffering several years of fiscal hardship, tried to annex
portions of adjacent unincorporated areas of southwestern
Jefferson County.

The annexation attempt failed, but Shively

got both the city's and the county's attention.

In an attempt

to pacify Shively officials, a portion of the small suburban
city would be allowed to join Louisville's EZ.

Shively would

be helped by both the city and the county so as to prevent any
further annexation attempts (Shafer, 1985).
As an overall compromise, local officials decided to ask
the 1986 General Assembly to expand Louisville's EZ into two
of the three areas that Ehrler wanted to turn into a separate
enterprise zone.

A large share of southern and southwestern

Jefferson County, including a portion of the City of Shively,
would join Louisville's EZ (Shafer, 1986). These new areas

4 Recall that census tracts within an EZ must be contiguous
and meet certain criteria to be economically distressed and
blighted. The areas that Ehrler wanted to form into a county
EZ would not be contiguous with city tracts nor would they be
considered economically distressed or blighted (Shafer, 1985).
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would include an area south of Standiford Field stretching
down to the Gene Snyder Freeway, bordered by Old
Shepherdsville Road on the east and an area surrounding 1-65
on the west.

This area included Fern Valley Road and its

chief resident the Louisville Ford Assembly Plant, one of the
area's largest employers.

Also, to be included were the

Rubbertown industrial area in Lake Dreamland and the Riverport
Industrial Park located in Pleasure Ridge Park.

As a small

token of appreciation to the city, some of the eastern side of
Louisville's downtown as well as the Phoenix Hill and
Butchertown neighborhoods were included in the EZ (see Figure
3, next page, and Figure 4, following page, which shows the
full-size EZ's relative size to the rest of the county).
Some local political figures argued that Ehrler and
Shively officials blackmailed the city into giving them what
they wanted in the first place--another tool for economic
development.

While this interpretation may be incorrect, it

is only rational that Shively and county officials would want
to promote the interests of their constituents by helping
their jurisdictions to create a business friendly
environment.
Nevertheless, the city would get something substantial
in return.

In 1986, Mayor Jerry Abrahamson and the new

County-Judge Executive, former Mayor Harvey Sloane, agreed to
a City-County Compact that included revenue sharing
between the city and the county as well as greater cooperation
in running local government services and promoting local
46

Current Enterprise Zone

(1986)

D

Cen~u!;

Trocts

Highways

Miles

o

Figure 3
Source:

Kentucky State Data Center

47

2

4

The Louisville/Jefferson County · ;I ;,
Enterprise Zone
'/
/;'>/

'-26.t

''''''''
_Z"'"

Figure
Source:

4

Office for Economic Deve10pment (OED)
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economic development.

In return for sharing in its rapidly

growing occupational tax revenues, the county would now be
able to participate in the Louisville EZ.

The Compact, along

with the EZ expansion, were approved by the 1986 General
Assembly

with both scheduled to go into effect

July, 1986

(Shafer, 1986).
If compromises and new government relationships were
necessary to start bringing together a divided community, then
the expansion of the Louisville EZ could be justified upon
social and political grounds.

The city was no longer as

desperate as it once was for revenues.

Even though 33% of

occupational tax revenues come from city residents, the city
was now going to receive 55% of these revenues.

In return,

the county would get something to help it with economic
development.

However, in the process of expanding the zone,

local leaders abandoned general EZ theory and principles:
keeping the zone focused on economica11y distressed and
pbysica11y b1igbted areas.

The new zone was so large,

according to critics of the compromise, that the chronically
depressed areas that the enterprise zone was supposed to help
would probably get lost in the overall growth of the county's
economy.
The new EZ would consist of 45.7 square miles and over 60
census tracts mostly sprawling over portions of western,
southwestern and southern Jefferson County.

Many of the new

areas were not economically disadvantaged as defined in House
Bill 505.

However, if one took all the new census tracts
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added to the zone and lumped them together with all of the old
census tracts, then the average of all the census tracts met
the standards put forth in House Bill 505 (Davidson, 1992).
In order to observe the law's mandate that all the
census tracts had to be contiguous and adjoining, the
University of Louisville's main campus was included in the
zone, even though it is a non-profit institution and has no
permanent year-round residents consistent with the enabling
legislation (Davidson, 1992).

U of L had to serve as a

connection between the eastern and western sides of the EZ.
Just as with the University, Louisville's airport could
not legitimately be considered an economically distressed
area.

Yet because the airport was at one time surrounded by

low income neighborhoods, United Parcel Service and other
firms doing business near or at the airport, were able to
obtain enterprise zone certification (Davidson, 1992).

Most

importantly, in the rush to provide an economic development
program for Louisville and Jefferson County, no real
monitoring and evaluation system was set up for Louisville's
EZ program.
and benefits.

There was no real tracking of the program's costs
By 1990, the failure to evaluate the EZ program

had become a serious political issue in the local press.

3. The Zone Comes under Scrutiny

In 1990, the Louisville and Jefferson County Office for
Economic Development (OED) distributed a press release titled
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"The Louisville Enterprise Zone:
Success Story."

Louisville's $1 Billion

The report touted the accomplishments of

Louisville's EZ by stating that "over 9,000 jobs have been
created and over 24,000 jobs have been retained" and that
Louisville'S EZ "became the first Enterprise Zone in the
country to reach the $1 billion capital investment mark."
(Office for Economic Development, 1990, p.1).

Despite these

impressive numbers, the report did not disclose how they were
calculated or arrived at.
On December 1, 1991, the EZ received a scathing review
in an article published in Louisville's Courier-Journal
(Heath, 1991).

Reporter David Heath uncovered abuses in the

use of the EZ's motor vehicle usage tax exemption.

Some

business owners were purchasing luxury cars and registering
the cars under the business's name, but using the vehicles for
purely personal reasons, thereby escaping any personal
property tax liability for the automobiles.

Heath's

investigation concluded that many of OED's numbers on jobs
created and retained as well as dollar figures for investment
in the EZ were greatly inflated.

OED never subtracted from

their totals firms that went out of business or relocated
outside of the zone.
Heath's investigative reporting, also came up with other
disturbing revelations.

OED record keeping never disclosed

whether some jobs would have been created regardless of
presence of the EZ.

the

Some firms locating in the EZ after its

creation in 1983 were not even aware of EZ incentives until
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after being in the zone for a period of time.

Also, there was

no monitoring of how many disadvantaged workers were actually
being hired.

One of the goals of the EZ was to help these

workers gain employment, but OED could not verify the total
number of disadvantaged workers hired.

The state's Department

for Employment Services did not then, and does not now, check
or verify EZ company records.
Finally, in a survey of OED's listings of the top ten
companies that had created the most jobs and investment, Heath
found that OED records were greatly in error.

Of the top ten

companies credited with creating jobs, Heath found that OED
overreported the actual number of jobs created by 2,210.

Of

the top ten companies credited with creating capital
investment, he found that OED overreported by $132.7 million.
Heath simply called and spoke to company officials in
order to find the actual numbers.

One of Heath's most

interesting conversations was with Humana, Inc. officials.
OED credited Humana with creating 1,100 jobs at a new office
location on 101 East Main Street.

When asked if that number

was accurate, Humana stated that only around 100 new jobs had
be~n

created due to the new downtown offices.

The other 1000

new jobs were actually existing employees who were brought in
from other offices throughout Jefferson County.
when asked if

Additionally,

the company would have undertaken the

renovation of the building necessary to create the new office
building regardless of EZ tax incentives, a company spokesman
said "yes."

Even though the renovations would have been made
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in any event, over $600,000 in sales taxes were lost to the
state treasury.
Around the same time, hearings were being conducted in
Frankfort on the efficacy of enterprise zone programs
throughout the state (Legislative Research Commission (LRC)
Memorandum No. 460, 1991).

In 1990, the Kentucky General

Assembly's Cities Committee created the Subcommittee on
Enterprise Zones because of press reports throughout the state
that chronicled abuses of EZ incentives.

According to the

Subcommittee's report, after eight meetings over two years,
the Subcommittee "was unable to determine how effective the
enterprise zone program has been in creating new economic
activity, or how the program's tax exemptions have affected
state revenues.

The statutes that govern enterprise zones

(KRS 154.650 to 154.705) have had little review or amendment
since they were enacted" (LRC Memorandum No.

460, p. 2).

Because of these findings, the 1992 General Assembly
mandated stricter monitoring and reporting on enterprise zone
activities throughout the state beginning the in 1992-1993
Fiscal Year.

The State Enterprise Zone Authority (part of the

Cabinet for Economic Development) was required to submit
annual reports on the number of new jobs and investment
created within each zone.

The Kentucky Revenue Cabinet was

also to begin submitting annual reports on the fiscal impacts
of enterprise zone tax breaks and incentives.
There were also changes made in EZ incentives.

The

exemption of usage taxes on automobiles was limited to just
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the first $20,000 of value whereas the usage tax exemption for
trucks was allowed to stay at 100% of value.

Exemptions for

net operating losses were eliminated as well as exemptions on
income earned from loans to certified EZ companies.

The loss

of these incentives were substituted with one that put more
emphasis on hiring employees from a targeted workforce--those
receiving public assistance for at least 90 days before being
hired by a certified company.

For each worker hired from this

group, EZ companies could claim a tax credit of 10% of such a
worker's annual wages, up to a maximum of $1500 per worker.
Any unused tax credits could be carried forward for up to five
years.
Additionally in 1992, Kentucky's Enterprise Zone program
got an unpleasant surprise from the state's Attorney General
Office. Assistant Attorney General Ross T. Carter issued an
opinion that said Kentucky's zones were chosen arbitrarily in
violation of the Kentucky Constitution's ban against special
legislation favoring certain jurisdictions over others (Heath,
1992).

The opinion further claimed that the EZ law was

specia1 1egis1ation because the zones were not necessarily in

the most depressed areas of the state, but simply areas which
have applied for special tax benefits; the benefits are given
on a "first-come, first-served" basis which arbitrarily denies
some needy areas tax relief; and even if a zone becomes a
thriving area, businesses in a zone will continues to receive
tax breaks for 20 years.

Attorney General opinions do not

carry the force of law and thus far no one has challenged the
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constitutionality of Kentucky's EZ program.

In the meantime,

state legislators began to work on refining EZ legislation so
that its constitutionality would be difficult to challenge
(Heath, 1992).
increasingly

Some legal scholars, however, were
alarmed at how state and local economic

development policies were being used by local governments to
justify a public purpose (Rubin, 1993 and 1994).

In the past,

state and local government intervention into the private
sector had to be justified by a public purpose--either markets
did not provide certain goods (such as roads, bridges, etc.)
or markets had to be regulated (health and safety standards,
etc.).

During the 1980s, state and local tax breaks to

businesses were seen as necessary in order to promote economic
development since the federal government had decided to play a
smaller roll in community development.

Many tax incentives

and subsidies given to private enterprises were justified
legally under the public purpose doctrine.

In other words, in

many jurisdictions local economic development had attained the
same status as providing police and fire protection. In
Rubin's (1993 and 1994) opinion, this was not an appropriate
use of the public purpose doctrine.

Private businesses, it is

felt, should not be subsidized or favored in any way through
the spending or sacrificing of public tax revenues, such as
was done when a new General Motors plant was built in Poletown
within the Detroit metropolitan area (Wylie, 1989).
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4. Summary

Consistent with the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and
the issues raised in it, the Louisville EZ experience is very
similar to others in that the EZ was not carefully planned,
implemented or monitored either for job creation and
retention, as well as for capital formation and business
creation.

In reality, political compromises and

considerations seemed to drive the evolution of the EZ.

The

original goals of economic development and community
revitalization for a depressed urban area suddenly became just
one part of a program that tried to achieve many different
goals and objectives.

During the entire history of the

Louisville EZ, there has never been a comprehensive evaluation
of the program's effectiveness in terms of costs and benefits.
Nor has anyone really tried to establish the number of jobs
that would have been created had the EZ not been in existence.
Despite this, the State Enterprise Zone Authority announced on
August 13, 1996 that it was considering another expansion of
Louisville's EZ from 45.7 to 63 square miles.

The main reason

given for expanding the zone was that the new area to be
included now met the definition of a distressed area (Shafer,
1996) .
All of this is not surprising.

According to Rubin and

Wilder (1996):
One weakness in the base of knowledge about
state enterprise zones is the lack of attention
to the planning process as an element in program
implementation. The failure to include planning
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process requirements in state legislation that
authorizes enterprise zones may critically
influence program outcomes; yet this issue is
generally not addressed in major studies of the
effects of enterprise zones.
The omission of
planning elements from state enabling legislation
for enterprise zones and from subsequent program
evaluations should be of special interest to
planners (p. 474).
According to the authors, Louisville's EZ would be no
different from other EZs in that a plan to implement the goals
and objectives of KRS 154 was never created.

Without a

strategic plan for EZ implementation, it is not surprising
then that the program changed its focus over time.

Absent a

plan for implementation, it is also not surprising that there
never was any real monitoring of program outcomes (Rossi and
Freeman, Chapter 4, 1985).
Rubin and Wilder (1996) also note that EZs were created
during a time when strategic planning had not yet caught on in
the public sector at the state and local level (p. 485). Also
given the severity of the recession of the early 1980s as well
as the federal government's withdrawal from state and local
matters during the 1980s, it is conceivable that many EZs were
created in a rush to do something, or anything, to address
local economic and fiscal problems.

That is, EZs could have

been created in a vacuum that did not allow for strategic
planning or implementation.
In the next chapter, a detailed plan for evaluating the
accomplishments of the Louisville zone will be presented.
evaluation plan will utilize cost benefit and shift-share
analysis.

A quasi-experimental and time-series design will
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The

allow estimation of whether or not the various incentives
produced the results intended by the enabling legislation.
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CHAPTER IV

Methodo1ogies for Eva1uation

1. Introduction

Similar to prior studies, the research design used to
evaluate the Louisville EZ case uses a multi-method approach.
Consistent with Rossi and Freeman (1985, 3rd edition) and
Haveman and Margolis (1983, 3 rd edition), this dissertation
follows the basic principles of program evaluation and policy
analysis.

The main issue here is whether the EZ accomplished

any of its goals and objectives and how well it accomplished
them. The basis for generating the hypotheses to be tested
will come from the goals that were to be achieved by the EZ as
articulated in KRS 154.45.
KRS 154.45 begins as follows:
154.45.001. Purpose of Enterprise Zone Program.The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that
the purpose of the Enterprise Zone Program is to
revitalize economically depressed areas of the
state.
It is the intent of the General Assembly to
achieve this purpose by adhering to the following
goals:
(1) Improve the qua1ity of 1ife of individua1s
that reside within an enterprise zone by
providing emp10yment opportunities, job training,
and neighborhood ~provement programs;

(2) Encourage economic activity by assisting and
maintaining existing business within an
enterprise zone;

(3) Encourage economic activity by st~u1ating the
inf1ux of new business within an enterprise
zone; and
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(4) Eliminate blighted and deteriorated areas
within an enterprise zone that feature chronic
abandonment or demolition of residential or
commercial structures or property. (p. 412 of
Kentucky Revised Statues, emphasis added).
The rest of the legislation includes definitions of what
constitutes an EZ, what is a "targeted workforce," etc.
back to chapter 3, pages 37-38 and see Appendix).

(refer

The

enabling legislation also specifies what application processes
must be undertaken for a locality to become an EZ, as well as
identifies the types of incentives that can be offered to
firms

(see chapter 3, pages 37-39 and Appendix).

KRS 154.45

also defines what type of area is eligible for EZ designation:

"(1) Any area of a local government may be
designated an enterprise zone that:
a) Has a continuous boundary, and
b) Is an area of pervasive poverty, unemployment,
and economic distress.
(2) An area meets the requirements of subsection
(1) (b) of this section if:
a) The average rate of unemployment in the area for
the most recent eighteen (18) month period for
which data is available was at least one and
one-half (1.5) times the average national rate
of unemployment for that eighteen (18) month
period; and
b) At least seventy percent (70%) of the residents
living in the area have incomes below eighty
percent (80%) of the median income of the
residents of the local government requesting
designation of an enterprise zone; or
c) The population of all census tracts in the area
decreased by ten percent (10%) or more between
1970 and 1980 and the local government
requesting designation establishes in writing,
to the satisfaction of the authority, that
either:
1. Chronic abandonment or demolition of
commercial or residential structures exist
in the area, or
2. Substantial tax arrearages of commercial or
residential structures exist in the area."
(p. 416 of Kentucky Revised Statutes,
emphasis added).
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Additionally, the legislation created the Enterprise
Zone Authority of Kentucky, which was to oversee the
administration, implementation and evaluation of Kentucky's
enterprise zones.

However, the Authority was never given any

funding to do an adequate job of overseeing Kentucky's EZs
(interview with Sarah Bell, 1996).

The Kentucky Revenue

Cabinet is also mentioned in KRS 154.45 as being responsible
for collecting data on Kentucky's EZs.

However, the Revenue

Cabinet claimed that it was never given the money to
adequately collect data (LRC Memorandum No. 460, 1991).
Therefore, there was no real monitoring of the Louisville EZ's
performance until amendments were added to KRS 154".45 in 1992,
and additional funding was given to various state agencies
(interview with Sarah Bell, Deputy Secretary of Kentucky
Cabinet for Economic Development, 1996).
In order to evaluate the impact of the Louisville and
Jefferson County EZ program, program outcomes and impacts will
be assessed by answering the following questions.

The

questions are posed as general research hypotheses, and were
derived from the goals and objectives identified in KRS
154.45.

This method of deriving research hypotheses and

questions directly from the enabling legislation is consistent
with the fundamentals of policy evaluation and impact analysis
(Rossi and Freeman, 1985; and Haveman and Margolis, 1983).
1). Did the EZ increase employment at a greater level
than what would have been the case had no incentives or
regulatory relief been offered to businesses?
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2).

Did the EZ stop or s10w outward popu1ation

migration from the zone area?

3). Did the EZ increase emp10yment among disadvantaged
and 10ng-ter.m unemp10yed workers who 1ived in the EZ area?

4). Did the costs of the EZ program outweigh its
benefits?

If so, could money used for the EZ have been used

more effectively in other economic development programs?
5). Was the wea1th and income of residents within the EZ
increased over the years?

6). Did the EZ increase emp10yment and attract capita1
at a rate greater than those portions of Jefferson County or
Jefferson County as a whole that were not in the EZ?
7). Were the 90a1s and objectives of the state
legislation which allowed the creation of the EZ accomp1ished?
If they were not accomplished, then why not?
The language appearing in bold print stresses the
relationship among the research hypotheses and to the goals
and objectives identified in the enabling legislation (KRS
154.45) .

2. Methods to be Used

Several methods will be used to assess the effectiveness
of the EZ.

The primary research design used is a quasi-

experiment as discussed by Cook and Campbell in
Quasi-Experimentation (1979).

Quasi-experimentation will play

a key role in this study because it is essential to compare
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and contrast similar areas within Jefferson County.

Areas

that received the economic development stimulus of EZ
incentives will be compared to counterpart areas in Jefferson
County that did not receive the advantages of EZ incentives.
These counterpart or comparison or control areas were chosen
because of their similarity either to the entire EZ or its
sub-areas.

If the economic incentives accomplished their

mission, then one would expect to see changes occurring within
the EZ or its component areas that were not occurring in the
control areas over a given time period.
For example, if EZ incentives were successful, then one
would expect that unemployment and blight would decrease in
the EZ at rates higher than comparable areas not eligible for
incentives.

Also according to the logic of the legislation,

one should see substantial job and business growth as well as
new construction in the EZ over time, but not in the control
or comparison communities.

Such incentives would be expected

to reverse the decline previously experienced in an EZ
designated area.

Perhaps the EZ area could even be expected

to overtake those portions of the county not included in the
EZ as far as growth rates of job and business creation as well
as growth rates of residential and commercial investment.
Finally, one would expect to see a stop to the outward
migration from an EZ designated area over time.
On the other hand, if incentives did not work, one would
expect to see continued economic decline and outward migration
from EZ neighborhoods at a rate greater than or equal to that
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experienced by control or comparison areas.

Similarly, one

would expect to see job and business growth within the EZ to
continue to at least remain flat if not continue to decline
when compared to other areas of the county which did not
receive EZ incentives.
In order to implement the quasi-experiment, it is
necessary to have a pre-test and a series of post-tests, and
control communities that are identical in all respects save
for the presence of the EZ incentives.

In this study,

numerous outcome measures spanning the years 1980 to 1996 will
be used to evaluate the EZ program.

The next few pages give

an outline of the outcome measures, data sources and
analytical methods to be used in the EZ program evaluation.

Job Creation Ana1ysis
As mentioned earlier, a shift-share analysis of job
creation within the EZ was conducted.

Job growth in the EZ

was analyzed by controlling for national economic and specific
industrial shifts that would influence changes in sectoral
employment within the EZ.

An important consideration in this

analysis was to try to estimate the job growth that would have
occurred. in the EZ over the last 13 years regardless of local
incentives, but instead due to national and specific industry
trends that were occurring throughout the area.
Sectoral job growth in the EZ was compared to job growth
in Jefferson County over two equivalent time periods--1980
through 1990 and 1981 through 1994.
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The approach taken was

similar to that

used in Rubin and Wilder (1989) and Dowall

(1996). Also, the rate of growth for the two control areas to
be analyzed (the Newburg Area as well as the Bluegrass
Industrial Park-Jeffersontown Area) was compared to the job
growth of Jefferson County over the same two time periods.
Job creation was analyzed by comparing job creation
within the EZ to the number of jobs created throughout the
county and control group communities over the periods of 1980
to 1990 and 1981 to 1994.

Job creation was measured by

examining Louisville and Jefferson County Office for Economic
Development (OED) records, surveys done by the Urban Studies
Institute (USI), County Business Patterns data at the zip code
level from 1981 to 1994, and from the manipulation of census
tract data from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses of Housing and
Population by University of Louisville researchers

Price, 1994).

(Coomes and

The last two data sources were used in a shift-

share analysis of EZ job creation following Dowall (1996), and
are considered to be the most accurate sources available for
estimating net changes in job numbers and industrial
composition over a given period of time.

Neighborhood revitalization

Demographic, employment and occupational changes in the
EZ were analyzed and compared to changes in the rest of
Jefferson County by looking at data from the 1980 and 1990
Bureau of the Censuses Housing and Population Survey.

Data at

the tract level were aggregated for the EZ and were compared
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to data at the tract level aggregated for two control group
communities within Jefferson County, the rest of Jefferson
County outside of the EZ, and Jefferson County as a whole.
The purpose of such a comparison was to see if EZ incentives
and the geographic enlargement of the EZ had any effect on the
neighborhoods and residents of the EZ during the first 7 years
of the program.

Changes in demographic patterns in the area

of Jefferson County outside of the EZ served as a
non-equivalent control communities to see if EZ program
interventions had any impact on slowing the decline of
neighborhoods within the EZ.

The 1980 and 1990 dates served

as the pre-test and post-test dates, and were used for timeseries estimates of possible changes.
The two most important control group areas within
Jefferson County that were used was the Newburg Area in
southeastern Jefferson County and the Jeffersontown-Bluegrass
Industrial Park Area in eastern Jefferson County. The Newburg
Area was selected because its socioeconomic conditions closely
parallel those of EZ neighborhoods, yet this area received
none of the same incentives that the EZ received in order to
help the area develop economically.

The Jeffersontown-

Bluegrass Industrial Park area was selected because it too
received none of the incentives that the EZ received and
because it was felt that the development and expansion of
Louisville's airport within the EZ was similar to creating an
industrial park within the EZ.

The Jeffersontown-Bluegrass

Industrial Park area grew from a mostly rural, underdeveloped
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portion of Jefferson County to an affluent and job-generating
edge-city within the county.
Neighborhood revitalization can be best examined by
looking at the results of 1980 and 1990 Census data (1980 and
1990 Censuses of Housing and Population).

By aggregating data

from tracts within the EZ, changes in the data from 1980 and
1990 were compared to demographic and socioeconomic changes
that occurred in the control group communities, the rest of
Jefferson County as well as Jefferson County in general.

This

comparison served as a pre- and post-test evaluation with the
aggregation of data at the census tract level for the EZ
compared to aggregate data at the census tract level for the
control communities, the rest of Jefferson County and then
compared to Jefferson County as a whole.

Usefulness of EZ incentives to Firms within EZ

A critical component of many program evaluations is to
ask program participants if the interventions used in the
program actually made a difference in participants' behavior
or decisions.

In order to ascertain program usefulness, a

survey was administered to 851 firms located within the EZ in
July and August of 1996.

Among the items included in the

survey were questions that asked respondents if they had used
any EZ incentives, and if so, to what degree did the
incentives make a difference in making hiring and capital
investment decisions.

The results of the survey conducted by

USI during 1996 will indicate how EZ firms evaluated tax
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incentives and their importance.

The survey data are used

extensively in the cost-benefit analysis of EZ incentives.

Changes in Residential Property Values

One way to measure any increase in community well-being
within the EZ is to measure any
residential property.

increase~

in the value of

If property values within the EZ did

not appreciate at the same rate as property outside of the EZ,
or worse, if property values declined, then this would be
taken as a sign that the EZ incentives did not help with
neighborhood revitalization or development.

Changes in

residential wealth within the EZ were compared to the control
communities, the area of Jefferson County outside of the EZ,
and Jefferson County in general.

The sources of data utilized

for this comparison were the Jefferson County Property
Valuation Administrator's (PVA) Office and the 1980 and 1990
Censuses of Housing and Population.

As a way to gauge whether there has been an increase in
the wealth of residents in the EZ, records from the Property
Valuation Administrator's office were examined to see if
property values within the EZ significantly increased when
compared to the two control areas, and to all of Jefferson
County over the same time period.

If there is shown to be no

significant difference, then the argument that EZ status
helped EZ neighborhoods will be weakened.
Another way to test for possible increases in community
wealth or community revitalization within the EZ is to look at
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the rates of residential and non-residential construction

and

home mortgage lending within the EZ compared to the control
areas and to Jefferson County.

Data from the St. Louis

Federal Reserve's report for the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA data) were used to see if the rate of home lending in
the EZ area differed substantially from the control
communities and the county.s

Again, any significant

differences in home lending or new construction undertaken
within the EZ compared to other areas over the same time
period was used as a possible measure of EZ program success or
failure in revitalizing EZ neighborhoods.

This is important

to assess because one of the primary purposes of the original
EZ legislation was to help impoverished, blighted urban areas.

Residentia1 Investment within the EZ
This part of the EZ evaluation attempted to determine
whether EZ incentives played any role (whether directly or
indirectly) in creating any new residential construction and
development within the EZ when compared to the control
communities, the rest of

Jefferson County outside of the EZ,

and Jefferson County in general.

If the EZ incentives had any

role in community revitalization, one would expect that
mortgage lending activity would have shown an increase greater
than that of the control areas, the rest of Jefferson County
and Jefferson County in general during the time periods
considered.
5

The HMDA data bank will be explained in greater detail in
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The HMDA data bank should show if there was a
significant difference between the EZ and the other
communities when it comes to home mortgage lending from 1981
to 1994.

Increases or decreases in home mortgage lending

would also be an indirect indication of construction and
reinvestment activity as well.

EZ Costs and Benefits: Job Creation and Capita~ Investment
and Creating Jobs for Disadvantaged Workers
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the costs and the
benefits of the EZ program were estimated and calculated.

Tax

losses over the last 13 years due to EZ incentives were
estimated and weighed against all possible EZ benefits derived
(tax withholdings from workers employed due to EZ incentives;
investment undertaken as a result of EZ incentives, etc.).
The cost-effectiveness analysis of the EZ program is a
critical component of the dissertation, for even if the EZ
program did cause an increase in investment and job creation
beyond what would have been the case in the absence of EZ
incentives, and if program costs outweigh program benefits,
then one must question the financial success of the program
and whether tax dollars could have been put to better use in
an alternative economic development initiative.
Obviously, program efficacy has to be gauged according
to how cost-effective the program is.

If program costs and

costs per job created outweigh program benefits and benefits
per job created, then the efficacy of the program must be
Chapter 5.
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doubted.
Using records from OED, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet
(KRC) , the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission (LRC) , and
the USI survey, estimates of EZ costs and benefits from 1983
to 1996 were calculated to see if program costs were offset or
outweighed by program benefits.

The costs per job created

were weighed against the estimated payroll tax revenues
generated per job.

In doing these calculations, it was

important to control for jobs that would have been created
regardless of EZ incentives.

The shift-share analysis and

survey results mentioned earlier was used to control for this
possibility.
The benefits of more capital investment within the EZ
were not easily quantified.

Often new plant and equipment can

lead to the creation of more jobs, or new plant and equipment
can lead to labor-saving techniques that can actually
eliminate existing jobs.

Only a cost per dollar of investment

figure can be arrived at using the data available.

If we

assume that all new investment is beneficial (i.e., it
generates jobs), then a low cost per dollar of capital
investment could be taken as a sign of EZ incentives
accomplishing their goals.

This cost per dollar of

investment, however, must be tempered by what businesses would
have done had EZ incentives not been in place.

To make

adjustments for that, one must look at survey results.

Also,

rates of capital investment in the EZ were compared to the
control communities and to Jefferson County.
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The benefits of

attracting more capital cannot be estimated as easily as that
for labor.

With labor, one can estimate a certain amount of

payroll tax revenue that the state will receive.

With capital

investment, one can only assume that firms undertake
investment because of either increased profitability or the
possibility of increased profitability due to future
expectations.

Other Methods and/or Sources of Data and/or Information

It should be pointed out that many sources of
information interspersed within the methods to be used for
program evaluation came from interviews with various
government officials, a newspaper reporter, and corporate
public relations directors.
throughout the dissertation.

These interviews will be cited
Records, annual reports and

press releases from the Louisville and Jefferson County Office
for Economic Development (OED) were used as a source of data
and information.

Finally, information and data from news

articles in Louisville's The Courier-Journal were used
extensively.

3. Summary

The following chapters will evaluate the efficacy of the
Louisville-Jefferson County EZ by using the methods and data
sources discussed above.

The next chapter examines how well

the EZ program promoted neighborhood revitalization.
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Following that, the next two chapters will assess, through the
shift-share method, how well the EZ did in creating jobs.
Following the shift-share analysis, the costs and benefits of
the EZ program are analyzed.
Finally, in the cost-benefit analysis chapter, data from
the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet will be used to determine how
many people previously on "public assistance" found jobs due
to the EZ program, and how much were the costs per job.

A key

question here is not so much one of method but whether this
component of the program was ever an important one.
Preliminary results seem to indicate that this incentive was
the least used among the others.
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CHAPTER V
Louisville EZ Performance Evaluation:
Neighborhood Revitalization
1. Overview

KRS 154.45 declared the purpose of EZs was to
"revitalize economically depressed areas of the state" (p.
412).

To accomplish this, the law set forth the goal of

improving

~'the

quality of life of individuals that reside

within an enterprise zone by providing employment
opportunities, job training, and neighborhood improvement
programs" and by eliminating "blighted and deteriorated areas
within an enterprise zone that feature chronic abandonment or
demolition of residential or commercial structures or
property" (p. 412, emphasis added).

As the literature review in a previous chapter noted,
and as the above quote indicates, neighborhood revitalization
has been a central and important goal of almost all EZ
programs.

This chapter of the study looks at how well the

Louisville EZ accomplished neighborhood revitalization and
improvement by looking at Census Bureau data, residential
investment data and changes in property values within the EZ
compared to another part of Jefferson County, Jefferson County
outside of the EZ, and Jefferson County as a whole.
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2. Eva1uating Neighborhood Revita1ization
using Census Data

Neighborhood revitalization and quality of life are
terms that can be interpreted broadly.

Using data from the

1980 and 1990 Censuses of Housing and Population, Tables 5-1
through 5-6 show how the original EZ (3.75 square miles), the
first addition to the original EZ (which made it 6.75 square
miles), the third addition to the EZ (which made it 45.7
square miles) and the total EZ

(referred to as the current EZ

in this dissertation) compare to three comparison or control
areas:

(1) the Newburg area or Newburg, the control

community;

(2) Jefferson County outside of the EZ; and (3)

Jefferson County as a whole.

6

This was done to make the

analysis as close to a quasi-experiment as possible using pretest (1980 Census data) and post-test (1990 Census data) times
series data (Cook and Campbell, 1979).
The Newburg area was selected as a control community and
is compared to all versions of the EZ because it is one of the
poorest areas of Jefferson County, because of its
socioeconomic similarity to the EZ areas, and because Newburg
received none of the economic development assistance that the
EZ communities received.

It would not be fair or accurate to

directly compare any portion of the EZ to the rest of
Jefferson County or to the county as a whole because of the

6 Data for each area were aggregated from census tracts that
existed within each area by Dr. Ken Singleton of the
University of Louisville's Urban Studies Institute.
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large differences among the three areas with respect to key
socioeconomic variables.

However, utilizing both the portion

of Jefferson County outside of the EZ and Jefferson County as
a whole as comparison communities is necessary.

This is

because of the need to find out whether any changes in EZ
areas simply mirrored changes in the county.

That is to say,

by comparing the EZ to these two larger areas, one could
ascertain as to whether any changes in the EZ could be
ascribed to EZ economic development incentives or simply to
trends that were occurring throughout the rest of Jefferson
County, if not Jefferson County in its entirety.

Finally, it

must be pointed out that the data come from Census
questionnaires administered or completed by place of
residence. 7

In looking at Table 1 on the next page, one notices that
between 1980 and 1990, the original EZ and the separate census
tracts added during the first and second expansions of the EZ
(columns 2 and 3) as well as the total/current EZ suffered a
decline in the number of census respondents reporting an
occupation (see bottom line, "N").

The comparison

communities--the Newburg area, the county outside of the EZ,
and the county overall--reported increases in the number of
respondents reporting an occupation.

For specific

occupational categories, the EZ communities had the most
significant declines (5% or more) in certain occupations than

The data in Tables 1 through 6 differ from the Census data
in the next chapter in that the Census numbers were derived by
place of work.
7
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Tabla 1
Occupations
ENTERPRISE ZONE COMMUNITIES

COMPARISON COMMUNITIES

OUTCOME
MEASURES
ORIGINAL ENTERPRISE ZONE

ENTERPRISE ZONE

ENTERPRISE ZONE

EXPl\IISION, 1985

EXPl\IISION, 1986

1980 / 1990 /

1980 /1990 / '

,

1980 / 1990 /

TOrN. ENTERPRISE ZONES

,

1980

I 1990 I

COMPARISON COMMUNITY

,

1980

I 1990 I

,

JEFFERSON COUNTY

JEFFERSON COUNTY TOTAL

loutside
enterprise zone)
1980

I

1990

I'

1980

I

1990

I'

Executive/Admin

3.6

2.8

-0.8

6.1

3.2

-2.9

4.4

5.4

+1.0

4.4

5.1

+0.7

8.5

7.3

-1.2

11.3

12.8

+1.5

10.4

12.0

+1. 5

Professional

5.1

7.0

+1.9

3.6

5.2

+1.6

6.4

6.6

+0.2

6.1

6.6

+0.5

8.4

7.1

-1. 3

13.3

14.7

+1.4

12.3

13.8

+1.5

Technical

1.4

1.8

+0.4

1.9

3.2

+1.3

1.9

3.0

+1.1

1.9

3.0

+1.1

2.7

3.7

+1.0

2.9

3.8

0.9

2.7

3.7

+1.0

Sales

5.2

9.4

+4.2

5.2

7.4

+2.2

6.5

8.8

+2.3

6.3

8.9

+2.6

10.0

9.7

-0.3

11. 4

13.5

+2.1

16.7

13.0

2.3

Admin/Clerical

17 .8

-12.3

-5.5

12.4

15.9

+3.5

15.1

15.1

0.0

15.2

15.2

0.0

19.8

18.9

-0.9

18.4

17.5

-0.9

18.0

17 .2

-0.8

Private Service

2.1

2.6

+0.5

1.1

0.0

-1.1

1.9

0.7

-1.2

1.9

0.9

-1.0

0.8

1.0

+0.2

0.4

0.3

-0.1

0.6

0.4

-0.2

Protective
Service

1.3

2.4

+1.1

0.4

1.6

+1.2

1.7

1.7

0.0

1.6

1.8

+0.2

1.1

1.5

+0.4

1.5

1.5

0.0

1.5

1.6

+0.1

Other Service

25.0

27.3

+2.3

20.3

14.1

-6.2

19.1

19.7

+0.6

19.6

20.1

+0.5

12.7

18.5

+5.8

10.4

10.2

-0.2

11.6

11.3

-0.3

+0.2

0.6

0.8

+0.2

0.4

0.6

+0.2

0.6

0.8

+0.2

0.6

0.8

+0.2

Farming/Forestry

0.8

0.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.8

Craftsmen

8.0

8.6

+0.6

13.2

17.0

+3.8

10.9

11. 6

+0.7

10.7

11.5

0.8

10.0

10.0

0.0

11.5

10.6

-0.9

11.4

10.7

-0.7

Machine-Operators

14.0

11.1

-3.1

23.1

16.4

-6.7

17 .0

12.0

-5.0

17 .0

12.0

-5.0

15.0

10.7

-4.3

10.2

6.5

-3.7

11.1

7.0

-4.1

Transportation

6.9

4.5

-2.4

5.1

8.6

+3.5

6.6

6.5

-0.1

6.6

6.4

-0.7

5.2

5.2

0.0

4.2

3.7

-0.5

4.5

4.0

-0.5

Laborers

8.8

9.2

+0.4

7.7

7.3

-0.4

7.8

8.0

+0.2

7.9

8.0

+0.1

5.1

4.9

-0.2

4.0

4.0

0.0

4.5

4.4

-0.1

3425

2596

-24.2

1603

941

N
"NOTE:

'i.

-41. 3 34227

31610

-7.6 39255

35147

-10.5 12284

raw change whare there i . change in percent.; , - '(90) - '(80)
, i . percentage change ~or valu•• that ara not percent.:
, _ (valu. 90 - Value 80) x 100
Value 80

12358

+0.6 260113 280970 +8.0 299363
-

316117 +5.6
-----

rr-

did non-EZ areas (e.g., administrative and clerical, machine
operators, and other services). On the other hand, when
compared to the Newburg area, EZ communities did see modest
increases in the percentage of its labor force working in
professional, technical, sales and craftsmen occupations.

Had

EZ incentives been fully effective, however, one would expect
to see an increase in all occupational categories as well as
an expansion in the total labor force in EZ communities when
compared to the Newburg area.

By 1990, the EZ incentives

would have been in effect for at least six and one-half years.
The mediocre performance of the EZ when compared to the
Newburg area indicates a short-run failure of the EZ to
accomplish the goals of KRS 154.45.
Table 2 shows horne ownership profiles and housing stock
statistics for the EZ areas and the four control areas. The
numbers do not reflect favorably upon the EZ when compared to
the three control and comparison areas.

In regard to total

occupied housing, owner occupied housing, and renter
occupied housing, the EZ communities show percentage decreases
in all these areas.

There were also declines in both white

and black occupied households as well as a decline in overall
housing stock for all EZ communities.

These numbers seem to

support the fact that western, southern and southwestern
Jefferson County lost population during the 1980s (Coomes and
Price, 1994).
Jefferson County outside of the EZ as well as Jefferson
County overall show the reverse of EZ trends during the 1980s.
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Table 2

Housing Ownership Profiles
------

---

ENTERPRISE ZONE COMMUNITIES

COMPARISON COMMUNITIES

OUTCOME
MEASURES
ORIGINAL ENTERPRISE ZONE

198011990

J ,

ENTERPRISE lONE
EXPANSION, 1985

1980 11990 1

Housing Stock

5586

4133

-18.3 1611

Tot.1 Occupied
Housing

5043

4113

-17 .8

owner Occupied

-28.1 1041

1586

,

ENTERPRISE ZONE
EXPNfSION,

TOTAL ENTERPRISE ZONES

1986

1980 11990 1

,

1980 1 1990 1

,

CCf1PARISON CCMruNlTY

1980 1 1990 1

,

JEFfERSON COUNTY

(ouutde
ent •• pct •• Ion_I

1980 11990

I ,

JEfFERSON COUNTY TOTAL

1980 11990

-36.1 39303

36151

-6.5 46560 42548

-8.6 10940

11519

+5.8 219222 240030

+9.5 265182 282518

+6.3

893

-43.1 35618

32133

-9.5 42241

31269

-11. 3 9930

10162

+8.4 205322 226869

+8.9 250569 264118

+5.4

-10.2 21413

18538

-13.1

-0.4 143996 151852

+5.4 165469 110390

+2.9

1526

1088

482

-54.0 18900 16968

4940

4918

n/.

59.1

n/.

90.0

n/.

55.6

n/.

38.2

n/.

65.3

n/.

92.9

n/.

89.0

, Bl.ck

n/.

40.1

n/.

9.1

n/.

44.4

n/.

60.3

n/a

34.5

n/.

6.4

n/a

10.4

3517

3055

64326

75017

85100

93748

n/a

12.8

n/.

81.7

n/.

73.0

n/.

17.2

n/.

25.8

, White

-13.1

539

411

n/.

93.7

-23.7 16118

15265

n/.

41.7
56.5

, Bl.ck

n/.

86.9

n/.

5.1

n/.

White Occupied

1517

1033

-31. 9 1451

819

-43.6 18419 15198

, Owners

n/.

62.2

n/.

53.0

n/.

, Renters

n/.

31 .8

n/.

47.0

3515

3099

Bl.ck Occupied
,

Owners

, Renters

, Bl.ck Occupied
Housing
, h
,

127

65

n/a

-48.8 17004

-8.1 20114
n/.
n/.

-14.2 21381

59.7

n/.

40.3
16091

n/.

-5.3 20646

18731

-9.8

38.2
60.3
17650

-17.5

59.5
40.5
19255

-6.7

4990

5844

n/.

53.5

n/.

45.3

6111

6339

n/.

50.7

n/.

49.3

3106

4344

+17 .1

190582 202435
n/.

+39.2

30.3

43.1

n/.

42.3

n/.

57.7

14.7

15.9

14.4

n/.

67.7

n/.

46.4

n/.

41.3

39.0

85.6

n/.

32.3

n/a

53.6

n/.

58.7

n/.

61. 0

n/.

56.9

69.7

14 .8

8.0

7.3

47.7

49.9

48.9

51.1

31.3

40.4

7.8

10.0

-0.7

+2.2

raw cha.nqe wher. tMra 1_ chanp 1Jl pez:cenu; , - \e9O) - "aO)
Value 90 - Value 10)
,(

i . percentage chan9- for valu•• that are not percent.:

Value 80

• 100

+2.8

+9.1

+39.7

+2.2

()')

r-+10.2

+3.8

68.9

22698

n/.

~

n/.

n/a

n/.

+5.1

+6.2 211969 220085

16250
n/.

-

+16.6

69.7

n/.

-

*lIOft:

-11.8

,

1058

, White

Renter Occupied

I

n/.

31.1

36896

41953

+13.7

+1.2

The Newburg area, despite being considered a depressed area,
showed an increase in total occupied housing, renter occupied
housing, black occupied housing, and an increase in the
overall housing stock.

The amount of owner-occupied housing

in this area remained virtually the same between 1980 and
1990, although the area did see less white occupied housing
than it did in 1980.

Therefore, the EZ failed to see

improvements in home ownership and neighborhood revitalization
despite program incentives, whereas the Newburg area, which
did not receive the EZ economic development stimulus, faired
much better.
Table 3 shows that housing conditions in all EZ
communities were, in general, either inferior to those of the
Newburg area and comparison communities or basically the same.
The percentage of housing units vacant is somewhat higher in
the EZ areas than in the others, and the EZ areas have older
housing stock than their control and comparison counterparts.
Most of the EZ housing stock was built before 1940 whereas
most of the control and comparison communities housing stock
was built from 1960-69.

Reflecting the older (and perhaps

less desirable) housing stock in the EZ areas, average housing
values are lower in EZ areas than in the comparison
communities.

Also, for the current EZ or total Enterprise

Zone, housing values appreciated 51.1% between 1980 and 1990
whereas Newburg was not far behind at 43.9%.

The rest of

Jefferson County and the county as a whole experienced greater
home value appreciation (62.7% and 64%, respectively) during
80

Table 3

Housing Conditions
ENrEllPkISE ZONE COHINITIES

cctlPARISON C<HtONITIES

OUTCCME

MEASURES
CllUGlNAL Dl!'llU'RUI 10lIl

I ,

IIfI"Uf1UII &mra DMlfSI<*,

1985

IDI'l'DrIUII 1<*1 IXPMSIOl,

,

,

I

I ,

I

(outside
enterprhe zone)

~ COWT't

CXMPMIION cotMIIIITY

I ,

I

I ,

.n:f'RIlSCM

I

aMn"Y TOTAl.

1980

I 1990 I

12.5

+4.3

5.1

15.6

+10.5

9.4

12.3

+2.9

9.2

12.4

+3.2

9.2

1.1

-2.1

5.0

5.5

+0.5

5.1

6.5

+0.8

, Rentals

69.1

13. '7

H.O

34.0

46.0

+12.0

46.9

45.3

-1.6

49.2

50.3

+1.1

50.3

54.3

+4.0

30.9

38.1

+2.2

34.0

35.5

+l.!t

, Public Water

99.9

99.5

-0.4

100.0

100.0

0.0

99.1

99.5

+0 .•

99.3

99.5

+0.1

100.0

99.9

-0.1

99.1

9B.3

+0.6

98.0

98.5

to.S

, Without Heat

4.2

0.9

-3.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.1

1.2

-0.5

2 0

1.1

-0.'

0.0

0.2

+0.2

1.1

0.2

+0.9

1.3

0.3

-1.0

11990

1980

1990

I

TOTAL PfTPPItU& IC»IU

9.1

1980
, Vacant

I

1986

1980

1990

1980

1990

1980

1990

1980

1990

I '

, IncOIIIplete Kitchens

2.2

2.3

+0.1

0.4

0.0

-0.4

2.2

2.1

-0.1

2.2

2.1

-0.1

1.0

O.B

-0.2

1.1

0.5

-0.6

1.3

0.1

-0.6

, No Telephone

11.6

23.5

5.'

6.9

12.3

+5 .•

12.8

ll.O

+0.2

ll.1

14.2

+1.1

1.4

1.2

-0.2

3 .•

3.4

-0.5

5.5

4.9

-0.6

1.2

1.0

-0.2

1.2

1.0

-0.2

2.2

1.1

-1.1

1.1

1.1

-0.6

0.5

0.1

+0.2

0.1

0.3

-0.4

0.'

0.4

-0.5

, Incomplete PIWllblng
,

No Bedroom.

, One BedrOOl1l. or Less

, Public Sewer
Period Most Housing

2.0

2.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.2

2.3

+1.1

1.3

2.2

+0.9

0.6

1.5

+0.9

1.0

1.2

+0.2

1.1

1.4

+0.3

36.1

34.5

-1.6

20.2

11.3

-2.9

26.5

23.3

-3.2

27 . ..

24.4

-3.0

22.5

21.7

+0.8

15.3

14.4

-0.9

11.4

15.9

-1.5

98.5

99.1

).2

91.1

98.1

+1.0

89.6

89.9

+0.3

90.9

91.3

+0."

98.2

98.5

+0. )

B2.5

85.0

+2.5

B3.9
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+2.0
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AV9. Gron Rent
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*RO'D:

,1e .... obaave
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+50.1
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+43.9
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S3U
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Sl84
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1(

100
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this same period.

Therefore, appreciation in housing values

was pretty much a common trend throughout most of the county
during the 1980s with the EZ neighborhoods being no exception.
With this in mind, the ability of EZ incentives to raise
residential wealth and to revive neighborhoods is very
doubtful.
One unusual number appearing in the table is the
increase of 93.5% in the value of houses in the census tracts
taken in during the first EZ expansion.

Perhaps one

explanation for this unusual climb in value is due to the
condemnation and removal of several lower middle class and
lower income neighborhoods during the late 1980s and early
1990s in order to expand Standiford Field, now known as
Louisville International Airport. a

If mostly higher priced

homes were left remaining in these tracts, then that would
explain such a large jump in average house value between 1980
and 1990.

Recall that the first line of Table 2 showed a

36.7% decline in the housing stock of this area and that the
second line of Table 2 showed a 42.7% decline in occupied
housing for these tracts between 1980 and 1990. This
aberration could skew the results for the full-size EZ by
helping to overstate the rate of home appreciation for the
full-size EZ. Appreciation for the full-size EZ may have
actually been less than 51.1%.
Note that all four columns under Enterprise Zone
a According to Professor John P. Nelson of the Urban Studies
Institute, the demolition of Louisville's Highland Park
neighborhood began in early 1989 and was nearly finished by
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Communities in Table 3 show increases in the percentage of

households without telephones whereas the comparison
communities show decreases in this same indicator of
substandard living conditions.

If owning a telephone is

considered a basic component of "quality of life" then the EZ
experiment did not seem to accomplish the goal of increasing
the quality of life for EZ residents during most of the 1980s.
Table 4 is perhaps the most telling table of this
chapter in regard to EZ incentives and EZ performance during
the 1980s.

Note that while comparison communities lost

population during this time period, the loss of population
within the EZ communities was even greater.
In looking at the category of education one can see one
of the possible reasons why the EZ area was at a comparative
disadvantage relative to the control/comparison communities.
Between 1980 and 1990, the percentage of high school and
college educated people living within the EZ communities went
up.

Yet, the percentage of those with at least a high school

diploma or college degree was still well below that of the
control or comparison communities.

For example, during the

1980s, the full-size EZ saw an increase in the percentage of
its population of high school graduates from 44.5% to 54.7%
and saw an increase in the percentage of its population of
college graduates from 3.6% to 4.9%.

However, each control

area had an even higher level of its population classified as
high school or college

the time of the 1990 Census.
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Table 4

Demographics and Education
COMPARISON COMMUNITIES

ENTERPRISE ZONE COMMUNITIES
OUTCOME
MEASURES
ORIGINAL ENTERPRISE ZONE

1980 I 1990 I

\

1980 I 1990 I

ENTERPRISE ZONE
EXPANSION, 1985

,

ENTERPRISE ZONE
EXPANSION, 1986

1980 I 1990 I

TOTAL ENTERPRI SE WlfES

,

1980 I 1990 I

\

CatPMISON CCHIUNITY

1980 I 1990 I

,

JEFFERSON COUNT'!

IOl,ltUdII

•• t.lprhe ,one'

1980 I 1990 I

Population

13241

10811

-11.9

3990

2303

-42.3 101265 86844

-42.3 118502 100024

-15.6 26119

26439

-1.0 566502 564913

White

3189

2166

-21.0

3113

2102

-44.2 50652

41110

-11.1 58154

46458

-20.0 16111

13585

-15.1 511522 491853

Black

9398

8019

-14.0

246

183

-25.6 49943

43884

-12.1 59581

52146

-12.5 10350

12581

+21.6 50340

, Black

10.9

14.3

+3.4

6.1

1.9

+1. 6

49.3

50.5

+1.2

50.2

36.1

36.7

+0.6

22.5

23.5

+1.0

29.3

27.3

-2.0

52.1

+1. 9

38.7

47.6

+7.9

8.9

29.9

28.3

-1. 6

27.6

25.8

-1.8

61134

,

JEffERSON COUNTY TOTAL

1980 I 1990 I

,

-0.3 685004 664931

-2.9

-2.1 569616 544401

-4.4

+21. 4 109921 113280

+3.1

10.8

+1. 9

16.0

17.0

+1.0

25.0

22.2

-2.8

25.9

23.1

-2.8

Age
Distribution
0-16
11-24

14.7

12.0

-2.1

13.6

10.9

-2.1

16.4

13.1

-3.3

16.1

12.9

-3.2

18.5

14.1

-4.4

14.5

10.5

-4.0

14.7

10.8

-3.9

25-34

12.8

14 .6

+1.8

12.1

19.9

+1.8

14.3

11.0

+2.1

14.0

16.3

+2.8

lB.7

lB.6

-0.1

11.5

17.1

+0.2

16.9

17 .5

+0.6

35-54

14.6

18.9

+4.3

22.8

22.4

-0.4

18.9

21.8

+2.9

21.5

+3.0

23.9

27.8

+3.9

22.2

26.4

+4.2

21. 6

25.7

+4.1

55-64

9.1

1.4

-2.3

13.2

10.2

-3.0

9.1

8.6

-0.5

9.3

8.5

-0.8

10.4

10.7

+0.3

10.0

9.5

-0.5

9.9

9.4

+0.5

65-16

8.0

8.0

0.0

10.0

1.0

-3.0

7.3

1.1

-0.2

1.4

7.1

-0.3

5.1

8.8

+3.1

6.6

8.0

+1.4

6.7

1.9

+1.2

75+

4.1

3.8

-0.3

5.7

5.9

+0.2

4.7

5.0

+0.3

4.7

4.9

+0.2

3.0

4.4

+1.4

4.2

5.1

+1.5

4.3

5.6

+1. 3

, High
School

40.9

43.5

+2.6

42.0

53.8

+11.8

45.0

55.9

+10.9

44.5

54.1

+10.2

67.8

12.2

+4.4

69.3

17 .1

+3.4

65.2

74.5

+9.3

, College
Grad

2.6

1.7

-0.9

2.5

6.3

+3.8

3.8

5.2

+1. 4

3.6

4.9

+1. 3

9.4

8.5

-0.9

15.3

20.0

+4.2

13.8

11.9

+4.1

18'

r

Education

Sex
, Male

43.2

43.9

+0.7

49.0

48.1

-0.9

46.9

47.5

+0.6

46.6

47.1

+0.5

46.8

45.8

-1.0

47.7

47.3

-0.4

47.5

41.2

-0.3

, Female

56.8

56.1

-0.1

51.0

51.9

+0.9

53.1

52.5

-0.6

53.4

52.9

-0.5

53.2

54.2

-0.5

52.3

52.7

+0.4

52.5

52.8

+0.3

-

-

*1IO'n:

-

- -
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graduates in both 1980 and 1990.

In fact, even though the EZ

saw an improvement in its "human capital" (more high school
and college graduates living in the area), all of the control
communities experienced increases as well.

These areas were

already ahead of the EZ in human capital in 1980 and had
stayed ahead by 1990.
With regard to unemployment, Table 5 shows that although
unemployment declined throughout most of the EZ

and

comparison communities during the 1980s, the overall level of
unemployment in percentage terms was still higher in the EZ
areas than in the control areas as of 1990.

This was pretty

much the case whether one was black or white, male or female.
The highest levels of unemployment still exist in the original
EZ area, the area that was initially targeted for urban
redevelopment.

For all EZ areas, their unemployment rates of

1990 were still anywhere from one and one-half times to three
times the rate of those in the comparison communities despite
drops in the unemployment rates from 1980 to 1990.

However,

the decreases in the unemployment rates in the EZ communities
were not that different in magnitude than those in the
comparison/control communities.
Finally, Table 6 shows that while average household and
family income rose in the EZ communities, the rates of
increase for the comparison communities were even higher.

Not

only that, but EZ communities were behind their counterparts
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Table 5

Unemployment

Statistics
COMPARISON COMMUNITIES

DlTERPRISE ZOIIE COtHlIIITIES
OOTCC»IE

MEASURES
ORIGINAL ENTEIlPIUSE zaiE

IllTEltPl\I S£ ZONE
EXPJ\NSIOII, 1985

1980 11990

8.l

+0.1

lS.2

ll.0

-2.2

10.l

1.l

-2.S

lS.1

3.6

9.0

+5.4

14.8

+4.4

9.2

6.6

-2.6 11.6

18.3

+l.3

11.8

4.0

13.1

+7.1

4.1

9.4

30.2

26.5

-3.1

0.0·

31.1

32.8

26.7

-6.1

0.0

44.2

0.0

0.0

I 1990 I

1980

I 1990 I

26.1

22.9

-l.2

1.6

Males

21.1

Females

25.5

2l.0

-4.1

22.8

-2.1

White Unemployment 11.1

16.1

Males

15.0

Females

6.0

Black Unemployment
Males
Females
*.:>D,

rorAL EllTERPRISE ZOIIES

,

1980

Unemployment Rate

£llTDPRISE ZONE
EXPJlNSIOII, 1986

28.6

'10 nw _ _ _

26.4

•

-2.2
--

~

i . _ _ ia

, 1. pe~tage oUnge foE' wat. . . that.

--

DDt ~u:

I 1990 I

-2.6

8.1

-l.O
-2.0
-2.6

9.2
8.1

1980

8.4

-O.l

6.6

S.l

9.4

9.1

-O.l

6.9

1.9

1.9

0.0

6.3

6.6

5.1

-0.9

6.2

-3.1

1.3

6.0

-1.3

6.5

-1.1

5.1

5.4

-0.3

S.8

18.5

-2.4

11.8

11.7

-0.1 11.9

18.3

-2.3

14.1

13.5

-0.6 12.7

18.3

-2.0

9.9

10.3

+0.4

ll.1

12.8

-2.9 16.S

ll.S

13.2

-1.6 16.0

14.0

8.1

-2.9 11.6

9.0

-1.8 12.2

8.9

-3.3 12.3

+4.7

10.8

8.4

-2.4 10.4

+31.1

19.3

11.5

-1.8

20.9

+44.2

20.1

11.8

-2.3 21.6

0.0 18.4
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-1.2 20.3

,.
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(
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&Ee

,
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I •

cotPARlSON CCM4UNITY
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1980

I 1990 I •

-1.S

1.9

6.1

-1.8

S.4

-1.5

8.l

6.l

-2.0

4.8

-1.5

1.5

5.9

-1.6

4.5

-1.1

6.6

4.8

-1.8

4.8

-1.7

6.9

5.1

-1.8

4.2

-1. 6

6.1

4.5

-1.6

10.3

-1.6

16.2

13.6

-2.6

11.6

-1.1

16.9

14.5

-2.4

9.2

-1.9

16.5

12.8

-2.1

\0
(X)

in both 1980 and 1990 when it came to the levels of household
and family income.

Poverty was worse in the EZ communities in

1980 than in the comparison communities and grew worse during
the 1980s as the 1990 census data show.

The comparison

communities only showed negligible increases in poverty during
the 1980s (with the exception of Bluegrass) whereas the EZ
areas showed larger gains in poverty on average.
In general, Table 6 points out that the EZ communities
saw their civilian labor force shrink significantly in
comparison to the control communities.

Not only did work seem

to disappear from these areas but so did workers.

Finally,

Table 6 shows that the EZ communities had both in 1980 and
1990 a much higher proportion of their population not in the
labor force than in the control areas.

These six tables do

not indicate that any real neighborhood revitalization was
taking place in the EZ communities by 1990.

In many ways,

according to Census data, the EZ communities had fallen behind
their non-EZ counterparts.

These results imply that EZ

incentives were not working as far as helping these targeted
areas to grow and prosper much less helping them to hold their
own against further decline.

87

Table 6

Economic
<DIPAI\ISOH CCIIMUIIITIES

Di'rERPR15E ZOIII. CCHIUIIITIU
OOTCOHE
MEASURES
(1) OIUGIIW. IIItUIRJI& &ellS

1980

I

I ,

1990

(2)

III'tINJUSI &mit

a.MIION, 1985

1980

I

1990

I ,

1OtIU. an'UI,ItUIt IQISI ••

(3) 1NI'IIlf1U'1 1IWI
P,M.ION, 1986···

1

1980

1990

J ,

1980

1

1990

1 ,

1980

I

1990

(outSide
enterprise zone)

.J&n'DICII CXUITY

CClCtNllICII CCMUltft

J ,

1980 -'- 1990
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3. Eva1uating Neighborhood Revita1ization using
Home Mortgage Disc10sure Act Data
In compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act of
1977 and the Horne Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, the St.
Louis Federal Reserve Branch releases on an annual basis data
that show horne mortgage lending patterns down to the census
tract level within Jefferson County.

This data goes back to

1981 with the most recent set of data released in 1994.

It

was hypothesized that if EZ incentives had led to neighborhood
revitalization in targeted areas, then one would find that
horne mortgage lending rates for the EZ areas would at least
match if not exceed those in the control communities, and that
the average dollar amounts for such loans would at least be
equal to those in the control communities.

If EZ communities

were blighted and needed a massive rebuilding effort, then the
data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve District should show
that horne building and construction should have taken off
after KRS 154.45 was passed in 1982.

Two of the goals of the

legislation and the incentives embodied in KRS 154.45 were to
"[I]mprove the quality of life of individuals that reside
within an enterprise zone by providing employment
opportunities,

job training, and neighborhood improvement

programs" and to "[E]1iminate b1ighted and deteriorated areas
within an enterprise zone that feature chronic abandonment or
demo1ition of residentia1 or commercia1 structures or
property" (KRS 154.45, p. 412, emphasis added).
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Figure 5

Figure 5 shows that from 1981 to 1994, all the EZ
communities taken together (ez), or the full-size EZ, were
behind the control and comparison areas (Newburg or control;
Bluegrass and Jeffersontown or bg jtown; the county; and the
county outside of the EZ or cnty\ez ) when it came to home
mortgage lending as a percentage of total home mortgage loans
in millions.

The volume of loans for the full-size EZ did

increase over this time period, but so did the volume for all
the comparison areas. This last point is underscored by Figure
6 where it is revealed that even though lending rates did
accelerate for the full-size EZ (ez) during this time, the
growth rates of mortgage lending for the comparison areas were
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somewhat larger .
Growth Rates of Mortgage Lending
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Next, Figure 7 shows that when comparing the average
loan amount within the EZ, the ratio of average home mortgage
loan values in the full-size or current EZ to average home
mortgage loan values in the comparison areas falls below 1.0
for most of the years between 1981 and 1994. The exception to
this is 1983 when the average loan in the EZ exceed the
average value of a loan in the Newburg area (cg).

Other than

that, the current EZ (established in 1986) saw less home
mortgage dollars on average than did the county outside of the
EZ (ez/balcnty) as well as the county as a whole (ez/all
cnty).

Only with the Newburg area does the full-size EZ come

close to matching average home loan values.
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RATIO OF AVG. LOAN IN CURRENT EZ
TO AVG. LOAN AMOUNT IN OTHER AREAS
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Just as with the Census data, these results do not show
the EZ catching up with or surpassing the control (Newburg) or
comparison communities when it comes to rates of housing
investment or value of investment.

The three figures show

that lending patterns generally varied to the same degree in
the EZ as it did in the comparison communities, but that the
amount of investment in the EZ never came close to what was
being invested in Newburg, other parts of Jefferson County, or
the county as a whole.
The Census data showed the EZ communities to be behind
the comparison communities in regard to housing stock value,
housing occupancy and new housing units.
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Any improvement in

this situation would have required a dramatic amount of
investment in new housing or housing rehabilitation during the
1980s and early 1990s.

The rate of investment would probably

have had to be much greater than what these three charts show.
Such a low housing investment rate raises the question of
whether the neighborhood improvement component of the EZ
legislation was ever taken seriously by state and local
economic development officials.

4. Eva1uating Neighborhood Revita1ization using
County Property Va1uation Administration Records

Information obtained from Jefferson County's PVA office
allowed calculating increases or decreases in tax assessment
values of homes in the EZ areas and the control areas
(Newburg, Jefferson County outside of the EZ, and Jefferson
County as a whole).

Tax assessment values are not the same as

the fair market values of housing used in the Census data.
However, if one assumes a high correlation between assessment
values and fair market values for housing in general in any
given neighborhood, then any increases or decreases in
assessment values from one point in time to another may
indicate a rise or fall in the fair market values of housing
for a particular area.
The local PVA office was able to provide computerized
assessment data for the years 1992 through 1996.
computerized records before 1992.

There are no

However, a look at changes

in assessment values from 1992 to 1996 would provide the
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opportunity to examine assessment, and indirectly, home value
appreciation in the EZ and control areas beyond the 1980 and
1990 Census data.

The previous section showed that this type

of revitalization was apparently not significant between 1980
and 1990.

Perhaps there are lagged effects with regard to EZ

incentives that could not have shown neighborhood
revitalization taking place by 1990.
Before going further, it should be noted that PVA
records are not kept according to either zip code or census
tract.

Instead, the local PVA office has its own geographic

configuration of neighborhoods in order to do its job of
regularly re-assessing and taxing property values.

These

neighborhoods are not necessarily defined in the same sense as
one may conceive of neighborhoods in general.

How.residents

see their neighborhood may be different from how the PVA
defines their neighborhood.

Because the PVA is interested in

administering and collecting taxes in a cost

efficient and

effective manner, PVA neighborhoods are mostly clusters of
very similar housing within a geographic area.
The average of the assessments for each PVA neighborhood
for the five years 1992 to 1996 was averaged.

PVA

neighborhoods were combined to closely mirror those areas in
the EZ and the control areas and to take the average of the
average of the assessments for each

assigned neighborhood.

Using averages is somewhat flawed because of the risk of a
skewed distribution of assessment values within a particular
neighborhood.

However, median assessment values were not
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available.
PVA records indicate that for the neighborhoods taken in
by the original EZ, the average of the mean values of PVA
neighborhood housing assessments in that area rose from
$16,787 in 1992 to $18,793 in 1996.

This was an increase of

11.9%.
In those neighborhoods taken in by the first EZ
expansion and added to the original EZ neighborhoods (which
together constituted Figure 2, the Intermediate Enterprise
Zone), the average of the mean values of PVA assessments rose
from roughly $32,727 in 1992 to $41,246 in 1996 for an
increase of 26.03%.

Meanwhile, in those neighborhoods taken

in by the second EZ expansion in 1986, the average of the mean
values of assessments rose from approximately $32,239 in 1992
to $39,892 in 1996 for an increase of 23.74%.

Finally, for

the total or full-size EZ, the average of the neighborhood
means rose from $30,437 in 1992 to $37,550 in 1996 for a
23.37% increase in average values.

Clearly, the EZ areas

outside of the original EZ as well as the full-size EZ saw a
much greater increase over the five year period in homeowner's
wealth if one assumes a correlation between assessment values
and fair market values.
For the Newburg area, Jefferson County outside of the
EZ, and for Jefferson County as a whole, average neighborhood
horne assessment values also rose between 1992 and 1996.

In

Newburg, the average assessment rose from $38,439 in 1992 to
$50,667 in 1996.

This was an increase of 31.8% and was the
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largest increase for all areas examined.

The area of the

county outside of the EZ saw the average of mean values of
assessments rise from $62,944 in 1992 to $75,543 in 1996 for a
20.02% increase.

During the same time period, PVA records

indicate that all of Jefferson County saw the average of the
means of home assessment values for all PVA neighborhoods rise
from $60,156 to $70,767.

This was a 17.64% increase in

average assessment values.
What does one conclude from this analysis?

First, if

assessment values are adequately correlated with fair market
values, the poorest part of the EZ, the original EZ, saw
homeowner's wealth increase the least.

This is in stark

contrast to one of the poorest areas of the county outside of
the EZ, the Newburg area.

This area saw the largest average

increase in its residential wealth, yet received none of the
economic development stimulus or incentives provided by EZ
legislation.

The Newburg area received no comparable economic

development assistance during this time period.

Perhaps new

subdivisions were started in this area during this time
period.

This may explain such a large rise in average

assessments.

However, even this

problems of the original EZ:

explan~tion

underscores the

a lack of new housing

development large enough to offset housing stock losses;
outward migration; and high unemployment (see Tables 2, 4, and
5).

If EZ incentives are working in the original zone area,

then they are having a minimal impact at best.
In fairness to the EZ area, the full-size EZ as well as
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those areas in the EZ outside of the original zone, did
slightly outperform Jefferson County and Jefferson County
outside of the EZ when it came to increases in average
assessment values.

This could be due to a renewal of housing

development in the southwestern part of Jefferson County
(Stahl, 1997).

During the 1970s and 1980s, southern and

southwestern Jefferson County saw little if any new housing
communities develop.

Most new development during this time

period took place in southeastern and eastern Jefferson
County, although these areas continue to see robust
residential housing development (Stahl, 1997).
However, one cannot say whether EZ incentives played a
key role, if any role, in the increase in new housing
development throughout most of the full-size EZ.

Based upon

three February 19, 1997 Courier Journal articles by Linda
Stahl, the 1990s have seen a housing boom throughout all of
Jefferson County.

The fastest growing area was the 40299 zip

code (which includes Jeffersontown and a large part of
southeastern Jefferson County), but data based upon-new home
permits issued from 1992 to 1996 showed that almost every zip
code in the county saw an increase in permits taken out for
new home construction that was greater than the rate of
permits issued in the 1980s (p Al and CJ Neighborhoods
section, p. 1).
The reasons given for the housing boom included a
revival in the demand for lower middle income and middle
income housing as well as the opening of a major highway, the
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Gene Snyder Freeway.

The Snyder was credited with opening up

mostly rural-like undeveloped land throughout the outlying
areas of Jefferson County.

Since a housing boom has been

taking place throughout most of Jefferson County throughout
the 1990s, it is difficult to make the argument that EZ
incentives played a role in higher average assessment values
from 1992 to 1996 in the EZ area outside of the original zone.
In fact, trends in the full-size EZ seem to be merely
reflecting county-wide trends.

5. Summary

Based upon the preceding analysis and discussion, it
seems that EZ incentives did very little if anything to
encourage neighborhood revitalization within targeted areas.
The first goal of KRS 154.45 was to improve the quality of
life of EZ residents through job training programs and
neighborhood redevelopment programs.

With the exception of

the original EZ area, neighborhood growth and development
within the EZ did not generally differ that much from the rest
of the county outside of the EZ or Jefferson County as a
whole.

Improving EZ neighborhoods apparently vanished as a

goal as the EZ program became a general economic development
tool and lost its focus on alleviating urban problems.
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CHAPTER

VI

Louisvi11e EZ Performance Eva1uation:
Job Creation and Retention
1. Overview

Two broad goals of KRS 154.45 (Subchapter 45: Enterprise
Zone Development) were to "Improve the quality of life of
individuals that reside within an enterprise zone by providing
employment opportunities, ... " and to "Encourage economic
activity by assisting and maintaining existing business within
an enterprise zone." (Kentucky Revised Statutes, p. 412).9
These goals were obviously aimed at job creation and
retention, usually the most important goals of most if not all
enterprise zones (Green, 1991).

Whether new jobs were created

and/or retained by EZ incentives, and whether the number of
new jobs created and/or retained by EZ incentives were
significant are the issues to be addressed in this part of the
evaluation.
According to the Louisville and Jefferson County Office
for Economic Development (OED), the Louisville EZ is
responsible for creating approximately 18,000 new jobs between
its inception in 1983 and June 30, 1996. 10

As noted

9 See the appendix for the full text of KRS 154.45, Subchapter
45: Enterprise Zone Development.
10 The figure 18,000 is from a quote by OED spokesperson Bill
Pettison in an August 14, 1996 Courier-Journal article
(Sheldon Shafer, p. E1).
However, if OED annual figures of
jobs created are summed, then the number of new jobs created
by the EZ from 1983 to June 30, 1996 is 19,664. OED
attributes this discrepancy to changes made in record-keeping
in 1992.
A survey of EZ certified firms done by the University of
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previously, the accuracy of OED numbers has been called into
question.

This chapter will attempt to check the accuracy and

plausibility of these numbers using shift-share analysis and
survey results.
First, an example is necessary to illustrate one of the
methods--shift-share analysis--used to evaluate job creation.
Tables 7 through 9 (see next several pages) compare Jefferson
County's economic growth and changes in its industrial
structure to national economic growth and changes in national
industrial structure from 1981 to 1994.

These tables are the

results of a shift-share analysis, a technique used in urban
and regional economics to see how much of a region's growth

Louisville's Urban Studies Institute projected a different
amount for jobs created--5,760.
However, respondents also
credited the EZ incentives with saving 3,152 jobs and creating
or saving 6,333 jobs. Without regard to incentives, the 851
companies surveyed (out of the approximately 1,200 certified
firms) indicated that their workforce had grown by a net of
13,271 employees since the companies had acquired EZ
certification. However, not all 851 companies had been
certified at the time that the zone had corne into existence.
Some companies had been certified since 1983 whereas others
had only been certified for a couple of years.
Unfortunately, United Parcel Service (UPS) was not
interviewed. According. to a phone conversation in October
1996 that I had with Ken Shapero of UPS's Public Relations
Office, in 1981 UPS employed 900 workers. As noted earlier in
this paper, UPS became part of the EZ in 1986. Ten years
later, Shapero reported that UPS employed around 14,000
people, 80% of whom are part-time workers. Adding 14,000 to
the 13,271 jobs that respondents reported would greatly boost
the number of jobs created within the EZ without regard to
incentives.
Since there does not appear to be any firm estimate of
the number of jobs created due to EZ incentives, this paper
will use OED's figure of 18,000 new jobs created between 1983
and 1996. This gives OED the benefit of the doubt when it
comes to establishing a hard number on the jobs created within
the EZ from 1983 to 1996. Also, these are the only official
numbers that exist.
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Table 7

SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS
Jefferson County and United States Economy
Years 1981 to 1994
Employment
1981

1994

Change, 1981-94
Absolute
Percent

Nation

Agricultural services, etc.
Mining
Contract Construction
Manufacturing
TPU
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
F/I/RE
Services

302694

586069

283375

93.62

1107726

607721

-500005

-45.14

4286069

4709379

423310

9.88

20428330

18098123

-2330207

-11.41

4613030

5713515

1100485

23.86

5260928

6365973

1105045

21. 00

15039998

20320266

5280268

35.11

5409780

7002431

1592651

29.44

17814081

33253032

15438951

86.67

Other

587766

76791

-510975

-86.94

TOTAL

74850402

96733300

21882898

29.24

Employment
1981

1994

Change 1981-94
Absolute
Percent

Jefferson County

Agricultural services, etc.
Mining
Contract Construction

1210

1508

298

24.63

479

252

-227

-47.39

15428

18803

3375

21. 88

Manufacturing

88922

65021

-23901

-26.88

TPU

16677

27183

10506

63.00

Wholesale Trade

22771

27838

5067

22.25

Retail Trade

56494

74706

18212

32.24

FIIIRE

20100

26002

5902

29.36

Services

67842

122811

54969

81. 03

Other

1775

183

-1592

-89.69

TOTAL

291698

364307

72609

24.89

1981 and 1994 Ky.
Source:
and U.S. County Business
Patterns.
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TABLE 8
National Growth Effect, Jefferson Co. 1981-94

Employment

Industry

1981

*N

1210

354

298

-56

479

140

-227

-367

15428

4511

3375

-1136

Manufacturing

88922

26001

-23901

-49902

TPU

16677

4876

10506

5630

Wholesale Trade

22771

6658

5067

-1591

Retail Trade

56494

16519

18212

1693

F/I1RE

20100

5877

5902

25

Services

67842

19837

54969

35132

Other

1775

519

-1592

-2111

TOTAL

291698

85292

72609

-12683

Agricultural services, etc.
Mining
Contract Construction

R

*R-N
sM+S

*N - 1981 County Employment X Nat'l Growth Rate of 29.24'
*R - N

=M +

S is the Net Relative Change to be explained by shift-share.

Industry Mix Effect, Jefferson County 1981-94
Industry

1981 Jobs, %
breakdown:
Nation

Industry Growth
minus
Jefferson
Nat'l Growth
County
(%)

Emp.,1981

*M

1210

779

Agricultural services, etc.

0.40

0.41

64.38

Mining

1. 48

0.16

-74.38

479

-356

Contract Construction

5.73

5.29

-19.36

15428

-2987

27.29

30.48

-40.65

88921 -36143

Manufacturing
TPU

6.16

5.72

-5.38

16667

-897

Wholesale Trade

7.03

7.81

-8.24

22771

-1875

20.09

19.37

5.87

56494

3315

7.23

6.89

0.20

20100

40

Retail Trade
F/I/RE

23.80

23.26

57.43

67842

38960

Other

Services

0.79

0.61

-116.18

1775

-2062

TOTAL

100.00

100.00

291687

-1228

*M

=

Product of previous two columns.

is due to national and industry-specific trends as opposed to
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possible local trends, local initiatives and local competitive
advantages.

If a region generates more jobs than what

national economic and industry-specific (or, industry-mix)
growth rates would indicate, then that region could be said to
possibly have a competitive advantage

within certain

industrial sectors (if not all sectors) relative to the rest
of the nation (Hoover and Giarratani, 1984, pp. 398-401; and
Bendavid-Val, 1991, pp. 67-72).

All the data come from the

Table 9
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Jefferson Co. ,
1981-94

1981

1994

1210

1764

298

RN

M

*S

Industry
Agricultural services, etc.
Mining

354

779

-835
-11

479

254

-227

140

-356

Contract Construction

15428

16742

3375

4511

-2987

1851

Manufacturing

88922

62608

-23901

26001

-36143

-13759
6527

TPU

16677

26375

10506

4876

-897

Wholesale Trade

22771

27147

5067

6658

-1875

284

Retail Trade

56494

71715

18212

16519

3315

-1622

F/IIRE

20100

26288

5902

5877

40

-15

Services

67842

119417

54969

19837

38960

-3828

Other

1775

102

-1592

519

-2062

-49

TOTAL

291698

352412

72609

85292

-1228

-11455

*S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive
component.
S=R -N - M

1981 and 1994 U.

s.

and Kentucky County Business Patterns

(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1981 and 1994).

Table 7 shows

that national employment grew 29.24% between 1981 to 1994.
However, within major industrial sectors, growth rates varied
from a high of 93.62% in agricultural services,

forestry,

fisheries, and food processing to a negative growth rate of
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-45.14% in mining.

All other categories had positive growth

rates except for manufacturing (-11.41%) and other
establishments that were not classified (-86.94%)

.11

Meanwhile, Jefferson County had an overall employment
growth rate of 24.89% during this time period with 72,609 jobs
being added to payrolls.

Jefferson County job creation

closely resembled the nation's when it came to the areas of
mining, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance,
real estate (F/I/RE), and services.

insurance and

On the other hand,

Jefferson County had over double the growth in the number of
jobs created in the area of transportation and public
utilities (TPU) than did the nation and had nearly two and a
one-half times the number of jobs lost in manufacturing than
did the nation (-26.88% for Jefferson County versus -11.41%
for the U. S.).

Finally, Jefferson County experienced an

increase in jobs in agricultural services, etc.

(24.63%), but

this did not come close to national job growth (93.62%).
The top portion of Table 8 shows that if each major
industrial sector within Jefferson County grew at the national
growth rate of 29.24% between 1981 and 1994, then the county
would have seen 85,292 new jobs generated.

This number is

designated as "Nil, the employment that would have resulted if
national trends had been duplicated in the locality during the
time period under consideration.

The number of jobs that

The reason for the dramatic drop in the Other category is
straightforward. Between 1981 and 1993, the Census Bureau
adopted a new Standard Industrial Code (SIC) which created new
classifications for businesses. This allowed for
establishments previously not classified to be put into a

11
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existed in 1981 is used as a base for calculating N.

"R" is

the actual number of jobs created in each sector from 1981 to
1994 (see Table 7).

Since this number is 72,609, Jefferson

County generated 12,683 fewer jobs than what national trends
would have produced (see last column, top half of table 8).
This difference of 12,683 is called the "net relative change"
that shift-share analysis must explain.

In other words, the

analysis must explain what industry-specific and local factors
prevented Jefferson County from producing jobs at the same
rate as the national economy.
The bottom half of Table 8 shows what would be the
effects of industry-specific trends and growth rates less or
"minus" the overall national growth rate of 29.24% on local
industrial development.

In other words, the percentage

national growth rates for each industry (see top half of Table
7, last column) less the overall U. S. growth rate of 29.24%
gives the percentages shown in the fourth column of the bottom
half of Table 8.

These percentages are then multiplied by the

level of employment within each industry in Jefferson County
for 1981 to yield "M", the industry mix effect, that shows the
number of jobs that should have been produced had
industry-specific growth rates (less the national growth rate)
been duplicated in Jefferson County.

In total, Jefferson

County produced 1,228 fewer jobs than what national industrial
trends would have produced had those same trends been
duplicated in the county.

major industrial category.
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Finally, Table 9 decomposes the effects of national and
industry-specific effects on Jefferson County job growth from
1981 to 1994.

"SH is the Local Share Effect or the

competitive component of shift-share analysis.

The

competitive component is possibly the job creation in a region
due to any local competitive advantages that may exist in that
region which would cause job growth in that region to

b~

higher than what would be expected given national and
industry-specific growth trends.
true.

The reverse could also be

If "S" is negative, then the region could have a

negative competitive component given national and industryspecific trends.
It should be noted, however, that the reasons why a
locality may have a positive or negative competitive component
cannot be explained by shift-share analysis (MIT Dictionary of
Modern Economics, 1989, p. 386; Blair, 1995, pp. 148-149).
This is because S is a residua1 number. It is the result of
subtracting Nand M from R (the actual job growth within the
locality).

As Table 9 shows, when Nand M are subtracted from

R, Jefferson County had a negative competitive component
relative to the rest of the nation when it came to job
creation from 1981 to 1994.

Jefferson County should have

produced 11,455 more jobs than it actually did.

That is, if

national and industry-specific trends had been duplicated in
Jefferson County from 1981 to 1994, then an even greater
number of jobs would have been created--11,455 more than the
72,609 produced.

Despite job gains in agricultural services,
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TPU, construction, wholesale trade and F/I/RE, these gains
were not enough to offset losses in other industrial
categories, especially in manufacturing, where local
conditions are assumed to possibly account for the loss of
13,759 (see column "3") out of the 23,901 actual manufacturing
jobs lost (see column "R") between 1981 to 1994. 12

As Blair

(1995, p. 146) writes, "Growth differentials due to the nature
of the local environment are termed the competitive component.
The mix and competitive components account for regional growth
that differs from the national level."
Now that shift-share analysis has been illustrated and
explained, the method will now be applied in comparing EZ job
growth to job growth in Jefferson County for the periods 1980
to 1990 and from 1981 to 1994.

Both the original-size EZ and

the current or "full-size" EZ will be compared to Jefferson
County job growth.

Because the area that comprised the first

expansion of the original EZ was so short-lived (a little over
one year) and because this area later became part of the
larger full-size EZ, an evaluation of this version of the EZ

These results are interesting because it is during this
time period that local governments took on most, if not all,
the tasks of economic development because of declining support
from the federal government.
The results may indicate that
creating and then enlarging the EZ, selling economic
development bonds and industrial revenue bonds and pursuing
other economic development policies (e.g., recruitment of
businesses into the local area)
may have had little effect on
local economic growth.
Or, if these economic development
policies did have some positive impact, perhaps they were not
enough to offset areas where Jefferson County suffered a
comparative disadvantage relative to other regions of the
country (e.g., inferior schools and universities, an unskilled
workforce, etc.).
12
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will be skipped.

The following analysis is similar to that

followed by Dowall (1996) in his evaluation of California's
Enterprise Zones.
As mentioned earlier, census tracts form the foundation
of the Louisville EZ.

All tracts must be contiguous and must

be in an area that is on average an economically depressed and
blighted area.

The difficulty in doing a shift-share analysis

at a level within the county boundaries lies in the fact that
County Business Patterns does not collect firm and employment

data at the census tract level.

Likewise, the 1980 and 1990

Censuses of Housing and Population do not collect firm and

employment data at the tract level.

Yet, even though County

Business Patterns does not have data at the census tract

level, it does have data at the zip code level going back to
1981 (Dowall, 1996).

Using a method where zip code areas are

matched as closely as possible to areas within the EZ (Dowall,
1996), one could use data from 1981 to 1994 (the most recent
data available at the time of the writing of this study) in a
shift-share analysis of the EZ.

This would provide a 14 year

time period for a pre- and post-test analysis with the EZ
being in existence for nearly 11 of those 14 years.

Also, a

recent report prepared for Jefferson County Government
estimated the location and number of jobs by census tract for
both 1980 and 1990 census boundaries (Coomes and Price, 1994).
Using these numbers, a shift-share analysis comparing both
versions of the EZ to Jefferson County job creation at the
tract level is possible.

As the following tables show, both
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data sources indicate the same trends and support each other.
Shift-share analysis dictates that a sub-region of a
larger area be compared to the larger area (as in comparing
Jefferson County to the U. S.)
1995, pp. 145-149).

(Bendavid-Val, 1991; Blair,

This chapter will compare both EZs (the

original and the full-size) to Jefferson County job growth
rates over two different time periods.

Shift-share analysis

would not allow a comparison between either version of the EZ
to either the Newburg or Bluegrass Industrial Park areas (the
control communities) because all of these areas are subregions of Jefferson County.

The county must be used as a

point of reference if shift-share analysis is to be done
properly.

Therefore, the control communities' and the

Louisville airport's rate of job growth will be compared to
that of Jefferson County's rate in the next chapter.

In that

way, inferences can be made as to how well the EZ (in its
original and current sizes) did in comparison not only to
Jefferson County but also in comparison to these other two
areas.

In this chapter as well as the next, it is assumed

that if EZ incentives were working, then one would expect job
creation and retention in the EZ communities and the airport
to at least match and/or exceed the rate of job creation and
retention in Jefferson County, as well as the Bluegrass and
Newburg areas.
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2. Job Creation in the Origina1 EZ versus the County,
1980 to 1990 and 1981 to 1994

As noted earlier, the original EZ was 3.75 square miles
of commercial and residential property west of Louisville's
CBD.

The following evaluation of the original EZ's capacity

to create jobs covers two parallel time periods because of the
use of two different data sources:

estimates based on the

1980 and 1990 Censuses of Housing and Population (Coomes and
Price) and 1981 and 1994 County Business Patterns data at the
zip code level (U. S. Commerce Department, 1981 and 1994).
The same two data sources and corresponding time periods will
be used throughout the rest of this section of the study while
comparing different sub-regions of Jefferson County to the
county as a whole.
On the following pages, Tables 10 through 12 compare the
original EZ to Jefferson County using data from the 1980 and
1990 Censuses and 1980 and 1990 County Business Patterns (CBP)
data for all of Jefferson County.13

The top half of Table 10

shows jobs by major industry classification according to the
1980 and 1990 CBPs for the County.

Because of the Coomes and

Price method (1994), some major industry categories have been
combined (e.g., Agricultural Services and Mining, TPU and
Wholesale Trade, and Services and Government) .14

13 Aggregate numbers for the county could have derived from
the 1980 and 1990 Census data.
However, in order to make all
tables comparable, the top half of each table will have data
from County Business Patterns.
.
14 Actually, County Business Patterns (CBP) does not disclose
the number of jobs in the government sector of our economy.
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Between 1980 and 1990, Jefferson County added 37,913
jobs to its jobs base, an increase of 12.78%.

Meanwhile, the

second part of Table 10 shows that those census tracts that
composed the original EZ lost 6,890 jobs between 1980 and
1990, a decrease of -26.12%.

At the end of 1990, EZ

incentives would have been in effect for at least six and a
half years.

Clearly the job losses estimated in the original

EZ from 1980 to 1990 do not do much to support the argument
that incentives helped to "[I]mprove the quality of life of
individuals that reside within an enterprise zone by providing
employment opportunities ... " or to "[E]ncourage economic
activity by stimulating the influx of new business
within an enterprise zone ... " (KRS 154.45, p. 412

(see

appendix)) .
TABLE 10
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS
Comparison of Original EZ to Jefferson County, 1980-1990
Employment

Employment Change, 1980-90

Jefferson County

1980

1990

Ag. & Mining

1154

2011

16331

17571

1240

7.59

Contract Construction

Absolute
Percent
857
74.26

Manufacturing

90643

68569

-22074

-24.35

TPU & Wholesale Trade

40948

42168

1220

2.98

Retail Trade

59633

67948

8315

13.94

F/I/RE

20718

26361

5643

27.24

Services & Gov't

67250

109962

42712

63.51

296677

334590

37913

12.78

TOTAL
Source:

1980 and 1990 CBPs

The numbers for "Services and Gov' t" in the top half of Table
10 and subsequent similar tables are a combination of jobs from
the CBP's "Services" and "Other Establishments Not-Classified"
industrial categories.
While not the same as "Services and
Gov't", this is the best approximation possible given data
constraints.
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Employment

TABLE 10, CONTINUED.

Employment Change 1980-90

1980

1990

Absolute

Percentage

136

44

-92

-67.65

740

775

35

4.73

Original Enterprise Zone Area

Ag.

&

Mining

Contract Construction
Manufacturing

14846

9757

-5089

-34.28

TPU & Wholesale Trade

5853

3060

-2793

-47.72

Retail Trade

1454

1445

-9

-0.62

F/r/RE

Services & Gov't
TOTAL
Source:

229

396

167

72.93

3125

4016

891

28.51

26383

19493

-6890

-26.12

1980 and 1990 Censuses of Housing and Population.

In fact the first part of Table 11, column 3, shows that
if job growth in the original EZ had been the same as the
county during this period, the EZ would have gained 3,371
jobs.

On the other hand, looking at the last column of the

TABLE 11
Jefferson Co. Growth Effect for original EZ, 1980-90
Industry

Employment
1980

Ag.

&

Mining

Contract Construction

136

N .. Employment
1980 X
County Growth
Rate(12.78%1
17

R

R-N
=M+S

-92

-109

740

95

35

-60

14846

1897

-5089

-6986

TPU & Wholesale Trade

5853

748

-2793

-3541

Retail Trade

1454

186

-9

-195

229

29

167

138

3125

399

891

492

26383

3371

Manufacturing

F/r/RE

Services & Gov't
TOTAL
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-6890 -10261

TABLE 11, CONT'D

Industry

Effect, Enterprise Zone, 1980-90
Qistribution of Total

~x

1980 Employment C%)

Agricultural services, etc.

0.39

Industry
Growth Rata
minus
Co. Growth
EZ
Rata C%)
0.52
61. 48

Contract Construction

5.50

2.80

-5.19

740

-38

Manufacturing

30.55

56.27

-37.13

14846

-5513

TPU & Wholesale Trade

13.80

22.18

-9.80

5853

-574

Retail Trade

20.10

5.51

1.16

1454

17

6.98

0.87

14.46

229

33

22.67

11.84

50.73

3125

1585

100.00

100.00

26383

-4406

Industry

F/IIRE
Services & Gov't
TOTAL

County

Ent.
Zone
ElDp. ,
1980
136

*M
84

*M '" Product of previous 2
columns.
TABLE 12

Employment and Components of Employment Change, Enterprise Zone,
1980-90
1980
1990

R

N

M

s

Industry
Ag. & Mining

136

44

-92

17

84

-193

Contract Construction

740

775

35

95

-38

-22

14846

9757

-5089

1897

-5513

-1473

Manufacturing
TPU & Wholesale Trade

5853

3060

-2793

748

-574

-2967

Retail Trade

1454

1445

-9

186

17

-212

229

396

167

29

33
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F/I/RE
Services & Gov't
TOTAL

3125

4016

891

399

1585

-1093

26383

19493

-6890

3371

-4406

-5855

S is Local Share Effect-are.'s competitive component.
S .. R - N - M

second part of Table 11, the EZ should have lost 4,406 jobs
due to industry-specific trends that existed in the county
during this time.

On net, the original EZ still should have

only lost 1,035 (=3,371-4,406)

jobs.

The fact that it lost

around six times this number in addition to failing to
generate 3,371 jobs is reflected by the -5,855 figure in the
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last column of Table 12. 15

The -5,855 is the original EZ's

competitive component relative to the rest of Jefferson
County.

Of the 6,890 jobs lost in this area between 1980 and

1990, 5,855 of these jobs were lost possibly due to some
attribute{s)

that the EZ had that the rest of Jefferson County

did not have or had to a lesser degree (e.g., higher crime
rates, a high number of unskilled workers, etc.).

Another

reason why this area may have been especially hard hit is that
when one looks at column 3 of the bottom half of Table 11 one
notices that the original EZ had almost twice the percentage
of its workforce in
county in 1980.

manufacturing than did the rest of the

Deindustrialization not only hit Jefferson

County hard in general, but may have hit certain areas within
the county harder than others.
Tables 13 through 15 compare the original EZ to
Jefferson County using zip code level data from the U. S.
Commerce Department's 1981 and 1994 County Business Patterns
(CBP).

According to Dowall

(1996, p. 365), since 1981 the

Census Bureau has been keeping zip code level CBP data for the
entire U. S.

The data for firms are presented according to

zip code within each county at the four-digit SIC level.

That

is, for a given zip code, the total number of firms in a fourdigit SIC classification is noted along with a breakdown of
how many firms in that classification fall into different size
categories {e.g., 1 to 4

~mployees,

5 to 9 employees, 10 to 19

employees, etc., up to those firms with 1000 or more

15

-5855=-6890 - 3371 - -4406, or S = R - N - M.
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employees). The data files do not show how many people are
employed within each 4-digit SIC category within each zip, but
this number can be estimated by using state-wide or countywide level data.
For the purposes of this study, Dowall's methodology for
evaluating the 13 California EZs was adapted by aggregating
"the establishment tabulations to the 2-digit level from the
4-digit level of aggregation (4-digit is based on a more
TABLE 13

SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS
Comparison of Original EZ to Jefferson County, 1981-1994
Employment

Agricultural services, etc.

Change 1981-94

1981

1994

Absolute

1210

1508

298

24.63

Percent

479

252

-227

-47.39

Contract Construction

15428

18803

3375

21. 88

Manufacturing

88922

65021

-23901

-26.88

Mining

TPU

16677

27183

10506

63.00

Wholesale Trade

22771

27838

5067

22.25

Retail Trade

56494

74706

18212

32.24

F/I/RE

20100

26002

5902

29.36

Services

67842

122811

54969

81. 03

Other

1775

183

-1592

-89.69

TOTAL

291698

364307

72609

24.89

Original EZ
Agricultural services
Mining
Contract Construction
Manufacturing

4

0

-4

-100

35

21

-14

-40

333

588

255

77

15258

10748

-4510

-30

TPU

1320

1918

598

45

Wholesale Trade

1492

1452

-40

-3

Retail Trade

1210

1195

-15

-1

259

339

80

31

2641

3034

393

15

Other

55

2

-53

-96

TOTAL

22607

19297

-3310

-15

F/I/RE
Services

Source:

1981 and 1994 CBPs.
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specific breakdown of economic activity than 2-digit)U and by
estimating "average employment for each establishment size
category by 2-digit SIC category.u (p. 365).

The estimation

of average employment for each establishment size category in
this study was done by using County Business Patterns total
number of firms and employment state-wide by 2-digit SIC and
TABLE 14

county Growth Effect, Original EZ, 1981-94
Industry

Employment, 1981

Agricultural services, etc.
Mining
Contract Construction

*N

R

R-N=M+S

4

1

-4

-5

35

9

-14

-23

333

83

255

172

15258

3798

-4510

-8308

TPU

l320

329

598

269

Wholesale Trade

1492

371

-40

-411

Retail Trade

1210

301

-15

-316

Manufacturing

F/I/RE

259

64

80

16

2641

657

393

-264

Other

55

14

-53

-67

TOTAL

22607

5627

-3310

-8937

Services

*N - 1981 Original EZ employment X county growth rate of 24.89%.
*R - N

=M+

S:

Net relative change to be explained by shift-share analysis.

Industry Mix Effect, Original EZ 1981-1994
Industry
minus
County
Growth

Industry
County

EZ

Agricultural services, etc.

0.41

0.02

Mining

0.16

0.15

Contract Construction
Manufacturing
TPU
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
F/I/RE
Services

M

-0.26

4

0

-72.28

35

-25

5.29

1. 47

-3.01

333

-10

30.48

67.49

-51.77

15258

-7899

5.72

5.84

38.11

1320

503
-39

7.81

6.60

-2.64

1492

19.37

5.35

7.35

1210

89

6.89

1.15

4.47

259

12

23.26

11.68

56.14

2641

1483

-114.58

Other

0.61

0.24

TOTAL

100

100.00

Source:

EZ Emp.

('II)

1981 and 1994 CBPs.
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55

-63

22607

-5951

by size of firm (Tables Ib and lc of Kentucky CBPs) .
These estimates of average firm employment using statewide
data are then applied to the number of firms identified with
each 2-digit SIC and firm size within each zip code within
Jefferson County.
Following Dowall (pp. 365-366), I used the estimates of
average employment for each firm size category to calculate
the average employment for all size of establishment
categories for each 2-digit level SIC industry within
Jefferson County.

Then, similar to Dowall, I estimated

employment by size category for each 2-digit SIC category for
each zip code within Jefferson County.

The estimates were

determined by multiplying the average employment estimate of a
specific size and 2-digit SIC category by the number of firms
in those categories for all 2 digit SIC categories, for all
firm sizes and for all zip codes.

When total number of jobs

for each zip code was summed, the estimates were only off by
1,636 jobs for 1981 and 2,014 jobs for 1994 when compared to
CBP totals for Jefferson County for those years.
Tables 13, 14, and 15 pretty much reinforce and parallel
the findings of the shift-share analysis of the 1980 and 1990
Census data.

Just as with the 1980 to 1990 time period, the

original EZ 16 experienced negative growth between 1981 and
1994 (-15%) whereas the county experienced a growth rate of
16
The original EZ census tracts closely correspond to the
western half of the area covered by the County's 40203 zip code
and all of the 40210 zip code.
There have been no changes in
zip boundaries wi thin Jefferson County over the fourteen year
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24.89%.

The original EZ, therefore, did not generate a net

gain of jobs over this time frame and did not meet two of the
objectives of KRS 154.45--job and business creation and
retention.

TABLE 13
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Original EZ

1981-1994

1981

1994

R

N

M

4

0

-4

1

0

-5

35

21

-14

9

-25

3

333

588

255

83

-10

182

S*

Industry
Agricultural services, etc.
Mining
Contract Construction

15258

10748

-4510

3798

-7899

-409

TPU

1320

1918

598

329

503

-234

Wholesale Trade

1492

1452

-40

371

-39

-372

Retail Trade

1210

1195

-15

301

89

-405

259

339

80

64

12

4

2641

3034

393

657

1483

-1747

Manufacturing

F/I/RE
Services
Other

55

2

-53

14

-63

-4

TOTAL

22607

19297

-3310

5627

-5951

-2986

*S=R -N - M
Source:

1981 and 1994 CBPs.

Table 14 shows that had the county's growth trend been
achieved in the original EZ, 5,627 jobs would have been
created (see top half, third column,

"N").

On the other hand,

given industry-specific trends, the EZ should have lost 5,951
jobs (see bottom half, last column, "M").

The net effect

would have been a job loss of 324, yet this area actually lost
3,310 jobs.

Table 15, Column "S" implies that this difference

period 1981-1994.
118

of 2,986 (=3310 - 324) is possibly due to some competitive
disadvantage(s) that the original EZ had relative to the
county.

As with the Census data, one can assume the same

possible causes of such a disadvantage.

3. Job Creation in the Fu11-size EZ versus the County,
1980 to 1990 and 1981 to 1994

The next few pages compare the current 45.7 square-mile

EZ, "Full-size EZ", to Jefferson County job creation using the
1980 and 1990 Census data as well as 1980 and 1990 CBP data.
Table 16 shows that the full-size EZ17 suffered a small
decline in job numbers--l,126 jobs lost, or a 1.09% drop.
Table 17 indicates that had the full-size EZ grown at the
county's growth rate, the EZ should have generated 13,226
jobs.

Since -the industry mix effect shows that the full-size

EZ should have lost 3,387 jobs (see last column, bottom of
table) the full-size EZ, according,to shift-share analysis,
should have generated a net of 9,839 jobs. But since the EZ
failed to generate this.number of jobs, and instead lost 1,126
jobs, the EZ has a negative competitive component relative to
the county. In fact, Column "S" of Table 18 shows that the
full-size EZ had a competitive component of 10,965 jobs that
"should" have been retained or created.

Again, shift-share

analysis cannot pinpoint "causality" or explain why the full-

17 This is composed of those census tracts in the original EZ
as well as those census tracts added in 1986.
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size EZ suffered from a negative competitive component.

One

can speculate that perhaps this area suffered from high crime,
poor infrastructure, deindustrialization, etc., although maybe
not to the same degree as the original EZ.

TABLE 16
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS
Comparison of Full-size EZ to Jefferson County, 1980-1990
Employment

Change, 1980-90

1980

1990

Absolute

Percent

1154

2011

857

74.26

Contract Construction

16331

17571

1240

7.59

Manufacturing

90643

68569

-22074

-24.35

Jefferson County

Ag. & Mining

TPU & Wholesale Trade

40948

42168

1220

2.98

Retail Trade

59633

67948

8315

13.94

F/I/RE

20718

26361

5643

27.24

Services & Gov't
TOTAL
Source:

67250

109962

42712

63.51

296677

334590

37913

12.78

1980 and 1990 CBPs
Employment

Change 1980-90

1980

1990

Absolute

Percent

613

687

74

12.07

Full-size EZ

Ag. & Mining
Contract Construction

5180

5722

542

10.46

Manufacturing

40546

33155

-7391

-18.23

TPU & Wholesale Trade

17885

17783

-102

-0.57

Retail Trade

11731

13331

1600

13.64

2184

2759

575

26.33

25352

28928

3576

14.11

103491

102365

-1126

-1.09

F/I/RE
Services & Gov't
TOTAL
Source:

1980 and 1990 Censuses.
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TABLE 17
Jefferson Co. Growth Effect for Full-size EZ 1980-90

Employment

Industry

1980

Ag. & Mining
Contract Construction

R

N

R-M=M+S

613

78

74

-4

5180

662

542

-120

Manufacturing

40546

5182

-7391

-12573

TPU & Wholesale Trade

17885

2286

-102

-2388

Retail Trade

11731

1499

1600

101
296

F/I/RE
Services & Gov't
TOTAL

2184

279

575

25352

3240

3576

336

103491

13226

-1126

-14352

Industry Mix Effect, Full-size Enterprise Zone, 1980-90
Distribution of Total
1980 Employment (%)
Industry

County

Agricultural services,
etc.
Contract Construction

0.39

EZ

0.59

Industry Growth
Rate
minus
County Growth
Rate (%)

61. 48

EZ
Emp. ,
1980

M

613

377

5.50

5.01

-5.19

5180

-269

Manufacturing

30.55

39.18

-37.13

40546

-15056

TPU & Wholesale Trade

13.80

17.28

-9.80

17885

-1753

Retail Trade

20.10

11.34

1.16

11731

137

6.98

2.11

14.46

2184

316

22.67

24.50

50.73

25352

12862

100.00

100.00

103491

-3387

F/I/RE
Services & Gov't
TOTAL

Source:

1980 and 1990
Censuses.
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TABLE 18

Employment and Components of Employment Change, Full-size Enterprise Zone, 1980-90
1980

1990

R

613

687

74

N

M

S

377

-381

Industry
Ag. & Mining
Contract Construction

78

5180

5722

542

662

-269

149

Manufacturing

40546

33155

-7391

5182

-15056

2483

TPU & Wholesale Trade

17885

17783

-102

2286

-1753

-635

Retail Trade

11731

13331

1600

1499

137

-36

2184

2759

575

279

316

-20

25352

28928

3576

3240

12862

-12526

103491

102365

-1126

13226

-3387

-10965

F/I/RE
Services & Gov't
TOTAL

S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive component.
S=R-N-M

The same two areas are compared in Tables 19 through
21 using 1981 and 1994 CBP zip code data. 18

Table 19

indicates that at best the full-size EZ experienced minor
economic growth over the fourteen year period (+3.46%).

Given

the previous analysis of these two areas, one can reasonably
conclude that economic growth in the full-size EZ during the

18 Job figures for the full-size EZ were estimated by using the
Dowall method. Specifically, job estimates for Jefferson County
zip codes that fell entirely wi thin EZ boundaries were not
truncated, whereas zip codes that partially overlapped EZ
boundaries were truncated by one-half or by whatever amount
seemed reasonable given comparisons between zip code and census
tract maps of the county.
This is a crude but necessary
adjustment as acknowledged by Dowall (p. 366) because it
assumes that all businesses are equally spaced throughout a
geographic area.
Specifically, for the purposes of shift share analysis,
the full-size EZ took in all of the 40210, 40209, 40219, 40221
(Louisville International Airport) and 40292 (University of
Louisville) zip codes.
It also took in one-half of zip codes
40203, 40204, 40211, 40212, 40213, 40214, 40216, 40217, and
40258. Finally, one-fourth of zip 40272 was included since a
portion of Riverport Industrial Park is in this zip code.
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TABLE 19

SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS

Comparison of Full-size EZ to Jefferson County, 1981-1994
Employment

Change 1981-94

1981

1994

1210

1508

298

24.63

479

252

-227

-47.39

Absolute Percent

Jefferson County
Agricultural services, etc.
Mining
Contract Construction

15428

18803

3375

21. 88

Manufacturing

88922

65021

-23901

-26.88

TPU

16677

27183

10506

63.00

Wholesale Trade

22771

27838

5067

22.25

Retail Trade

56494

74706

18212

32.24

F/I/RE

20100

26002

5902

29.36

Services

67842

122811

54969

81. 03

Other

1775

183

-1592

-89.69

TOTAL

291698

364307

72609

24.89

280

245

-35

-12.50

95

21

-74

-77.89

4909

4912

3

0.06

39265

25810

-13455

-34.27

Full-size EZ
Agricultural services
Mining
Contract Construction
Manufacturing
TPU

5581

8506

2925

52.41

Wholesale Trade

6858

7165

307

4.48

14390

20332

5942

41. 29

Retail Trade

3199

3291

92

2.88

14424

22148

7724

53.55

Other

371

32

-339

-91. 37

TOTAL

89372

92462

3090

3.46

F/I/RE

Services

Source: 1981 and 1994 CBPs

1980s and early 1990s was pretty much non-existent or stagnant
despite EZ incentives being introduced in 1983 and then
expanded in 1986.

Looking at the top half, third column of

Table 20, the full-size EZ should have created 22,245 jobs had
it grown at the same rate as the county (24.89%).
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At the same

time, the EZ should have lost 9,726 jobs due to the

TABLE 20
county Growth Effect, Full-size EZ, 1981-94
N

Industry

R

R-NmM+S

Employment
1981
Agricultural services, etc.

280

70

-35

-105

95

24

-74

-98

4909

1222

3

-1219

39265

9773

-13455

-23228

TPU

5581

1389

2925

1536

Wholesale Trade

6858

1707

307

-1400

14390

3582

5942

2360

3199

796

92

-704

Mining
Contract Construction
Manufacturing

Retail Trade
F/I/RE

14424

3590

7724

4134

Other

371

92

-339

-431

TOTAL

89372

22245

3090

-19155

Services

Industry Mix Effect, Full-size EZ 1981-1994
Distribution of Total
1981 Employment (%)

Industry

Industry Growth
Rata minus
EZ County Growth Rate
(%)
-0.26
0.31

County
Agricultural services, etc.

0.41

Emp. ,
1981
280

M

-1

Mining

0.16

0.11

-72.28

95

-69

Contract Construction

5.29

5.49

-3.01

4909

-148

30.48

43.93

-51.77

39265

-20327

5.72

6.24

38.11

5581

2127

Manufacturing
TPU
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
F/I/RE

7.81

7.67

-2.64

6858

-181

19.37

16.10

7.35

14390

1057

6.89

3.58

4.47

3199

143

23.26

16.14

56.14

14424

8097

Other

0.61

0.42

-114.58

371

-425

TOTAL

100

100.00

89372

-9726

Services

Source: 1981 and 1994 CBPs.

industry mix effect (bottom half, last column of Table 20) .
Therefore, the EZ should have seen the creation of at least a
net of 12,519 jobs given county and industry mix trends.
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TABLE 21

Employment and Components of Employment Change, Full-size EZ

1981

1994

280

1981-1994

R

N

M

245

-35

70

-1

S*

Industry
Agricultural services, etc.
Mining
Contract Construction
Manufacturing

-104

95

21

-74

24

-69

-29

4909

4912

3

1222

-148

-1071

39265

25810

-13455

9773

-20327

-2901

TPU

5581

8506

2925

1389

2127

-591

Wholesale Trade

6858

7165

307

1707

-181

-1219

14390

20332

5942

3582

1057

1303

Retail Trade

3199

3291

92

796

143

-847

14424

22148

7724

3590

8097

-3963

Other

371

32

-339

92

-425

-6

TOTAL

89372

92462

3090

22245

-9726

-9428

F/r/RE
Services

S is Local Share Effect-area competitive component.
*S=R -N - M

However, since this area only saw 3,090 new jobs
created, the full-size EZ fell short of what job growth trends
would have predicted by 9,428 jobs (see Column "S", Table 21)
Again, the inference is that the full-size EZ had some type,
or several types, of disadvantages that may have held it back
when compared to the county's record of job creation.

Once

again, both data sets indicate that EZ incentives do not seem
to have offset the negative competitive components that this
area faced relative to the county.

4. Job Creation in the Airport area versus the County,
1980 to 1990 and 1981 to 1994
In order to control for any stimulus that EZ incentives
had on the growth of Louisville's airport that may have caused
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it to grow faster than the rest of the full-size EZ, the
following tables were created.
TABLE 22
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS
Comparison of Louisville Airport Area to Jefferson County, 1980-1990
Employment
1980

1990

Employment Change,
1980-90
Absolute Percent

Jefferson County

Ag. & Mining

1154

2011

857

74.26

Contract Construction

16331

17571

1240

7.59

Manufacturing

90643

68569

-22074

-24.35

TPU & Wholesale Trade

40948

42168

1220

2.98

Retail Trade

59633

67948

8315

13.94

F/IIRE

20718

26361

5643

27.24

Services & Gov't

67250

109962

42712

63.51

296677

334590

37913

12.78

TOTAL
Source:

1980 and 1990 CBPs
Employment

Change
1980-90
Absolute

1980

1990

126

218

92

73.02

1230

1507

277

22.52

Percent

Louisville Airport Area

Ag.

&

Mining

Contract Construction
Manufacturing

4775

3688

-1087

-22.76

TPU & Wholesale Trade

3440

7293

3853

112.01

Retail Trade

1479

2604

1125

76.06

221

516

295

133.48

2558

4395

1837

71.81

13829

20221

6392

46.22

F/I/RE
Services & Gov't
TOTAL
Source: 1980 and 1990 Censuses.

Because the airport is somewhat like an industrial park,
it was believed that EZ incentives may have had a greater
effect on this area than on other EZ areas.

The Census data

in Table 22 show the airport growing at a much faster rate
than the rest of Jefferson County.

This is due in large part

to jobs created in TPU and wholesale trade.
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There were also

large percentage increases in Ag. and Mining, F/I/RE and
Services and Gov't, but nearly half of the new jobs created
were in TPU and Wholesale Trade.

TABLE 23

Jefferson Co. Growth Effect for Louisville Airport Area 1980-90
Employment

Industry

N

R

R-N"'M+S

1980

Ag. & Mining
Contract Construction

126

16

92

76

1230

157

277

120

Manufacturing

4775

610

-1087

-1697

TPU & Wholesale Trade

3440

440

3853

3413

Retail Trade

1479

189

1125

936
267

F/I/RE

221

28

295

2558

327

1837

1510

TOTAL

13829

1767

6392

4625

Industry Mix Effect, Louisville Airport

Area, 1980-90

Services & Gov't

Distribution of Total
1980 Employment (%)
Industry
County

Agricultural services, etc.
Contract Construction

0.39

Industry
Growth Airport County Growth Emp. ,
(%)
1980
0.91
61. 48
126

M

77

5.50

8.89

-5.19

1230

-64

Manufacturing

30.55

34.53

-37.13

4775

-1773

TPU

13.80

24.88

-9.80

3440

-337

20.10

10.69

1.16

1479

17

6.98

1. 60

14.46

221

32

22.67

18.50

50.73

2558

1298

100.00

100.00

13829

-750

&

Wholesale Trade

Retail Trade
F/I/RE
Services

&

Gov't

TOTAL

Table 23 shows that the airport created jobs across all
industries (with the exception of manufacturing) at a rate
greater than the county whereas industry trends show that the
airport fell short of generating 750 jobs that should have
been created ("M").
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Finally, Table 24

(next page) shows that the airport had

a positive competitive component relative to the county in
that 4,486 jobs were created due to the fact that airport job
growth rates outperformed the overall county average despite
not outperforming industry growth rates.

However, it should

be pointed out that during this time period of 1980 to 1990,
the airport underwent massive reconstruction and expansion.
Millions of dollars from the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and bonds sold by the Commonwealth of Kentucky financed
the construction of a second runway for the airport.

This

second runway allowed United Parcel Service (UPS) to expand
its operations from a nearly 1,000 employees in 1981 to nearly
14,000 by 1994.

Therefore, EZ incentives cannot be given full

credit for this expansion in jobs at Louisville International
Airport.
Finally, the Coomes and Price database, which used 1980
and 1990 Census data, defined the Louisville airport as
covering four 1990 census tracts:
119.01.

tracts 55, 91.01, 92, and

This area is actually slightly larger than the area

encompassed by the airport itself and so this may cause the
airport job numbers to be slightly larger than if one used the
airport's exact boundaries.

Perhaps Coomes and Price should

have labeled this as the "airport area."
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TABLE 24

Employment and Components of Employment Change, Louisville Airport Area, 1980-90

1980

1990

126

218

92

1230

1507

N

R

M

S

16

104

-28

277

157

-34

154

Industry

Ag. & Mining
Contract Construction
Manufacturing

4775

3688

-1087

610

-797

-900

TPU & Wholesale Trade

3440

7293

3853

440

-128

3541

Retail Trade

1479

2604

1125

189

19

917

F/I/RE
Services & Gov't
TOTAL

221

516

295

28

66

201

2558

4395

1837

327

910

600

13829

20221

6392

1767

139

4486

S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive component.
S-R-N-M

Table 25 uses CBP data at the zip code level to look at
job growth in the airport.

For zip code purposes, Louisville

International Airport has been classified as zip code 40221
for at least the last 16 years
Office) .

(Louisville Branch, U. S. Post

The zip code boundary more closely reflects the

airport boundaries than the four census tracts used by Coomes
and Price.

Because of a smaller geographic area covered,

Table 25 shows no employment in some major industry
categories.

This is to be expected because as one goes from a

larger area to a smaller area, one expects to find fewer
firms.

Table 25 shows job growth at a rate better than the

other areas examined under the EZ, but this growth rate is
still not as good as that of the county's as a whole.
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TABLE 25
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS
Comparison of Louisville Airport to Jefferson County using CBP Zip Coda Data

Employment

Change 1981-94

1981

1994

Absolute

Percent

1210

1508

298

24.63

479

252

-227

-47.39

Jefferson County

Agricultural services, etc.
Mining
Contract Construction

15428

18803

3375

21. 88

Manufacturing

88922

65021

-23901

-26.88

TPU

16677

27183

10506

63.00

Wholesale Trade

22771

27838

5067

22.25

Retail Trade

56494

74706

18212

32.24

F/I/RE

20100

26002

5902

29.36

Services

67842

122811

54969

81. 03

Other

1775

183

-1592

-89.69

TOTAL

291698

364307

72609

24.89

Change, 1981-94
Airport-Entire

40221 Zip Coda

Absolute

-4

o
o

o
o
o

0

0.00

0

0.00

5311

255

-5056

-95.20

Agricultural services, etc.

4

Mining
Contract Construction
Manufacturing

Percent

-100.00

TPU

3022

18965

15943

527.56

Wholesale Trade

1235

6226

4991

404.13

Retail Trade

7337

2079

-5258

-71. 66

F/I/RE

5816

1010

-4806

-82.63

Services

1021

241

-780

-76.40

14

-109

-88.62

28790

4921

20.62

Other

123

TOTAL

23869

Source:

1981' and 1994 CBPs.

In fact, Table 26 shows the airport should have
generated 5,941 jobs if it had grown at the county growth
rate, yet it fell short by 1,020 jobs.

Despite very strong

growth in TPU and wholesale trade, this area lost quite a few
manufacturing, retail, F/I/RE, and service jobs.
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I can only

TABLE 26

County Growth Effect, Louisville Airport, 1981-94

Industry

Emp. , 1981

N

R-N-M+S

R

Agricultural services, etc.

4

1

-4

-5

Mining

0

0

0

0

Contract Construction

0

0

0

0

Manufacturing

5311

1322

-5056

-6378

TPU

3022

752

15943

15191

Wholesale Trade

1235

307

4991

4684

Retail Trade

7337

1826

-5258

-7084

F/IIRE

5816

1448

-4806

-6254

Services

1021

-1034

254

-780

Other

123

31

-109

-140

TOTAL

23869

5941

4921

-1020

Industry
- Co.
Growth

Emp.
1981

Industry Mix Effect,

Airport
Distribution of Total
1981 Employment ('Is)

Industry

County

Airport

M

Agricultural services, etc.

0.41

0.02

-0.26

4

0

Mining

0.16

0.00

-72.28

0

0

Contract Construction
Manufacturing
TPU
Wholesale Trade

5.29

0.00

-3.01

0

0

30.48

22.25

-5l. 77

5311

-2750

5.72

12.66

38.11

3022

1152

7.81

5.17

-2.64

1235

-33

19.37

30.74

7.35

7337

539

6.89

24.37

4.47

5816

260

23.26

4.28

56.14

1021

573

Other

0.61

0.52

-114.6

123

-141

TOTAL

100

100

23869

-399

Retail Trade
F/IIRE
Services

speculate that airport expansion may have caused many firms in
these categories to leave the area.

Table 26 also shows that

the airport carne up short as far as industry mix effects.
Because employment growth in the airport did not reflect
industry growth trends, the column M indicates that the
airport did not see 399 jobs created due to industry trends.
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Finally, Table 27 implies that the airport had a small
negative competitive component relative to the county.
Overall,

job generation, if county and industry growth trends

had been replicated in the 40221 zip code, 621 more jobs

should have been generated between 1981 and 1994 than was
actually created.

TABLE 27

Employment and Components of Employment Change, Louisville Airport, 1981-1994
Industry

1981

Agricultural services, etc.

4

Mining

0

Contract Construction

0

1994

R

0

-4

0

0

0

0

M

S*

1

0

-5

0

0

0

0

0

0

N

Manufacturing

5311

255

-5056 1322 -2750

-3628

TPU

3022

18965

15943

752

1152

14039

Wholesale Trade

1235

6226

4991

307

-33

4717

Retail Trade

7337

2079

-5258 1826

539

-7623

F/I/RE

5816

1010

-4806 1448

260

-6514

Services

1021

241

Other

123

14

TOTAL

23869

28790

-780

254

573

-1607

-109

31

-141

1

4921 5941

-399

-621

*S"'R-N-M

S is "local share effect" showing an area's competitive component.

It should be noted, however, that job growth in this
area was very uneven.

Probably because of UPS, growth in TPU

and wholesale trade almost offset job losses in other
industries.

Also, if firms dislocated due to airport

expansion stayed in an area close to the airport or within the
EZ, then outcomes from the analysis of airport CBP data may be
underestimating job growth in this area.
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5. Summary

Overall, it does not appear on the surface that EZ
incentives did a great deal to stimulate job growth in the
targeted areas (with the possible exception of the airport
area).

One objection that could be raised against this

speculation is that if it had not been for the EZ incentives,
then job losses in the EZ (whether in the original EZ or the
full-size EZ) would have been even worse. There is, of course,
no direct way to refute this possible outcome. In fact, OED
claims that EZ incentives helped to create 18,000 new jobs
between 1983 and 1996.

It has never said whether these 18,000

jobs were "net" of jobs lost.

However, OED cannot say that

these were net jobs gained because the data herein show this
to be impossible.

However, the results above do not appear

consistent with OED's claim that the EZ is a "$1 Billion
Success Story" (OED Press Release, 1990).
Also, if it can be shown that other areas in Jefferson
County similar to the EZ had attained job growth rates greater
than the EZ during the same time period, and if these areas
had done so without any type of government intervention,
assistance and/or incentives, then the OED claim about success
would be further questioned.

Consistent with the logic of

quasi-experimentation, such comparisons would be in order.
The next chapter examines these issues in more detail.
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CHAPTER VII

Job Creation in Contro1 and Comparison Communities

1. Job Creation in the Newburg Area versus Jefferson
County,
1980 to 1990 and 1981 to 1994

As mentioned in Chapter 4 and in the previous chapter, it
is important to and consistent with the logic of quasiexperimentation to compare changes in the full-size EZ and its
component parts to other areas in Jefferson County and to
Jefferson County as a whole.

Since these other areas did not

receive the economic development stimulus of EZ incentives, it
is important to establish whether other areas comparable to
the EZ areas changed similarly over time when compared to the
EZ.
For that reason, the Newburg area was chosen as a control
area to be compared to the EZ because of its socioeconomic and
demographic similarities to the original EZ.

Using 1980 and

1990 Census data again, Table 28 shows that the Newburg area
saw mild job loss between 1980 and 1990 (a decline of just
.31%).

This, of course, is far behind the county's overall

growth rate of 12.78%.

But it is better than what the Census

data show for both the original and full-size EZ during the
same time period. 19

If job growth in the Newburg area had

19 Recall that census tracts that comprised the Newburg Area
were included as a control area to be compared to EZ areas
because of the socioeconomic profile of the area and because
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been the same as the county's from 1980 to 1990, then Newburg
should have gained 4,367 jobs (Table 29, column 3, top half).

At the same time, the industry mix effect shows that because
of the Newburg area's industrial composition in 1980, it
should have lost 5,609 jobs (Table 29, last column, bottom

half).

This is probably due to the high concentration of

manufacturing jobs within Newburg in 1980:

57.71% of

Newburg's workforce was in manufacturing whereas the county
had 30.55% in manufacturing (Table 29, bottom half, columns 2
and 3).
Table 30 shows that because Newburg lost only 106 jobs
when it should have lost a net of 1,242 (=4,367 - 5,609) jobs,
the area had a positive competitive component of 1,136 (=1,242
- 106) jobs.

Newburg was able to "cut its 10sses H by

experiencing job growth in all of the other industrial sectors
outside of manufacturing.

In this way, the Newburg area was

at least able to remain static rather than decline like both
versions of the EZ.

More importantly, it was able to do so

without any economic development stimulus like EZ incentives.

the Newburg area received none of the economic development
stimulus or treatment that either the original or full-size EZ
received.
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TABLE 28
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS
Comparison of Newburg Area to Jefferson County, 1980-1990
Jefferson County

Change 1980-90

Emp~oyment

Industry

1980

1990

Ag. & Mining

1154

2011

Abso~ute

Percent

857

74.26

Contract Construction

16331

17571

1240

7.59

Manufacturing

90643

68569

-22074

-24.35

TPU & Wholesale Trade

40948

42168

1220

2.98

Retail Trade

59633

67948

8315

13.94

F/r/RE

20718

26361

5643

27.24

Services & Gov't

67250

109962

42712

63.51

296677

334590

37913

12.78

TOTAL

Source:

1980 and 1990 CBPs
Emp~oyment

Change 1980-90

1980

1990

105

203

Absolute Percent

Newburg Area

Ag.

&

Mining

Contract Construction
Manufacturing
TPU & Wholesale Trade

98

93.33

1355

1570

215

15.87

19718

14346

-5372

-27.24

4261

5203

942

22.11

Retail Trade

3820

4982

1162

30.42

F/r/RE

1098

1200

102

9.29

Services & Gov't

3810

6557

2747

72 .10

34167

34061

-106

-0.31

TOTAL

Source:

1980 and 1990 Censuses.

TABLE 29
Jefferson Co. Growth Effect for Newburg Area, 1980-90

Industry

Employment

N ..
1980

Ag. & Mining

Emp~oyment

County Growth
Rate(12.78%)

1980 X
R-N=M+S

R

105

13

98

85

1355

173

215

42

19718

2520

-5372

-7892

TPU & Wholesale Trade

4261

545

942

397

Retail Trade

3820

488

1162

674

F/r/RE

1098

140

102

-38

3810

487

2747

2260

34167

4367

-106

-4473

Contract Construction
Manufacturing

Services & Gov't
TOTAL
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TABLE 29 , CONTINUED.
Industry Mix Effect, Newburg Area, 1980-90
Distribution of Total
1980 Employment (%)
Industry
Industry Growth minus
County Growth

(%)

Newburg
Emp ..
1980

County

Newburg

0.39

0.31

61. 48

105

65

5.50

3.97

-5.19

1355

-70

M

Agricultural services,
etc.
Contract Construction
Manufacturing

30.55

57.71

-37.13

19718

-7322

TPU & Wholesale Trade

13.80

12.47

-9.80

4261

-418

Retail Trade

20.10

11.18

1.16

3820

44

6.98

3.21

14.46

1098

159

22.67

11.15

50.73

100.00

100.00

F/I/RE
Services & Gov't
TOTAL

3810

1933

34167

-5609

TABLE 30
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Newburg Area, 1980-90
1980

1990

105

203

R

N

M

13

65

S

Industry

Ag. & Mining
Contract Construction

98

20

1355

1570

215

173

-70

112

19718

14346

-5372

2520

-7322

-570

4261

5203

942

545

-418

815

Retail Trade

3820

4982

1162

488

44

630

F/I/RE

1098

1200

102

140

159

-197

Services & Gov't

3810

6557

2747

487

1933

327

34167

34061

-106

4367

-5609

1136

Manufacturing
TPU & Wholesale Trade

TOTAL

S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive component.
S=R-N-M

Tables 31 to 33 show a slightly different story for the
Newburg Area.

Since half of the Newburg area is in zip code

40218 and the other half is in zip 40219,

I divided the number

of jobs for each industrial sector for each zip code by two
and then combined the resulting numbers.

This is a crude

method of approximation since it assumes that jobs are equally
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distributed geographically throughout a zip code, but it is
the only way to arrive at a rough job estimate for the area.
Also, the estimate for the total number of jobs for the
Newburg area shows wide variation between the estimates given
by CBP zip code data and the Census data.

In addition to

using the step mentioned in the previous paragraph in order to
arrive at job figures for Newburg, the Dowall method that I
followed estimated that in 1981 the total number of jobs in
Newburg was 12,560.

For 1980, the Census data show that this

area had a total of 34,167 jobs.

Despite the fact that 1981

was a recession year, an economic downturn could not explain
this great of a drop in the number of jobs from one year to
the next. So far,

the two methods have rendered numbers that

were reasonably close, given that two different data sets are
being analyzed.

With regard to the Newburg area, perhaps the

Dowall method does not accurately reflect actual job
conditions in 1981 and 1994 because of the crudeness of having
to arbitrarily divide zip codes into halves.

By arbitrarily

splitting both zip codes in half, the actual job performance
of the Newburg area may not be accurately reflected in tables
31 to 33 since Newburg is only a small portion geographically
of both zip codes when the two zip codes are combined.
However, despite the fact that the CBP zip code numbers
for the Newburg area for 1981 and 1994 do not correspond very
well with the Census data, there may be some patterns that the
data show that are worth examination. 2o

20

Interestingly, Table

Also, notice that both the 1981 and 1994 CBP zip code
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31 shows that between 1981 and 1994 the Newburg area saw the
development of 2,900 new jobs for a growth rate of 23.09%.

TABLE 31
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS
Comparison of Newburg Area to Jefferson County using CBP Zip Coda Data
Empl.oyment

Change 1981-94

1981

1994

1210

1508

298

24.63

Absol.ute

Percent

Jefferson County

Agricultural services, etc.

479

252

-227

-47.39

Contract Construction

15428

18803

3375

21. 88

Manufacturing

88922

65021

-23901

-26.88

TPU

16677

27183

10506

63.00

Wholesale Trade

22771

27838

5067

22.25

Retail Trade

56494

74706

18212

32.24

F/IIRE

20100

26002

5902

29.36

Services

Mining

67842

122811

54969

81. 03

Other

1775

183

-1592

-89.69

TOTAL

291698

364307

72609

24.89

Change 1981-94
Newburg Area--Part 40218 and part 40219 Zip Codas

Absol.ute

Percent

Agricultural services, etc.

83

65

-18

-21.69

Mining

20

0

-20

-100.00

935

890

-45

-4.81

3122

2555

-567

-18.16

Contract Construction
Manufacturing
TPU

661

960

299

45.23

Wholesale Trade

622

883

261

41.96

4023

5695

1672

41. 56

702

706

4

0.57

2347

3701

1354

57.69

Retail Trade
F/IIRE

Services
Other

45

5

-40

-88.89

TOTAL

12560

15460

2900

23.09

Source:

1981 and 1994 CBPs.

This growth rate is only slightly below the county's growth

numbers are less than half those of the Coomes and Price data
for each year.
Therefore, there is at least some
proportionality when it comes to the discrepancies between the
data sets.
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rate of 24.89%.

Growth in TPU, wholesale trade, retail trade

and services more than offset losses in agriculture, mining,
construction and manufacturing.

TABLE 32

County Growth Effect, Newburg Area, 1981-94

Industry

Emp. , 1981

N

83

Agricultural services, etc.

-21

R-N=M+S

R

-18

-39

20

5

-20

-25

935

233

-45

-278

3122

777

-567

-1344

TPU

661

165

299

134

Wholesale Trade

622

155

261

106

4023

1001

1672

671

Mining
Contract Construction
Manufacturing

Retail Trade

702

175

4

-171

2347

584

1354

770

Other

45

11

-40

-51

TOTAL

12560

3126

2900

-226

F/I/RE
Services

Industry Mix Effect, Newburg Area
Distribution of Total
1981 Employment (%)
Industry

County

Newburg

Industry County
Growth(%)

Employment
1981
83

-0.2

M

Agricultural services, etc.

0.41

0.66

-0.26

Mining

0.16

0.16

-72.28

20

-14.5

Contract Construction

5.29

7.44

-3.01

935

-28.1

30.48

24.86

-51.77

3122

-1616.3

TPU

5.72

5.26

38.11

661

251. 9

Wholesale Trade

7.81

4.95

-2.64

622

-16.4

19.37

32.03

7.35

4023

295.7

Manufacturing

Retail Trade

6.89

5.59

4.47

702

31. 4

23.26

18.69

56.14

2347

1317.6

Other

0.61

9·36

-114.58

45

-51.6

TOTAL

100

100

12560

170

F/I/RE
Services

Table 32 shows that had this area grown at the county's
growth rate, it should have produced 3,126 jobs (third column,
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top half) .

And the industry mix effect shows that it should

have generated 170 new jobs between 1981 and 1994 (bottom
half, last column).

Finally, Table 33 shows that Newburg

TABLE 33

Employment and Components of Employment Change, Newburg Area, 1981-1994
Industry

1981

1994

Agricultural services, etc.

83

65

-18

21

-0.2

-39

Mining

20

0

-20

5

-14.5

-11

935

890

-45

233

-28.1

-250

777

-1616.3

272

R

Contract Construction
Manufacturing

N

S*

M

3122

2555

-567

TPU

661

960

299

165

251. 9

-118

Wholesale Trade

622

883

261

155

-16.4

122

4023

5695

1672

1001

295.7

375

Retail Trade

702

706

4

175

31. 4

-202

2347

3701

1354

584

1317.6

-548

Other

45

5

-40

11

-51. 6

1

TOTAL

12560

15460

2900

3127

170

-397

F/I/RE
Services

*S=R-N-M
S is "local share effect" showing an area's competitive component.

a negative competitive component relative to the county by
failing to generate 397 jobs that it should have.

This number

results from the addition of 3,127 and 170 jobs (N and M)
minus the actual number of jobs created--2,900 ("R").
Despite differing numbers and slightly different
outcomes when it comes to competitive component, I believe
that Tables 31 through 33 basically show the same thing that
the Census data show.

The Newburg area essentially "held its

own" during the 1980s and early 1990s. That is, it either came
close to matching county and industry specific growth rates,
or Newburg gained just enough new jobs to roughly offset the
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jobs that it lost.

This seems to have occurred despite the

fact that the type of incentives offered in the EZ were not
offered in the Newburg area.

In fact, there are no economic

development incentives in place that have targeted the Newburg
area.

This is especially important when comparing Newburg to

the original EZ.

Free market forces seem to have done a

better job of helping Newburg hold its own than EZ incentives
did in trying to revitalize the original EZ.
How then could an area that is one of the poorest in
Jefferson County (and probably the poorest outside of the City
of Louisville) outperform the EZ, especially the original EZ?
Most importantly, is the comparison to Newburg
methodologically justified?

With regard to the first

question, it should be noted that there are several industrial
parks in the Newburg area that are located not far from
Interstate 65 and Louisville International Airport.

Also,

both the CBP zip code data as well as the Census data show
that retailing and services grew dramatically in this area.
The Newburg area takes in or is adjacent to major
thoroughfares such as Bardstown Road, Newburg Road, Poplar
Level Road, Indian Trail Lane, Preston Highway, Old
Shephardsville Road and Outer Loop.

These roads/highways have

seen the proliferation of new shopping centers, restaurants,
and a large shopping mall (Jefferson Mall) over the last 20
years or so.

It is possible that suburban sprawl due to cheap

and available land is largely responsible for this, despite
the fact that the Newburg area is a lower middle class to
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lower income area.

However, as Schmenner (1982) points out,

taxes and regulation are only two of many considerations that
a business mulls over when it decides on a location.
With regard to the second question, perhaps the
accessibility to major roadways and the availability of cheap
land helped the Newburg area to outperform the EZ.

This may

mean that despite the dour socioeconomic and demographic
profiles of Newburg, it may not be fair to compare it to the
EZ, especially the original EZ, because of these possible
local competitive advantages.

However, land is also cheap in

the original EZ (see the analysis in Chapter 5), and the
original EZ is close to Louisville's central business district
as well as major interstate highways and bridges.

Therefore,

there must be other reasons why the EZ did not perform as well
as Newburg.

These reasons will be discussed in the concluding

chapter of this dissertation.

2.

Job Creation in the Jeffersontown-B1ueqrass
Industria1 Park Area versus Jefferson County,
1980 to 1990 and 1981 to 1994

The Jeffersontown-Bluegrass Industrial Park area was
included as a comparison/control community because of the
possible effects that the Louisville airport expansion could
have on the EZ.

Because the Bluegrass area received no

incentives like the EZ or the airport area, it was chosen as
a control area to be juxtaposed to the development in the
airport area.

Although the airport is not an industrial park,

it was the closest comparison area within the EZ to Bluegrass
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Industrial Park.
The Bluegrass area shows the strongest generation of job
growth compared to any area that has been looked at so far,
including Louisville International Airport.

Both data sets

(Census and CBP data at the zip code level) show that this
area not only outperformed both versions of the EZ, but also
outperformed Newburg, Jefferson County as a whole, and the
U.S. when it came to job growth rates.
Using Census data, Table 34, next page, shows that total
job growth in this area was a phenomenal 94.07% between 1980
and 1990.

Every major industrial classification experienced

significant job growth, including manufacturing (+70.1%).
This table shows that "Bluegrass" grew at almost 8 times the
county growth rate and that each industrial sector within the
Bluegrass area grew faster than each sector for the entire
county with the exception of agriculture and mining.
It is not surprising then that the first part of Table
35 shows that at a county growth rate of 12.78%, the Bluegrass
area would have been expected to produce only 1,037 jobs
(column 3).

However, this area actually saw a gain of 7,635

jobs (column 4). Also, according to the industry mix effect,
Bluegrass should have only gained 139 jobs due to
industry-specific trends within Jefferson County (second part,
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TABLE 34
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS
Compari.on of Bluegra•• Indu.trial Park Ar.a to Jeff.r.on county,
1980-1990
Employment
Change, 1980-90
Indu.try

1980

1990

Ab.olute

P.rcent

Ag.

1154

2011

857

74.26

Contract Construction

16331

17571

1240

7.59

Manufacturing

90643

68569

-22074

-24.35

TPU & Wholesale Trade

40948

42168

1220

2.98

Retail Trade

59633

67948

8315

13.94

F/I/RE

20718

26361

5643

27.24

Services & Gov't

67250

109962

42712

63.51

TOTAL

296677

334590

37913

12.78

&

Mining

Sourc.:

1980 and 1990 CBP.
Employment

Chang. 1980-90

1980

1990

Ag. & Mining

169

228

59

34.91

Contract Construction

649

1035

386

59.48

Manufacturing

2147

3652

1505

70.10

TPU & Wholesale Trade

1304

3571

2267

173.85

Retail Trade

1600

2971

1371

85.69

F/I/RE

454

1150

696

153.30

Services & Gov't

1793

3144

1351

75.35

TOTAL

8116

15751

7635

94.07

Ab.olute

P.rcent

Bluegra.. Indu.trial Park

Source: 1980 and 1990 C.n.u •••.

last column).

Finally, Column S of Table 36 shows that the

Jeffersontown-Bluegrass Industrial Park area's competitive
component is +6,459 jobs.

This can be interpreted to mean

that of the 7,635 jobs gained in this area between 1980 and
1990, 6,459 of those jobs were created possibly because of
some competitive advantage(s) that Bluegrass had over the rest
of the county.

County and industry mix effects can only

account for 1,176 out of the 7,635 new jobs.

From 1980 to

1990, the workforce in this area almost doubled by growing
from 8,116 to 15,751 according to the Census data.
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TABLE 35
Jefferson Co. Growth Effect for Bluegrass Industrial Park Area 198090
Employment
Industry
1980

R-N

R

N

=M+S

Ag. & Mining

169

22

59

37

Contract Construction

649

83

386

303

Manufacturing

2147

274

1505

1231

TPU & Wholesale Trade

1304

167

2267

2100

Retail Trade

1600

204

1371

1167

454

58

696

638

F/I/RE
Services & Gov't

1793

229

1351

1122

TOTAL

8116

1037

7635

6598

Industry Mix Effect, Bluegrass Industrial Park Area, 1980-90
Distribution of Total
1980 Employment (%)
Industry

Industry-

1980

County %

Emp.

County

Bluegrass

Ag. and Mining

0.39

2.08

61. 48

169

104

Contract Construction

5.50

8.00

-5.19

649

-34

Manufacturing

30.55

26.45

-37.13

2147

-797

TPU

13.80

16.07

-9.80

1304

-128

20.10

19.71

1.16

1600

19

6.98

5.59

14.46

454

66

22.67

22.09

50.73

1793

910

100.00

100.00

8116

139

&

Wholesale Trade

Retail Trade
F/I/RE
Services
TOTAL

&

Gov't

146

M

TABLE 36
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Bluegrass Industrial Park Area 1980-90
1980

1990

N

R

S

M

Industry

Ag. & Mining

169

228

59

22

104

-67

Contract Construction

649

1035

386

83

-34

337

Manufacturing

2147

3652

1505

274

-797 2028

TPU & Wholesale Trade

1304

3571

2267

167

-128 2228

Retail Trade

1600

2971

1371

204

19 1148

454

1150

696

58

F/I/RE
Services

&

Gov't

TOTAL

1793

3144

1351

229

8116

15751

7635

1037

66

572

910

212

139 6459

S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive component.
S=R-N-M

Shift-share analysis of the Bluegrass area using CBP zip
code level data basically corroborates and reinforces the
analysis using the Census data.

Table 37, part 2, shows that

the area experienced a net gain of 8,005 jobs from 1981 to

TABLE 37
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS
Comparison of Bluegrass Industrial Park Area to Jefferson Co.
using CBP Zip Coda data.
Employment

Change, 1981-94

1981

1994

1210

1508

298

24.63

479

252

-227

-47.39

15428

18803

3375

2l. 88

Absolute

Percent

Jefferson County

Agricultural services, etc.
Mining
Contract Construction
Manufacturing

88922

65021

-23901

-26.88

TPU

16677

27183

10506

63.00

Wholesale Trade

22771

27838

5067

22.25

Retail Trade

56494

74706

18212

32.24

F/I/RE

20100

26002

5902

29.36

Services

67842

122811

54969

8l. 03

Other

1775

183

-1592

-89.69

TOTAL

291698

364307

72609

24.89
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TABLE

37, CONTINUED.

Bluegrass Industrial Park Area-Part of 40299 Zip Code

Change, 1981-94
Absolute Percent

Agricultural Services, etc.

125

114

-11

-8.80

0

0

0

0.00

Contract Construction

1068

1424

356

33.33

Manufacturing

5706

7598

1892

33.16

735

1440

705

95.92

Wholesale Trade

3386

3596

210

6.20

Retail Trade

1423

2613

1190

83.63

424

650

226

53.30

1591

5078

3487

219.17

Mining

TPU

F/I/RE
Services
Other

55

5

-50

-90.91

Total

14513

22518

8005

55.16

Source:

1981 and 1994 CBPs.

1994 for a growth rate of 55.16% (more than twice the county
growth rate for the same time period) .

Using the county

growth rate of 24.89%, the Bluegrass area should have only
seen the creation of 3,612 jobs (Table 38, column 3).

The

second part, last column of Table 38 (next page) shows that
TABLE 38

County Growth Effect, Bluegrass Industrial Park Area, 1981-94

Industry
Employment

Agricultural Services, etc.
Mining

19B1

N

125

31

R

R-N=M+S

-11

-42
0

0

0

0

Contract Construction

1068

266

356

90

Manufacturing

5706

1420

1892

472

735

183

705

522

Wholesale Trade

3386

843

210

-633

Retail Trade

1423

354

1190

836

424

106

226

120

1591

396

3487

3091

Other

55

14

-50

-64

Total

14513

3612

BOOS

4393

TPU

F/I/RE
Services
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Table 38, CONTINUED.
Industry Mix Effect, Bluegrass Industrial Park Area
Distribution of Total
1981 Employment (%)
Industry

County

Industry-

Bluegrass

County %

Emp. ,
1981

M

Agricultural Services, etc.

0.41

0.86

-0.26

125

-0.3

Mining

0.16

0.00

-72.28

0

0.0

Contract Construction
Manufacturing
TPU

5.29

7.36

-3.01

1068

-32.2

30.48

39.32

-51.77

5706

-2953.9

5.72

5.06

38.11

735

280.1

7.81

23.33

-2.64

3386

-89.3

19.37

9.81

7.35

1423

104.5

6.89

2.92

4.47

424

19.0

23.26

10.96

56.14

1591

893.1

Other

0.61

0.38

-114.58

55

-63.0

Total

100

100

14513

-1842

Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
F/IIRE
Services

Source: 1981 and 1994 CBPs.

the Bluegrass area should have lost 1,842 jobs due to the
county's industry mix effect.

Yet the negative industry mix

TABLE 39

Employment and Components of Employment Change, Bluegrass Industrial Park Area,
1981-94
Industry
1981
1994
R
N

Agricultural Services, etc.

*S

M

125

114

-11

31

-0.3

-42

0

0

0

0

0

0

Contract Construction

1068

1424

356

266

-32.2

122

Manufacturing

5706

7598

1892

l420

-2953.9

3426

735

1440

705

183

280.1

242

Wholesale Trade

3386

3596

210

843

-89.3

-543

Retail Trade

1423

2613

1190

354

104.5

731

Mining

TPU

F/I/RE

424

650

226

106

19

102

1591

5078

3487

396

893.1

2198

Other

55

5

-50

14

-63

-1

Total

14513

22518

8005

3613

-1842

6235

Services

S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive component.
*S=R-N-M
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effect was not enough to slow down growth in the Bluegrass
area.

In seeing 8,005 jobs created between 1981 and 1994,

Bluegrass could claim that 6,235 of those jobs were created
due to some possible competitive advantage(s) that it had over
the county (Column S, Table 39).
Once again, "S" is only a residual number and there are
limits as to what can be inferred from its sign (positive or
negative) and its magnitude.

Nevertheless, both data sets are

saying that after controlling for county growth trends and
industry-specific trends, for whatever reason, the
Jeffersontown-Bluegrass Industrial Park area was a net job
gainer in the 1980s and early 1990s.

One could infer from the

Census data that around 85% (=6,459/7,635 X 100) of the new
jobs created in this area were possibly due to some unique
feature(s)

special to the area.

argued using the CBP data.

Almost the same could be

Around 78%

(=6,235/8,005 X 100) of

the new jobs gained in the Bluegrass area between 1981 and
1994 could have possibly been gained due to some attributes of
Bluegrass that made it desirable for job and business growth.
It seems unlikely that such robust job growth results could
have been caused by random chance.
What has caused the Jeffersontown-Bluegrass Industrial
Park area to grow at such a fast pace over the years?

Why did

it greatly outperform the EZ and the airport, much less
Jefferson County?

As mentioned earlier, Schmenner (1982) and

others who have studied business site location decisions have
found that tax incentives and regulatory relief are only two
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of a long list of factors that businesses consider when making
decisions.

In fact, many firms may be willing to locate to a

relatively high taxing and regulatory jurisdiction if these
burdens are offset by such factors as a high amount of local
amenities, low crime rates, good schools and colleges, and an
educated, skilled labor force.
With regard to the Bluegrass area, it must be remembered
that it did not receive any type of economic development
stimulus similar to that received by the EZ or the airport.
It appears reasonable to argue that private market forces had
a great impact on this area.

News reports indicate a

phenomenal growth in housing in this area over the last two
decades because of an abundance of undeveloped and available
land (Stahl, 1997 and Stahl, 1997).

Also, one can see rapid

growth in this area from the Census Bureau data shown in
Chapter 5.

Over the last two decades, the City of

Jeffersontown, home of Bluegrass Industrial Park, has gone
from a semi-rural, underdeveloped portion of eastern Jefferson
County to what would now be called an edge-city.

Legally,

Jeffersontown is a fourth-class city as defined by the
Kentucky Constitution.

It has its own police, fire,

sanitation and public works departments just like many larger
cities in the Commonwealth.

As with other portions of eastern

Jefferson County, this area has grown dramatically over the
last 20 years or so (Coomes and Price, 1994).
As mentioned in an earlier footnote, OED claims that
18,000 new jobs were created in Louisville's EZ between July
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1983 and June 1996 (Shafer, 1996).

However, if

OED figures

from EZ Annual Reports of jobs created are summed, then the
number of new jobs created by the EZ from 1983 to June 30,
1996 is 19,664.

OED attributes this discrepancy to changes

made in record-keeping in 1992.
A survey of EZ certified firms done by the University of
Louisville's Urban Studies Institute (USI) projected a
different amount for jobs created--5,760.

However,

respondents also credited the EZ incentives with "saving"
3,152 jobs and creating or saving 6,333 jobs.

Without regard

to incentives, the 851 companies interviewed indicated that
their workforce had grown by a net of 13,271 employees since
the companies had acquired EZ certification.

However, not all

842 companies had been certified at the time that the zone had
corne into existence.

Some companies had been certified since

1983 whereas others had only been certified for a couple of
years.
Unfortunately, United Parcel Service (UPS) was not
interviewed.

According to a phone conversation in October

1996 that I had with Ken Shapero of UPS's Public Relations
Office, in 1981 UPS employed 900 workers.

As noted earlier in

this dissertation, UPS became part of the EZ in 1986.

Ten

years later, Shapero reported that UPS employed around 14,000
people, 80% of whom are part-time workers.

Adding 14,000 to

the 13,271 jobs that respondents reported would greatly boost
the number of jobs created within the EZ without regard to
incentives.
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Since there does not appear to be any firm estimate of
the number of jobs created due to EZ incentives, this analysis
will use OED's figure of 18,000 new jobs created between 1983
and 1996.

This gives OED the "benefit of the doubt" when it

comes to establishing a hard number on the number of jobs
created within the EZ from 1983 to 1996.
only official numbers that exist.

Also, these are the

This number along with

other possible figures for job creation and/or retention will
be used in a later chapter that evaluates the costeffectiveness of the EZ.
Finally, according to analysis of the USI survey data,
only 26.5% of the survey's respondents said that the EZ
incentives had helped to save jobs, and a little less than
half of the respondents (48.5%) said that EZ incentives had
helped to create new jobs.

These percentages lend some

credence to the results that EZ incentives can be credited
with only creating and/or saving 6,333 jobs.

This number

would only be at best one-third of OED's claim of 18,000 jobs
created and thousands of more jobs saved (which in 1990 was
supposed to have been 24,000 jobs (OED Press Release,
Louisville Enterprise Zone:
Story, 1990))

.21

The

Louisville's $1 Billion Success

Certainly, the results of the survey seem to

OED annual reports only gave numbers for jobs saved or
retained for only a handful of years out of their thirteen
fiscal year (FY) reports (FYs 1983-84 to 1995-96).
For FY
1987-88, OED claims that EZ incentives helped to retain 11,646
jobs.
For FYs 1989-90, 1992-93, 1994-95, and 1995-96, OED
claims that EZ incentives helped to retain 6,003, 1,653, 282,
and 528 jobs, respectively.
There are no job numbers given
for other fiscal years, so there is no hard cumulative number
for the number of jobs retained due to EZ incentives over the
153
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further diminish the claims of success by OED.

3. Summary

In looking back at the results of analyses conducted in
Chapters 5 and 6 as well as this chapter, there are strong and
reasonable doubts about how well the EZ program did with
regard to economically revitalizing the full-size EZ or any
portion of it.

Chapter 5 showed that EZ areas, especially the

original EZ, failed to improve socially and economically at a
rate better than the Newburg area.

Chapter 6 showed that,

with the exception of the Louisville airport, not even strong
job growth throughout Jefferson County was enough to pull most
of the EZ area beyond a stagnant level of job growth at best.
And in regard to the airport, there were probably important
factors other than EZ incentives that helped it to grow.
Finally, this chapter showed that two areas which did not
receive EZ incentives at least matched or outperformed EZ
counterparts when it came to job growth, thus suggesting that
market forces might have been as effective, if not more
effective, than any type of economic development policy
intervention.
With this in mind, the issue of the cost-effectiveness
of the EZ program must be analyzed.

For even if program goals

were not completely met, perhaps program costs could be
justified for whatever small gains were made in the EZ when

fourteen year period.
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compared to program benefits.

That is to say, if one argues

that things could have been worse in the EZ area from 1983 to
1996 without the intervention of EZ incentives, then the
program could be called a modest success, especially if
program benefits outweighed program costs.
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CHAPTER VIII

Costs and Benefits of the EZ and an Ana1ysis
of How We11 it He1ped Disadvantaged Workers

1. Introduction

At the heart of program evaluation is an assessment of
the cost-effectiveness of any policy intervention (Gramlich,
1981; Haveman and Margolis, 1983; Rossi and Freeman, 1983, Ch.
8; Stiglitz, 1988, Ch. 10; Schofield, 1987; and Weimer and
Vining, 1992, Ch. 9).

This chapter examines the costs and

benefits associated with the Louisville and Jefferson County
EZ program when it comes to job creation and retention and
capital investment.

Monitoring and evaluation are important

components in the program planning process.

Outcomes should

be measured against costs to see if the program is performing
efficiently and effectively.

High costs that indicate program

inefficiency can lead to either relevant changes, or to the
formulation of a completely different program if costs are
deemed too high for given outcomes.
One problem consistently noted in the literature on the
analysis of program cost-effectiveness is the difficulty of
measuring outcomes in governmental and non-profit programs.
There are issues of program externalities, shadow-pricing,
opportunity costs and equity to name but a few (Stiglitz,
1988).

For instance, the direct benefits to recipients and

costs of many government welfare programs such as AFDC are

156

well-documented.

But it is much more difficult to measure the

gain to society as a whole for such a program.

In fact, the

belief by many that welfare programs yield fewer benefits to
society, if any, than was previously believed when these
programs were first created, has led to a movement to
drastically curtail these programs and their funding.
Therefore, cost-effectiveness analysis outside of the private
sector can be a very complicated and politicized undertaking.
With regard to the Louisville and Jefferson County EZ
program, the problems of weighing program costs and benefits
are compounded by the lack of monitoring and data collection
done by EZ authorities.

The lack of monitoring provisions

were discussed in detail earlier in Chapter 3.

Because

monitoring and data collection were not fully and adequately
undertaken until mid-1992, data for all but four of the total
years considered in this study are either not available or
incomplete.

For these reasons, many assumptions and estimates

had to made in order to corne up with the dollar amounts used
in the cost-effectiveness analysis presented in this chapter.
Finally, since perhaps the biggest reason for creating
EZs was to provide jobs for the urban poor (Hall, 1977), the
ability of the EZ program to generate such jobs will be
evaluated by looking at that portion of the EZ program that
granted tax credits for firms that hire "disadvantaged
workers."

These issues were described earlier in Chapters 3

and 4.
It appears from the analysis thus far that the EZ
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program has not been a good generator of net new jobs, with
perhaps the exception of the Louisville airport. 22

Also, the

EZ program has not been completely successful with regard to
the social and economic revitalization of EZ neighborhoods
when compared to a control community.

The rest of this

chapter will try to establish whether the costs incurred in EZ
program implementation were at least matched if not offset by
any benefits derived from the program.
2. EZ Program Costs

As outlined in Chapter 3, EZ certified firms were
granted fee and tax waivers in return for engaging in certain
hiring practices and/or investment practices.

Among the

incentives were the following: 1) tax exemptions for capital
gains; 2) special net operating loss write-offs from business
income taxes; 3) exemptions on state motor vehicle usage
taxes; 4) waiver of state sales taxes on the purchase of
building materials, equipment, and machinery; and 5) waiver of
local government inspections, building and permit fees.
Table 40 shows the estimated tax revenue losses
resulting from EZ firms taking advantage of capital gains
exemptions:

$520,310.19.

This incentive was eliminated by

July, 1992.

As the table shows, it is estimated that only

around a half million dollars was lost to this incentive.
Perhaps this is because 10 years (1983 to 1992) is not enough
22 Recall that the airport received millions of dollars of
money from both state and federal sources in order to grow and
expand. These expenditures were not a part of either the EZ
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time for a significant amount of capital appreciation in many
assets.

In any event, it was recommended that the incentive

be dropped because it did not seem to be making a significant
contribution to capital formation or job creation (LRC
Memorandum, No.

460, 1991).

The only definite number for this table was for the
Fiscal Year (FY) 1987-88 as determined by the Kentucky Revenue
Cabinet (LRC Memorandum, No.

460).

Because records for other

years were not kept, and since the incentive was abolished by
the time that better monitoring of the program was in place,
estimates for other years in Table 40 were determined by
multiplying the FY 1987-88 amount ($75,957.69) by a GOP
deflator listed in the 1992 and 1995 editions of the
Statistical Abstract of the United States (U. S. Commerce

Department, 1992 and 1995)

.23

For the first fiscal year after

FY 1987-88, an estimate for FY 1988-89 was calculated by
multiplying $75,957.69 by the GOP deflator number for FY 198889.

Then $78,966.00 was multiplied by the deflator for the

next year in order to get the following year's estimated
amount.

This iteration was used up to FY 1991-92.

For fiscal

years before FY 1987-88, an estimate for FY 1986-87 was
calculated by multiplying $75,957.69 by the GOP deflator for
that year (FY 1986-87).

Then the $75,957.69 was multiplied by

the deflator for the previous year, and so on until FY 1983~rogram or
3 The base

the EZ legislation.
year for the deflator is 1987. This, of course,
assumes that the EZ grew at a rate comparable to real U. S.
Gross Domestic Product. This was probably not so, but absent
any other method of estimation, this was the best technique

159

86.

Also, as in other similar tables in this chapter,

estimates for the first three FYs were divided by seven in
order to reflect the original zone's small size. 24
TABLE 40

Estimated taxes 10st to capita1 gains exemptions
(Incentive was eliminated in 1992)

Amount

Fisca1

GDP Def1ator

Year

1983-84

$9,548.97

0.88

1984-85

$9,874.50

0.91

1985-86

$10,200.04

0.94

1986-87

$73,678.96

0.97

1987-88

$75,957.69

1. 00 Base Year

1988-89

$78,996.00

1.04

1989-90

$82,793.88

1. 09

1990-91

$86,591.77

1.14

1991-92

$92,668.38

1.22

$520,310.19

TOTAL

SOURCES:

A do11ar amount for FY 1988-89 was determined by the Legis1ative Research

Commission with assistance from the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet.

Because records for

other years were not kept, estimates for other years were determined by adjusting
the FY 1988-89 amount by a GDP def1ator (1995 Statistica1 Abstract of the U. S. and
1992 Statistica1 Abstract of the U.S.).

Because of the zone's sma11 size during the first three
fisca1 years of its existence, estimates for FYs 1983-84 to 1985-86 were mu1tip1ied by oneseventh. This was a crude but necessary procedure.

Table 41 shows the estimated state tax revenues lost due
to EZ certified businesses being allowed to deduct net
operating losses (NOL) at full value over the 20 year life of
available.
This is a crude yet necessary adjustment. As the zone grew
and became more geographically dispersed, the sheer number of
businesses eligible to participate in the EZ sky-rocketed.
Some adjustment had to be made for the first two EZs small
sizes:
3.75 and 6.75 square miles, respectively.
24
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the EZ, that is until the year 2003.

For most firms, these

losses are usually capped and can only be carried forward for
a certain period of time.

Allowing such losses to be matched

against future net profits was supposed to allow fledgling
companies a chance to grow and thrive after incurring initial
net losses.

Since most new businesses incur net losses in

their first few years, this provision of the law was enacted
to encourage entrepreneurship.
Like Table 40, the only available and certain dollar
figure for Net Operating Loss Carryforward was for FY 1987-88.
Therefore, the same estimation procedures used in Table 40
were also used in Table 41.
TABLE 41

Estimated Net Operating Loss Carryforward (write-offs)

(incentive was eliminated in 1992)
Fiscal
Year

Amount

GDP Deflator

1983-84

$725,607.02

0.88

1984-85

$750,343.61

0.91

1985-86

$775,080.23

0.94

1986-87

$5,598,717.80

0.97

1987-88

$5,771,874.00

1. 00 Base year

1988-89

$6,002,749.00

1. 04

1989-90

$6,291,342,.70

1. 09

1990-91

$6,579,936.40

1.14

1991-92

$7,041,686.30

1.22

TOTAL

$39,537,337.06

SOURCE: Estimates based upon Kentucky Revenue Cabinet and Legislative Research
Commission disclosed amount for FY 1988-89.
Other years were estimated by using a GDP deflator with a base year of 1987 on the
FY 1988-89 dollar amount (1995 Statistical Abstra9t of the United States, Table 771,
p.

505 and 1992 Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 752, p. 481).
for the first three fiscal years, estimates were reduced by one-seventh

~so,

because of the zone's original small size.

No records existed for other years,

so this method was employed.
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Estimated tax revenues lost due to this provision of the
EZ law were considerable:
period.

$39,537,337.06 over a 9 year

Despite the fact that this incentive was originally

seen as encouraging small business formation,

it too was

eliminated as a tax incentive at the end of FY 1991-1992.

The

Kentucky State Legislature's subcommittee looking into the
state EZ program felt that while this aspect of the EZ law may
have been helping small business formation, there was also the
possibility and some evidence in the local press (Heath, 1991)
to suggest that large, already well-established corporations
were taking advantage of this incentive.

It was also felt

that there was no direct way to link the costs of this
incentive with actual job creation (LRC Memorandum, No.

460).

Table 42 shows the estimated costs of motor vehicle
taxes foregone by the state because of EZ incentives.

Because

the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet only had the actual dollar
amounts and the number of vehicles exempted for FY 1988-89 and
FYs 1991-92 to 1994-95, it was necessary to estimate the data
and dollar values for other years by first calculating the
approximate percentage that EZ vehicles were of all vehicles
registered in Jefferson County for the years for which we had
solid numbers. For the years given, the average was
approximately .33% of 1/3 of 1%.

The number of vehicles

exempted from either full or partial motor vehicle usage
taxation for the years for which we had no number of vehicles
was then estimated by multiplying .0033 by the total number of
registered motor vehicles in Jefferson County for those years
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(Source:

1985, 1990 and 1994 Kentucky Handbook of Economic

Statistics).

Because of poor EZ administration and data

collection, this was a crude but necessary method of
estimation.
Once the number of exempted EZ vehicles were estimated
(see Number of Vehic1es) the amount of taxes lost per vehicle
was calculate (Taxes 10st per Vehic1e).

Using the actual

number of vehicles for the four years for which there were
data (FYs 1991-95), taxes lost per vehicle for those four
years was calculated by dividing the actual amount of taxes
foregone by the number of vehicles.

Next, an amount for the

taxes lost per vehicle was estimated for FY 1990-91 by
dividing taxes lost per vehicle for FY 1991-92.

For FY 1989-

90 the same was done but the resulting number was multiplied
by 5/6.

This was done because state sales taxes were raised

from 5 cents per dollar to 6 cents per dollar on July 1, 1990.
Therefore, an adjustment had to be made because there was a
change in tax rates.
Taxes lost per vehicle for FY 1989-90 were then adjusted
downward by 1.08 in order to arrive at a value for 1988-89.
This method was repeated for each year until FY 1985-86 and
before.

For these periods, each number calculated was divided

by 7 in order to adjust for the size of the EZ during this
time period.
Finally, the Taxes Foregone for each FY in Table 42 were
derived by multiplying the Number of Vehic1es by Taxes 10st

per Vehic1e.

Next, these amounts were summed to arrive at
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$13,911,208.60.

Recall from Chapter 3 that this provision of

the EZ law was amended so that beginning in July 1992 only the
first $20,000 of passenger vehicle (e.g., sedans, station
wagons, etc.) values were exempted from the tax.

This was

done because some business owners in the EZ had registered
high priced luxury cars for their personal use in the name of
their business and had not been paying any taxes on these cars
(Heath, 1991).

In that case, and if such abuses of the law

were widespread, then the dollar amounts estimated for the
years prior to 1991 may actually be higher.

TABLE 42
Estimated Motor Vehicle Usage
Taxes Foregone
Fiscal
Year

Number of
Vehicles

Taxes Foregone

Taxes
Tot. MV'
, of Co.
lost
Jeff Co.
per
Registered
Registered
Vehicle
$401.90
460394

1983-84

217

$87,212.30

1984-85

208

$90,700.48

$436.06

441767

1985-86

211

$98,912.58

$468.78

447654

1986-87

1486

$752,346.94

$506.29

450296

1987-88

1504

$822,387.20

$546.80

455739

1988-89

1538

$908,440.00

$590.50

456306

1989-90

1555

$991,623.50

$637.70

471131

1990-91

1528

$1,262,892.00

$826.50

462694

1991-92

1882

$1,679,835.00

$892.58

464596

0.40%

1992-93

1590

$1,521,022.00

$956.62

463575

0.34%

1993-94

1613

$1,635,806.00

$1,014.14

464697

0.35%

1994-95

1447

$1,915,507.00

$1,323.78

445855

0.32%

1995-96*

1500

$2,144,523.60

$1,429.68

0.34%

Avg.
TOTAL

.33'

$13,911,208.60

*Number of vehicles for this year is estimated.
Source: Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Ky. Handbook of Economic
Statistics.

The next table shows the estimated amount of sales taxes
lost due to exemptions on the purchase of building materials,
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equipment, and machinery.

The Kentucky Revenue Cabinet'

provided dollar amounts for actual sales taxes lost for FYs
1991-92, 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95.

There were no records

for other years.
As an approximation of the taxes lost for other years,
the following method was used.

First, the amount of actual

taxes lost for each of the four years was divided by the
amount of sales taxes collected for Jefferson County for each
of those same four years (Source:
Annual Report).

Kentucky Revenue Cabinet's

When averaged, sales taxes lost each year due

to EZ incentives as a percentage of all Jefferson County sales
taxes was around 3.05%.
Next, sales taxes lost for other years were calculated
by multiplying .0305 by the total sales taxes collected in
Jefferson County for those years.

The only year for which an

amount was not reported was for FY 1987-88. Taxes for this
year were estimated by averaging sales tax collections for FYs
1986-87 and 1988-89.

Finally, sales taxes lost for FY 1995-96

was estimated by averaging the sales taxes lost for the four
previous fiscal years.

Total sales tax revenues for Jefferson

County for FY 1996-96 were arrived at by dividing this
estimate of sales taxes lost ($10,218,415.00) by .0305.

When

added, the total amount of taxes foregone due to sales tax
waivers from FY 1983-84 to FY 1995-96 was estimated at
$91,218,145.39.
The methodology employed to arrive at the numbers
displayed in Table 43 was a crude but necessary ohe given the
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sparse data collected by the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

It

should also be noted that this incentive was the only original
incentive to remain unchanged since 1982.

TABLE 43

Estimated Sales Taxes lost due to exemptions on the purchase of
building materials, equipment and machinery.

Fiscal

Sales taxes lost

Total state sales taxes

Taxes lost

Year

in Ent. Zone

for Jefferson Co.

as % of total
taxes
for Jeff. Co.

$749,989.02

$172,128,628.00

1984-85

$830,037.40

$190,500,386.00

1985-86

$947,012.10

$217,347,040.00

1986-87

$6,754,709.83

$221,465,896.00

1987-88*

$7,095,013.70

$232,623,400.00

1988-89

$7,435,317.63

$243,780,906.00

1989-90

$8,105,150.73

$265,742,647.00

1990-91**

$8,208,727.97

$269,138,622.00

1991-92

$ll, 852, 997.00

$338,036,253.00

1992-93

$12,490,748.00

$344,800,879.00

3.62%

1993-94

$6,976,430.00

$352,045,658.00

1.98%

1994-95

$9,553,597.00

$311,555,144.00

3.07%

1995-96

$10,218,415.00

$335,030,000.00

Total

$91,218,145.39

1983-84

Source:

3.51%

AVG: 3.05%

Kentucky Revenue Cabinet and estimates based on Rev. Cabinet data.

*No data for sales taxes collected in Jefferson Co. for FY 87-88 was ever
compiled according to Gene Brown of Rev. Cabinet.
Dollar values are estimates.
**Sales tax rate raised from 5 cents to 6 cents per dollar
on July 1, 1990.

Besides these incentives, the state was also doing
things in the Louisville EZ which may have had an impact upon
local economic development.

Table 44 shows a listing of

Kentucky Economic Development Bonds issued by the state which
were for projects located in the EZ.
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Although not part of the

EZ program, these bonds must be considered as a possible
stimulus to EZ job creation and retention.

Therefore, they

should be added to the costs of job creation and retention
within the EZ.

By the same token, the airport project funded

by these bonds could be considered an overall public good or
asset.

TABLE 44

Kentucky Economic Development Bonds used in Enterprise Zone Area

Year Issued

Amount

Project Nama

1984
1986
1990
1990
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1993
1993
1994
Total

$10,500,000.00
$3,000,000.00
$300,000.00
$1,000,000.00
$1,000,000.00
$50,000,000.00
$725,000.00
$250,000.00
$500,000.00
$750,000.00
$2,170,000.00
$600,000.00

Louisville Airport
Riverport Industrial Part
Riverport Industrial Park
Washington Apparel Group
Henry Vogt Machine Co.
Louisville Airport
Monfort, Inc.
B. F. Goodrich Co.
Kroger
Kroger
Ford Motor Co.
Hillerich and Bradsby

Source:

$70,795,000.00

Dan Jacovitch, Kentucky Legislative Research Commission.

Unfortunately, despite repeated attempts to collect data
from the LRC and other state agencies on the amount of
interest paid on these bonds as well as attempts to determine
which amounts had been retired and which were still
outstanding, I had to settle upon the face value of the bonds
as an economic development cost.

Therefore, these figures can

be considered a low estimate.
Notice that $60,500,000 of the $70,795,000 in bonds
issued was devoted to the development of Louisville
International Airport.

Along with millions of dollars of

Federal Aviation Administration funding, such an infusion of
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money enabled the airport to add an extra runway and other new
facilities.

Referring back to the shift-share analysis of

Chapter 6, this probably provides an explanation of why the
airport did better than the rest of the EZ when it came to job
creation.

Also, the addition of this runway allowed UPS to

expand and hire more workers.

It is doubtful that EZ

incentives alone would have been enough to allow UPS to grow
from roughly 1,000 employees in 1981, to 8,412 in 1990, and to
nearly 14,000 by September 1996, approximately one year after
the second runway was opened (interview with UPS public
relations, 10/7/96).

In fact, UPS's decision to stay and hire

more workers in the Louisville area was primarily based on the
condition that Louisville's airport was to be expanded and
enhanced (interview, 1996).
Finally, it should be noted that in addition to EZ
incentives and development bonds, the Commonwealth of Kentucky
also has various other incentives at its disposal in order to
recruit new firms to the state or to help existing firms in
the state.

The Kentucky Industrial Development Act and the

Kentucky Job Development Act were passed by the 1992 General
Assembly.

These acts contained incentives that allowed

companies payroll tax credits for workers hired.

However,

according to Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development
records, out of the millions of dollars authorized for
companies to take the tax credit, only a little over $3,000 in
credits have been claimed to date.

Perhaps many firms are

waiting to take the tax credits when earnings become higher,
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but this is only speculation.
In addition to state incentives, KRS 154.45 allowed each
EZ designated area a certain amount of latitude in offering
their own local incentives.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the

City of Louisville and Jefferson County waive or discount
inspections, permits and license fees for certified EZ firms.
Table 45 shows estimates of what the city has foregone in fee
revenues over the years:

$569,194.94.
TABLE 45

Estimates of Building Permit Fees Foregone, 1983-96
Fiscal Year

Amount

GDP Deflator

1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96

$2,597.95
$2,952.22
$3,244.20
$24,154.92
$24,906.10
$24,906.10
$25,902.35
$28,233.56
$29,997.71
$81,647.25
$90,965.25
$166,001.66
$63,685.67
$569,194.94

.88
.91
.94
.97
1. 00
1.04
1. 09

TOTAL

Source: City of Louisville Department of Inspections, Permits and Licenses (IPL) provided
dollar amounts for FYs 1990-91 to 1995-96. Other years were estimated using GDP deflator
numbers used in Tables 8-1 and 8-2. Once again, the estimates for the first three years
of the EZ were divided by seven to reflect the small size of the original EZ.
The total estimated amount of $569,199.08 is probably close to being correct because Paul
Nicholson of IPL said in a June 1996 interview that EZ permit fee waivers and discounts
had cost IPL about $40,000 to $50,000 per year on average since the EZ began in 1983.

Because of a lack of diligent record-keeping, actual
dollar amounts for revenues foregone are only known for FYs
1990-91 to 1995-96.

The other figures listed in Table 45 are

estimates based upon the GOP deflator used in previous tables.
The amount for FY 1990-91 was divided by 1.09 to arrive at
$25,902.49 for FY 1989-90.

Then the estimated amount for FY

1989-90 was divided by the GOP deflator for the previous year
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in order to arrive at the estimated amount of fees foregone
for FY 1988-89.

The same process was repeated until an

estimate was created for FY 1986-87.

Then the estimated

amount for FY 1987-88 was multiplied by the GOP deflator of
.97. 25

Then this amount was multiplied by the previous year's

deflator in order to arrive at the previous fiscal year's
estimate, and so on, until FY 1983-84.

As with other tables,

the estimates for the first three fiscal years were lowered by
dividing the estimates by 7.

Again, this was done to reflect

the small size of the EZ during its first 3 years.
As can be seen, the amount of revenues and fees lost due
to this incentive have not been very large when compared to
the costs of other incentives.

In fact, in an interview with

Paul Nicholson of the Louisville and Jefferson County
Department of Inspections, Permits and Licenses, very few
certified firms within the EZ take advantage of this
incentive.

He could not speculate as to why this was so

(interview, June, 1996).
foregone,

The estimated total amount of fees

$569,199.08, also seems consistent with Nicholson's

estimate that EZ incentives have cost the Department of
Inspections, Permits, and Licenses anywhere from $40,000 to
$50,000 per year on average.
Table 46 takes information from the previous tables in
this chapter as well as other data and gives the total

25 When calculating back in time, numbers for years after the
base year have to be divided by GOP deflator numbers. After
the base year is reached, estimates are then multiplied by GOP
deflator numbers that are less than 1.00 in order to discount
values.
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estimated costs associated with EZ economic development.

The

accuracy of such estimates are questionable because of a lack
of data and cooperation provided by state and local officials.
However, these figures represent the best estimates possible
based upon records available.
Before going further,
need elaboration.

some of the amounts in Table 46

By looking at City of Louisville budget

documents, it was estimated that $532,725 had been spent on
TABLE 46

Estimated Total Enterprise Zone Costs, 1983-96
Expenditures and/or Revenues Foregone

Dollar Amount

Administration and Overhead
Economic Development Bonds
Inspection, Permit and License Fees foregone

$532,725.00
$70,795,000.00
$569,194.94

Sales Taxes lost due to exemptions on the purchase
of building materials, equipment, and
machinery
Motor Vehicle Usage Taxes foregone
Net Operating Loss Carryforward
Taxes lost due to Capital Gains exemptions
Taxes Foregone on exempted interest income earned
from loans to other businesses in the EZ
Tax Credits for hiring disadvantaged workers

$91,218,145.39
$13,911,208.60
$39,537,337.06
$520,310.19

- 0 $46,015.00
$217,129,936.18

TOTAL

administration and overhead for the EZ.

This is a very low

amount given the size of the zone, but it is a reasonable
estimate because the staffing of the Louisville EZ program has
mostly consisted of just two people over the past 14 years.
Such a small staff probably accounts for the lack of recordkeeping and attention to detail that was necessary to
adequately monitor the EZ program.
The category Taxes foregone on exempted interest income

earned from loans to other businesses in the EZ shows a zero
amount because, according to all records reviewed, this
incentive never was used.

Apparently, there was no lending of
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money from one EZ firm to another.
Finally, the amount of $46,015 for Tax Credits for
hiring disadvantaged workers came directly from Kentucky

Revenue Cabinet reports.

This incentive was started in July,

1992, and was intended for the EZ program to put a greater
emphasis on job creation for the long-term unemployed or for
those who had been on some type of public welfare for at least
90 days.

Despite the fact that the original 1982 legislation

was supposed to help such workers, a specific incentive to
hire such workers was not implemented until 10 years later.
This incentive consists of a $1,500 tax credit per
disadvantaged worker hired.

This tax credit can be taken at

any time within a 5 year period after the worker is hired.
The amount $217,129,936.18 was estimated to be the total
costs of EZ economic development incentives.

One could

question whether the amount for economic development bonds
should be included in this list because capital expenditures
via bonds are not called for in the EZ enabling legislation.
However, to ignore the effects of these economic development
bonds would be to ignore the effects of job creation and
retention through government expenditure policies.
control for the impact of these expenditures.

One must

Therefore, it

was decided to include the face value of the bonds as an EZ
cost. 26

In looking at municipal budgets showing bond issues and
expenditures by the City of Louisville and Jefferson County
during this same time period, I could find no evidence of
either of the two governments issuing debt or spending money
for local economic development projects.
Instead, both
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26

If, according to OED estimates, approximately 18,000 new
jobs were created due to EZ incentives (Shafer, 1996); and if
around 24,000 jobs were retained due to the EZ from 1983 to
1990 (1990 OED Press Release); and if 21,193 jobs were
retained due to EZ incentives from 1989 to 1994 (1995 OED
Press Release), then getting a firm number for the total
number of new jobs created as well as jobs saved from these
sources is problematic.
Table 47 shows that if one totals up all the new jobs
created according to OED Annual Reports from 1983 to 1996,
then that number is 19,664, not 18,000.

Also, OED has never

clarified how much overlap there exists between the number of
jobs saved between 1983 and 1990 (24,000) and the number of
jobs saved between 1989 and 1994 (21,193).

However, OED's

1995 Press Release did claim that the total number of jobs
created and/or saved was 32,981 from 1989 to 1994 (1995 OED
Press Release, p. 2). This figure was composed of 11,788 jobs
created and 21,193 jobs saved.

If one were to add 6,212 jobs

to the 11,788 jobs cited, this would bring the total amount of
jobs created to the 18,000 cited in a Courier Journal article
(Shafer, 1996).

Adding 6,212 to 32,981 to bring the total

number of jobs created and/or saved due to EZ incentives to
39,193.

This would also mean that the costs per job created

and/or saved would be roughly $5,540(=$217,129,936.18/39,193).
Is this cost too high or too low? The best way to gauge this
is to compare it to the benefits per job created and/or saved.
governments' capital expenditures were mostly focused upon
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3. EZ Program Benefits

Table 47 provides an estimate of the possible tax
revenues generated by new jobs created by EZ incentives.

As

pointed out in an earlier chapter, OED claims that roughly
18,000 jobs were created due to the EZ program.

However,

Table 47 shows that when one uses OED annual reports and sums
the number of reported jobs created in each of those annual
reports, the number of new jobs is 19,664.

Nevertheless, I

will use the 19,664 number in order to estimate EZ financial

TABLE 47

Enterprise Zone Job Creation and
Retention
Fiscal

Jobs Created

Year

(new to Zone)

Est.
Hourly
Wage *

Cumulative

Cumulative

Total Wages

Taxes Paid

Over the years

Over the years, 10'

1983-84

606

$7.50

$9,453,600.00

$945,360.00

1984-85

542

$7.50

$17,908,800.00

$1,790,880.00

1985-86

323

$7.50

$22,947,600.00

$2,294,760.00

1986-87

927

$7.50

$37,408,800.00

$3,740,880.00

1987-88

2413

$7.50

$75,051,600.00

$7,505,160.00

1988-89

3312

$7.50

$126,718,800.00

$12,671,880.00

1989-90

1999

$7.50

$157,903,200.00

$15,790,320.00

1990-91

2613

$7.50

$198,666,000.00

$19,866,600.00

1991-92

999

$7.50

$214,250,400.00

$21,425,040.00

1992-93

1807

$7.50

$242,439,600.00

$24,243,960.00

1993-94

1250

$7.50

$261,939,600.00

$26,193,960.00

1994-95

860

$7.50

$275,355,600.00

$27,535,560.00

2013

$7.50

$306,758,400.00

$30,675,840.00

$1,946,802,000.00

$194,680,200.00

1995-96
TOTAL

19664

public housing, roads, parks, etc.
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TABLE 47,

CONTINUED.

Fiscal Year

Cumulative

Cumulative

Cumulative Total

Total Wages

Taxes paid from

Taxes paid from

(jobs saved)

jobs saved

jobs saved and

OVer the years

(estimated @ 10%)

created.

1983-84

Jobs
Retained**
0

$0.00

$0.00

$945,360.00

1984-85

0

$0.00

$0.00

$1,790,880.00

1985-86

0

$0.00

$0.00

$2,294,760.00

1986-87

0

$0.00

$0.00

$3,740,880.00

1987-88

11646

$181,677,600.00

$18,167,760.00

$25,672,920.00

1988-89

0

$181,677,600.00

$18,167,760.00

$30,839,640.00

1989-90

6003

$275,324,400.00

$27,532,440.00

$43,322,760.00

1990-91

0

$275,324,400.00

$27,532,440.00

$47,399,040.00

1991-92

0

$275,324,400.00

$27,532,440.00

$48,957,480.00

1992-93

1653

$301,111,200.00

$30,111,120.00

$54,355,080.00

1993-94

0

$301,111,200.00

$30,111,120.00

$56,305,080.00

1994-95

282

$305,510,400.00

$30,551,040.00

$58,086,600.00

1995-96

528

$313,747,200.00

$31,374,720.00

$62,050,560.00

20112

$2,410,808,400.00

$241,080,840.00

$435,761,040.00

TOTAL

*Assumes $7.50/hour because 1995 OED report stated that this was avq. wage across all
industries.
Ky. Revenue Cabinet reported that avq. hourly wage for FY 93-94 and FY 94-95
were only $7.63 and $8.00, respectively.
**These are the only years for which OED gave numbers for jobs
retained. The TOTAL number, however, is close to a 1990 OED report
which claims that between 1983 and 1990, EZ incentives had helped to
retain 24,000 jobs.
In 1995, OED issued a report claiming that the EZ
had helped to save around 21,000 between 1989 and 1994. However,
neither of these two reports listed jobs retained by fiscal year.
Source: Louisville and Jefferson Co. Office for Economic Development
(OED) .

benefi tS. 27
Table 47 assumes that each job created was full-time,
year-round, and paid

$7~50

per hour.

OED claims that on

average EZ wages are $7.50 per hour, although the presence in
the EZ of some high paying firms such as Ford Motor Company
may skew this number upward.

OED also claims that all of the

The discrepancy between the two numbers is probably due to
either some firms being de-certified between the time of the
last OED annual report and the time of OED spokesperson
Pettison's proclamation that the EZ should be credited with
creating 18,000 jobs or due to revisions made for previous
years.
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27

jobs it counts are full-time and year-round (interview with
Paul McGowan of OED, 9/96).

According to surveys of firms by

USI, it is estimated that around 95% of all their workers are
full-time.

The surveys did not ask about average pay.

Therefore, OED claims were used to obtain the estimates in
Table 47.
Making generous assumptions based upon the information
above (that is, that each worker worked 40 hours per week, 52
weeks per year, and earned $7.50 per hour) this means that the
typical EZ worker earned $15,600 per year from 1983 to 1996.
According to Coomes and Kornstein (1996, p.28), these annual
earnings are far below what typical Louisville metro area nonmanufacturing and manufacturing jobs paid in 1993:
approximately $23,000 for non-manufacturing and roughly
$38,000 for manufacturing.

Even though OED may claim that EZ

incentives helped to create around 18,000 new jobs, the
quality of pay for these new jobs may be debatable when
compared to how well others are paid throughout the
metropolitan area.

In fact, by today's standards, one who

earns $15,600 per year would be living at or below the poverty
line if he or she had any non-working dependents.
The typical EZ worker like all workers in Jefferson
County would have to pay city, county, and Jefferson County
Public School occupational taxes of 2.2%.

Such a person would

also probably be in Kentucky's lowest income tax bracket of 4%
and would qualify for the state's low income tax credit.
Kentucky state sales taxes of 6 cents on the dollar would also
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hit this person hard.

However, if one assumes that a person

at this income level spends a large portion of his or her
budget on food, then the sales tax burden is probably not as
onerous since food is not taxed.

With all this in mind, Table

47 assumes that each person employed due to EZ incentives paid
to the state and local governments approximately 10% of his or
her income in taxes.
In cumulative terms, Table 47 shows that given jobs
created and retained, state and local governments should have
received $435,761,040 in taxes from EZ workers from 1983 to
1996.

Taking this amount and dividing by the estimated number

of jobs created and/or retained, one obtains a benefit per job
of around $11,118.

This is a little more than double the

amount calculated for the cost per job created and/or
retained--$5,540.

On the basis of this cost per job to

benefit per job comparison, one could conclude that the EZ
program was a success.
over two to one.

Benefits appear to outweigh costs by

The program appears cost-effective using

this simple criteria.
Table 48 shows the amount of private capital investment
that OED claims that EZ incentives helped to attract (1983 to
1996 OED Annual Reports).

The dollar amounts suggest an

extraordinary amount of business investment in the EZ from
1983 to 1996.

If one were to compute EZ costs per dollar of

investment, then only $0.14 (=$217,129,936.18 /$1,545,248,477)
was spent or foregone in tax revenues due to EZ incentives in
order to attract this volume of capital.
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This is a very small

amount.
If all of this capital investment resulted in net job
creation (i.e., more jobs were created by capital than
replaced or supplanted by capital investment), and if all of
this investment helped increased the profitability of EZ
firms,

then the state would have received even more taxes paid

on business profits and wages than if EZ incentives had not
been in place.

There exists no data to either support or

refute this claim.

However, if business tax receipts were

increased, then the EZ benefits in Table 47 would be even
larger in dollar value.

Also, if any of this investment was

taxable property, then property tax receipts would also be
expected to rise, thereby boosting the total amount of EZ
benefits in dollar terms.
TABLE 48

Private Capital Investment
Fiscal Year

Dollar Amounts

1983-84

$9,250,000.00

1984-85

$13,840,000.00

1985-86

$3,830,000.00

1986-87

$66,730,000.00

1987-88

$432,000,000.00

1988-89

$185,640,000.00

1989-90

$273,400,000.00

1990-91

$190,585,652.00

1991-92

$63,499,000.00

1992-93

$91,921,132.00

1993-94

$68,800,000.00

1994-95

$38,556,087.00
$107,196,606.00

1995-96

$1,545,248,477.00

TOTAL

SOURCE:

Louisville and Jefferson County Office for Economic Development

Reports.
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Annua~

It should be noted that the greatest portion of private
capital investment listed in Table 48 occurred through FYs
1987-88 to 1990-91.

This time period roughly corresponds to

the time period when Louisville's airport was undergoing a
massive expansion.

Along with this expansion, UPS expanded

its operating facilities on the airport's premises.

This may

account for the large dollar amounts of private capital
investment during this time period.

If so, it would seem that

the airport received a disproportionate amount of both private
and public investment dollars relative to the EZ.2B

4. Caveats on EZ Job Creation and Retention
as we11 as EZ Capita1 Investment
The preceding cost-benefit analysis can be criticized on
several grounds.

In a survey done by USI during the summer of

1996, around 67% of all EZ certified firms were interviewed
regarding EZ incentives and the usefulness of these incentives
to the firms.
findings.

Table 49 gives a brief synopsis of survey

As mentioned at the close of Chapter 7, when it

came to hiring practices, survey respondents indicated that
incentives had only directly helped to create 5,760 new jobs.
Also, respondents credited the EZ incentives with "saving"
just 3,152 jobs and creating or saving 6,333 jobs.

Without

regard to incentives, the 851 firms interviewed indicated that
their workforce had grown by a net of 13,271 employees since
the companies had acquired EZ certification.
28

To repeat a

Unfortunately, OED does not keep summary records of where
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caveat from Chapter 7, it should be remembered that not all
firms interviewed had been certified at the time that the zone
had come into existence.

Some companies had been certified

since mid-1983 whereas others had only been certified for a
couple of years.
With regard to capital investment, on average 77% of the
firms interviewed said that they would have undertaken capital
investment regardless of EZ incentives.

Therefore, some

Table 49

USI Survey Results of 851 EZ certified firms*.

Jobs

Would have created or saved jobs without incentives?

Jobs Saved

3,152

Jobs Created

5,760

Jobs Created or Saved

6,333

Jobs Saved
Jobs Created

Investment

Yes

No

190 (26.5%)

529

(73.5%)

339

360

(51.5%)

(48.5%)

Would have done investment anyway?
Yes

No

New or used equipment

569

(81%)

137

Motor Vehicles

393

(77%)

116 (23% )

Construction and Buildings

389

(75% )

132

Total and Average
of "Yes" and "No'
Answers

1,351 (77'k)

(19%)

(25%)

385 (23'k)

*Note: Survey number do not always add to 842 because not all firms interviewed used all
incentives available.

portion of the $1.5 billion in investment in Table 48 might
have been carried out any way.

However, it is possible that

the average of 23% of the respondents who said that one or
more incentives made a difference in investment decisions may

investment occurs within the EZ.
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have made the bulk of the $1.5 billion in investment.

There

is no way to know for sure how much of this investment is due
to what portion of the EZ certified firms.

But, just as with

business location, Schmenner (1981), Blair (1995) and others
point out that tax considerations are only one of many
considerations in capital investment decisions.

Investment

decisions are generally made with regard to future
expectations about long-term firm profitability, adequate
financing, changes in technology, etc.

As mentioned

previously, United Parcel Service (UPS) was not interviewed.
If one adds UPS's 14,000 jobs to the 13,271 jobs that
respondents reported, this would greatly boost the number of
jobs created within the EZ without regard to incentives.
However, it should be remembered that more than half of UPS's
positions are part-time.
live within the EZ.

Also, probably not all UPS employees

If these jobs have been counted by OED as

jobs created and/or retained within the EZ, then the benefits
suggested by Table 47 would be significantly diminished.
The USI survey also suggests other problems with Table
47.

Table 49 shows that only 26.5% of the survey's

respondents said that the EZ incentives had helped to save
jobs, and just 48.5% said that EZ incentives had helped to
create new jobs.

If these percentages are reflective of the

over 1,200 EZ certified firms, then the benefits indicated in
Table 47 could be further diluted.

That is, a good portion of

the number of jobs created and/or saved could be overstated.
Respondents indicated that EZ incentives were responsible for
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creating and/or saving 6,333 jobs.

These firms apparently

created only a third of the 18,000 new jobs created.

Without

interviewing the other 400 or more EZ certified firms, there
is no way to know whether there could be more jobs to add to
the 6,333 job figure.
Next, there is the problem in survey research of
respondents often not being candid in their answers to
questions no matter how hard the researcher tries to control
for this possibility.

There could be a portion of respondents

(e.g., a portion of the 48.5% of those firms interviewed who
said that incentives had made a difference in hiring new
workers) who intentionally overstated the EZ program's impact
out of their fear of possibly losing EZ tax benefits.

If this

is true, then claims regarding EZ job creation and retention
as well as capital investment could be further deflated.
Additionally, some of the assumptions made in Table 47
may have been far too generous.

To assume that all the jobs

created were full-time and year-round is probably an
overstatement, especially because of UPS's presence in the EZ.
Also, even if the jobs mentioned in Table 47 were year-round
and full-time, the amount of taxes paid by the typical worker
earning the average $15,600 salary may be overstated.

If a

taxpayer can itemize deductions, then occupational taxes and
other local payroll taxes withheld are deductible from one's
state income tax.

If many of these workers were able to

itemize, then the amount that they would have paid in state
income taxes would have been reduced.
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More importantly, if

most of these workers had dependents or any other forms of
deductions, their tax liability would have been reduced
substantially.

In fact, if one considers all of the possible

deductions, exemptions and tax credits available to such lowincome taxpayers, then many of these workers may have received
from the state a complete or nearly complete tax refund on all
taxes withheld during the year.

This possibility would also

greatly reduce the amount of benefits, in terms of taxes paid
to the state, due to the EZ program.
In fairness to the EZ program, it could be argued that,
even if EZ benefits are overstated in Table 47, creating and
saving jobs probably prevented many workers from having to
rely upon social welfare programs which may have cost the
state more than the costs associated with the EZ program.
However, given the average low pay of the EZ jobs, the EZ
program cannot exactly claim to have moved many people into
the ranks of the middle class.

Instead, the average salary of

$15,600 per year would generally be considered a pay level for
the working poor.

Certain1y this wou1d not have been enough

to he1p those in the origina1 EZ neighborhoods for whom KRS
154.45 was origina11y intended.

More importantly, recall Tables 10 and 13 regarding the
original EZ, and Tables 16 and 19 regarding the full-size EZ.
Using Coomes and Price data, Table 10 showed a dec1ine in the
number of jobs in the original EZ between 1980 and 1990.
Table 13, using CBP zip code level data, also showed a decline
between 1981 and 1994 for the same area.
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For the full-size

EZ, Table 16, based on Coomes and Price data, showed a small
decline in employment from 1980 to 1990 whereas Table 19 using
CBP data showed a small increase in employment from 1981 to
1994.

Considering the data in these four tables, one can only

conclude that jobs created by EZ incentives were jobs that
merely offset job losses within the full-size EZ.
original EZ did not even do that well.

The

Ironically, it was the

original EZ that most closely resembled the type of areas
targeted for EZ incentives in KRS 154.45.
The tables in Chapter 5 also question the benefits
indicated in Tables 47 and 48.

Those tables showed all·EZ

communities losing population and workers.

Was a sizable

portion of the new jobs created and/or saved in the EZ given
to residents outside of the EZ?

Was any new business

investment undertaken in the EZ barely enough to offset
disinvestment within the EZ?
possibility.

These tables raise that

If this is true, then several of the original

goals of KRS 154.45 were not met regardless of how one weighs
program costs and benefits.
Additionally, the tables in chapters 5, 6 and 7 indicate
that not one segment of the EZ grew at rates comparable to the
control areas.

Even if program benefits did outweigh program

costs, EZ growth and quality of life did not match growth and
quality of life in areas that did not receive the same
economic development stimulus.

One must then question what

factors led these others areas to grow faster than the EZ
despite these areas not receiving EZ incentives.
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Could the

over $217 million in incentives have been better spent?

I

will have more to say on this in the next chapter.
Finally, it should be pointed out that federal dollars
used to expand and rebuild Louisville's airport were not
included in the costs of the EZ program.

However, one could

argue that, just as with state funds, these costs should be
taken into account since these funds were used in an area that
was part of the EZ.

Just as with state expenditures, federal

expenditures probably provided an economic stimulus to the
airport area that EZ incentives could not match.

According to

a March 23, 1997 Courier-Journal article, total costs for the
expansion and enhancement of the airport will probably total
$676 million when the project is completed (Howington, 1997).
This is more than double the original projected costs that
were forecasted in 1988.

According to the article, many

construction expenditures have gone over budget in order to
accommodate UPS and neighborhoods affected by UPS and airport
operations. The Kentucky Air National Guard base headquarters
had to be moved from one part of the airport grounds to
another; and a greater number of area residents had to be
removed and relocated than was originally anticipated.

All of

this was done because of increased traffic volume due to a
second runway and more UPS shipping flights

(Howington, 1997).

To be fair to UPS, the article noted that UPS had
contributed $54 million to airport expansion and renovation.
Also, according to state and local officials, the airport
expansion has generated around $85 million a year in economic
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benefits, including state and local taxes.

It is also pointed

out in the article that UPS's growth has helped Louisville and
Jefferson County attract businesses that rely upon UPS's fast
shipping abilities.

However, if one adds several hundred

million dollars in federal aid to the list of EZ costs in
Table 46, then EZ costs of job creation would at least equal
if not exceed EZ job creation benefits (Table 47).

These

additional dollars would also greatly increase the ratio of EZ
costs to private capital investment as well.

Perhaps the

ratio would rise from fourteen cents on the dollar to nearly
50 cents on the dollar.
For example, adding an additional $600 million 29 to the
total costs of Table 46 of roughly $217 million brings total
EZ costs up to approximately $817 million.

Dividing this

number by the estimated 39,193 jobs saved and created yields a
cost of $20,846 per job created and saved.

This is

approximately $9,000 more than the benefit per job saved or
created that was calculated above.

Also, this means that the

cost of each job saved and/or created was greater than what
the typical job in the EZ annually paid:

$15,600.

Clearly,

this outcome would not indicate a good return on either
federal or state taxpayers dollars.

29 Recall that $60.5 million in state bonds have been
accounted for in Table 46. Adding $600 million to the total
derived in Table 46 would still leave out approximately $16
million of the projected total airport costs of $676 million.
This has been done so as to be cautious in estimating the
final costs of airport expansion.
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S. The EZ and Disadvantaged Workers

Table 46 showed that between FYs 1992-93 and 1995-96,
only $46,015 in tax credits for hiring disadvantaged workers
had been claimed by EZ companies.

EZ certified firms can

receive a tax credit of 10% of a disadvantaged worker's annual
salary, up to $1,500, for each disadvantaged worker hired and
can carry forward such credits for up to five years.

A tax

credit is more desirable than a tax deduction because tax
credits can be taken directly off tax bills whereas a
deduction simply lowers a firm's gross income before taxes are
assessed.
In KRS 154.45, one of the three possible conditions of
becoming an EZ certified firm was to have at least 25% of a
firm's workforce consist of workers who were previously
categorized as "disadvantaged H

(see Chapter 3 for definition) .

The 1992 General Assembly did not consider this adequate, so
it amended KRS 154.45 to provide businesses with direct tax
credits for hiring disadvantaged workers (KRS 154.45, p. 421).
Whether this change in the law worked is either
questionable or unknown.

If the maximum of $1,500 per worker

is used, then the amount of $46,015 indicates that only about
30 workers have been hired over the previous four fiscal years
under this provision of the law.

Either that is the case, or

many firms have not yet claimed credits for disadvantaged
workers that they have hired.
portion of the credits.

Or, they have only claimed a

Businesses do have up to five years
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to take the full tax credit.
Another possibility is that since this provision of the
EZ law is relatively new, perhaps many firms are not yet aware
of it.

If this is true, then it would indicate that OED has

done a poor job of promoting this EZ incentive.

On the other

hand, perhaps many firms are not interested in hiring these
types of workers because they have a lack of work experience
or skills.

If that is the case, then these tax credits would

only be used by low-skill, low-wage employers.

Using this

logic, the small amount of $46,015 would possibly indicate
that many of these low-skilled, disadvantaged workers are not
being hired.

Ironica11y, these are the very peop1e for whom

EZ incentives are supposed to he1p.

In any event, this incentive may see greater usage over
the next few years, but for now it does not seem to be working
that well, especially for residents of the original EZ.
Previous chapters have shown very little progress made in
alleviating poverty and unemployment in this area.

Creating

job opportunities for residents in the original EZ also seems
to have been an unfulfilled goal of KRS 154.45.

Instead, the

tables in Chapter 5 show this area to still be an area of
urban poverty.

The $46,015 in tax credits given for hiring

disadvantaged workers may have been better used for something
else, such as training people with low job skill levels in
order to make them more employable.
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6.

S~~

The results of EZ cost-effectiveness analysis done by
comparing benefits per job to costs per job, and costs per
capital investment must be interpreted cautiously.

The

caveats mentioned above dilute OED arguments of total EZ
success.

Most of all, the people for whom the program was

supposed to benefit the most--disadvantaged workers--seem to
have benefited very little if at all from EZ program
initiatives.

Also, as pointed out in previous chapters and in

this chapter, the area that was originally targeted for EZ
incentives and the most hard-pressed for neighborhood
revitalization and job creation has shown the least amount of
improvement in its social and economic climate.
This especially diminishes OED claims of complete EZ
success when one considers what has happened in the control
community of Newburg.

Although similar in social and economic

conditions, Newburg, without EZ incentives, at least was
stable during the same time period as the original EZ was
still undergoing decline.
The next and final .chapter summarizes the findings of
all previous chapters and the implications that these findings
have for future policy consideration.
EZ program efficacy will be given.

A thorough critique of

It will be shown that the

EZ program had many shortcomings because of its failure to
plan for and remain focused on its original goals:
urban blight, poverty and outward migration.
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CHAPTER IX

1. Review of Findings:
Implications for Research, Theory,
and Public Policy

Summary of Findings
The preceding chapters have made the case that
Louisville and Jefferson County's Enterprise Zone (EZ) cannot
be considered a total success.

EZ proponents can claim mixed

results overall, but results vary widely according to which
parts of the EZ are examined and according to the financial
conclusions one draws about the cost-effectiveness of the
entire program.

The Original EZ

Through the use of Census Data, HMDA data, and PVA data,
the analysis showed that the original EZ continued to suffer
from poverty, poor housing conditions, outward migration and
low property values, as well as sluggish lending activity,
despite EZ incentives.

The original EZ did show an increase

in educational levels and overall household earnings, but
these levels were still lower than those of the control area.
A shift-share analysis using two different data bases, showed
poor job creation performance in the original EZ.

To the

chagrin of EZ proponents, the community juxtaposed to the
original EZ for comparison purposes (Newburg) did quite well
in the shift-share analysis presented in Chapter 7 when
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compared to the original EZ.

It also faired better than the

original EZ despite receiving no economic development
assistance.
The outcome measurements showed the original EZ losing
residents and jobs whereas a similar area, Newburg, roughly
retained its original level of residents and jobs.

This was

true no matter which time period was used to examine the two
areas.

What is especially noteworthy is that the Newburg area

received no type of economic development stimulus and/or
program assistance during any of the time periods considered.
Either a single factor or a combination of factors could
explain Newburg's stability and the original EZ's stagnation.
One can speculate that, even though in 1980 Newburg was
roughly similar to the original EZ with regard to social,
economic and demographic characteristics, there were events
taking place in the original EZ which made it a less desirable
place in which to live, work, and invest, in comparison to
Newburg.

A higher crime rate and/or a higher level of

environmental problems (e.g., brownfields) in the original EZ
when compared to Newburg would surely make the original EZ
less attractive.

Until a locality can solve its problems of

high crime and environmental pollution, no amount of tax
incentives can generate neighborhood business and job
development.

Tax incentives alone probably cannot make up for

the risks that business firms would incur if they located in a
crime-ridden and environmentally hazardous area.
Another possible explanation, which is tied to the
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previous one, is that despite the pre-Enterprise Zone program
similarities between Newburg and the original EZ, there were
and still are problems in the original EZ that only large
amounts of government spending, along with tax incentives for
businesses, could have solved.
When one looks at KRS 154.45 and the original 3.75
square mile area targeted for EZ program assistance, then the
program did not appear to assist those in this impoverished
and blighted area to the extent desired in the enabling
legislation.

This would be a narrow interpretation of the EZ

program's efficacy, but it is justified because the original
goals and objectives of Kentucky's EZ legislation were
intended for economically depressed, urban areas.

Areas outside of the Original EZ and the Full-size EZ

Looking at the tables in Chapter 5, the full-size EZ
showed modest gains in many social and economic conditions,
but it still lagged behind the rest of Jefferson County and
the Jefferson County as a whole.

In the full-size EZ, job

generation was at least static, showing no big losses or
gains.
area.

The exception within the full-size EZ was the airport
This area showed robust job growth, although as pointed

out in other chapters, this job growth may not have occurred
solely due to EZ incentives.

Finally, Bluegrass Industrial

Park also did at least as well as Louisville's airport, and
yet Bluegrass received no economic development aid.
It appears that the EZ incentives may have worked to
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some degree in EZ areas outside of the original EZ and the
airport.

In these areas, it could be claimed that EZ

incentives may have played a small but important role in
keeping lower middle income areas from sliding into lower
class status.

Although there is no direct proof, EZ

incentives may have helped these areas "hold their own"
socially and economically by keeping viable such areas as
Rubbertown, Riverport, and the Strawberry Lane industrial
area.

If this is the case, then perhaps EZ incentives work

best in areas which are neither impoverished or wealthy.
Perhaps EZ incentives work best in areas which are on the
verge of economic decline, but are above the very lowest
levels of poverty and economic deprivation.
When it comes to Louisville's airport, EZ incentives
probably only played a very minor and perhaps unimportant
role.

Instead, it appears that the nearly $676 million that

has been and/or will be invested in this area has been a major
catalyst for job creation.

Without building a second runway

and new facilities as well as removing several nearby
neighborhoods, UPS would not have expanded its operations in
Louisville.

In fact, the company probably would have

relocated to another airport.

While UPS has become Jefferson

County's largest employer, it must be remembered that most of
its nearly 14,000 workers are part-time and earn $8.00 per
hour (Howington, 1997).
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Cost-Effectiveness
The EZ program, whether small in size or large, appeared
to be a financially cost-effective program over the years when
one uses the only real data kept by an agency since the EZ
began.

Using OED data, and the most cautious assumptions

possible, EZ incentives may not have helped firms to create
and retain, on average, the best-paying jobs in the metro
area, but at least the costs of job creation was outweighed by
job benefits.

Nevertheless, the caveats introduced cast some

reasonable doubts about the cost-effectiveness of the EZ
program, especially when one introduces what possible effects
that federal and state spending had on creating jobs in the
Louisville airport area.
Summarizing the research findings, it appears that local
economic development officials cannot make the claim that the
EZ program was completely and absolutely successful.

At best,

the evidence shows that job growth in the full-size EZ, with
the exception of the airport area, was stagnant during the
time periods covered in the analysis.

The evidence suggests

that local officials can only claim that their estimate of
18,000 new jobs created is a gross number and not a net
figure.

The same is true for their claim that the EZ

incentives retained around 24,000 jobs.

Finally, the evidence

also strongly suggests that EZ incentives cannot take full
credit for airport job growth. There is little doubt that
federal and state public investment played a major role, if
not perhaps the biggest role, in airport job growth. ,
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The evidence and arguments presented in this study also
suggest that the original EZ probably saw further decline,
despite EZ incentives, for another major reason besides those
mentioned above.

By expanding the EZ beyond a geographically

limited area, the EZ program probably lost its focus as an
urban, anti-poverty program and instead became a catch-all
economic development program for most of the City of
Louisville and for parts of Jefferson County.

When

interviewed by a Wall Street Journal reporter, EZ proponent
and theorist Stuart Butler was dismayed at how large
Louisville's EZ had become since its beginning (Davidson,
1992).

Butler said that EZs were never meant to encompass

such large geographic areas because to do so would cause an EZ
program to lose its urban emphasis.

Within just a few years

of its inception, Louisville's EZ program completely changed
direction without any mandate from state government and
without any consideration given to the residents of the
original EZ.

According to the Wall Street Journal article,

the EZ was allowed to expand by Kentucky's Enterprise Zone
Authority without much deliberation or planning, if any, with
regard to the consequences of such action.

The EZ was allowed

to expand so as to include UPS and Louisville's airport, as
well as to make possible the City-County Compact signed in
1986.

It appears that the goals and objectives of KRS 154.45

were conveniently overlooked or glossed over in order to
pursue other goals and objectives unrelated to urban poverty
or blight.
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As indicated in Chapter 3, there never was any real
monitoring of EZ program performance until 1992.

Adequate

planning and program assessment cannot be done without
monitoring program outcomes (Rossi and Freeman, 1983;
Schofield, 1987).

And with regard to program outcomes, the

broad goals and objectives of KRS 154.45 were never
sufficiently monitored at the local level in order to
accurately measure program results.

Had local economic

development officials identified specific goals to be achieved
in the original EZ, perhaps this area's needs would not have
become overlooked in the various expansions that occurred
after 1983.

A specific goal for the original EZ area, for

example, might have been to reduce its unemployment by onehalf over the zone's 20 year life span. But nothing so
explicit was ever established with regard to the original EZ.
The abandonment of the original EZ appears to have been a
failure in planning.

In this regard, this dissertation

confirms much of what Rubin and Wilder (1996) found in their
studies of EZs throughout the U. S.

There are few solid

conclusions about the efficacy of many EZs throughout the U.
S. because so many of them failed to specify program goals and
objectives when they were started.

Many programs were

conceived with little planning, and very little attention was
given to monitoring program outcomes, if any outcomes were
specified by programs.

This is why there appears to be,

paraphrasing Rubin and Wilder, a gap between the EZ rhetoric
of accomplishments and the EZ reality of accomplishments.
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2. Contributions of the Research to Economic Development
Theory and Public Policy

Limitations of this Study and Methodological Caveats

Before making any further policy observations and
recommendations, it should be stressed that there were many
gaps in the data used in this study.

Due to the lack of

monitoring of the EZ program by the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
many estimates and assumptions had to be made in the costbenefit analysis appearing in Chapter 8.

At all times,

however, estimates were made cautiously by giving OED the
benefit of the doubt, and using their data alone, estimates of
EZ program costs and benefits look very good.

However, in

order to give balance to the analysis, caveats and other
considerations were included in Chapter 8 to give the reader a
better perspective on the costs and benefits of the EZ
program.

Based on the evidence in Chapter 8, it appears that

the EZ program was not nearly as cost-effective as one would
initially conclude using only OED numbers and data.
Likewise, the shift-share method and data used in
Chapters 6 and 7 is not without limitations.

As stated

before, shift-share analysis cannot explain why an area may
have a competitive advantage or disadvantage relative to
another area.

The number of jobs calculated for

"s"

(the

local share effect) is also only a residual number that is
left after county and industry-specific job forecasts are
subtracted from the actual number of jobs gained in an area
over a specific time period.

Just because
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"s"

may be a

positive number does not guarantee that an area has a
competitive advantage relative to another.

Random chance,

luck, or the selection of a certain beginning and ending year
(like 1981 and 1994), may playa role in "S" yielding a
certain value.

The choice of two other years used in a shift-

share analysis comparing two regions could yield different
results than two other years chosen.

A researcher is not

always in a position to explain why or under what economic
circumstances "S" indicates some type of possible competitive
advantage or disadvantage that an area may have relative to
another.
Additionally with regard to the analysis presented in
Chapters 6 and 7, there is the problem of arbitrarily dividing
zip codes either in half, or by some fraction in order to
arrive at job estimates within certain areas of Jefferson
County.

The weakness of doing this is the implicit assumption

that business firms are evenly and uniformly spread out over a
given area.

This, of course, is not generally true.

Again,

this was a crude, yet necessary method, and has been used in
other studies.
Finally, the Census data used in Chapter 5 deserve a
word of caution.

The data appearing in Tables 1 to 6

represent only two years:

1980 and 1990.

If data for each

year from 1980 to 1990 had been available, it is possible that
the results of 1990 Census data may have been misleading.
That is, for example, perhaps the original EZ was actually
doing quite well up through and including 1989, and then
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things took a turn for a worse.

Although very improbable,

this is always possible when comparing cross-sectional data at
two different points in time, especially over a ten year
period.
Nevertheless, the methods used in this study were
basically sound and the best ones available.

The fact that

shift-share analysis using two different data bases and two
different points in time (1980 to 1990 versus 1981 to 1994)
showed pretty much the same trends lend credence to the idea
that one can assume an area has a competitive advantage or
disadvantage relative to another.

Also, the other data

sources and methods generally showed the same trends.

Through

using various analytic methods, there was direct and indirect
confirmation of the conclusions made in this study.

More

importantly, the multiple methods and data sources showed
consistent patterns and trends, thus reinforcing the
conclusions reached.
I would argue that the support garnered for the
conclusions of this dissertation through a multi-method
approach make this study a unique contribution to the study
and evaluation of enterprise zones.

This characteristic,

along with the comprehensive nature of the study, make it
different from others conducted so far.

The literature on EZs

mostly show just one method applied in an EZ evaluation in
order to assess one outcome-either job creation, investment,
or some other objective.

This dissertation has looked at

every possible aspect of the Louisville EZ and has tried to
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judge its efficacy by using more than one method and one
outcome measurement.

The findings and methods used improve

both our understanding of EZs and how to study them.

Po1icy Imp1ications and Prob1ems

Since the Louisville and Jefferson County EZ program was
and probably still is a program without a clear focus, and
since its performance has been mixed, all things considered,
it must be asked:

What could have been done to make the

program better, provided that it was possible to have made it
better?

Even if implemented correctly, there is always the

possibility that the EZ program would not have been enough to
do the job KRS 154.45 intended it to do.

Based on the results

of my research, the following policy recommendations appear
warranted.
First, for the program to at least have had a chance to
work, I believe that the size of the EZ should not have been
changed.

The targeted area should have remained

geographically small, urban, and in desperate need of economic
assistance.

The communities included in the EZ after its

start in 1983 were not as bad off socially and economically as
the original, targeted area.

This fact probably diverted

attention from the initial target of EZ incentives.

However,

retaining the focus on the original geographic area may not
have been enough for the goals and objectives of KRS 154.45 to
have been realized.

As mentioned before, tax incentives and

regulations are only one part of a whole group of
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considerations that businesses contemplate when making hiring,
investment, and location decisions (Schmenner, 1982; and
Blair, 1995).

In order to revitalize an area like the

original EZ, high-paying jobs would have had to have been
created in the area.

These jobs usually require high skill

and educational levels, things that the original EZ still
lacks to this day.

Therefore, it is doubtful that, even if

the boundaries of the original EZ had not changed, the EZ
program would have been successful.
Making business costs as low as possible would certainly
have been advantageous to the original EZ.

In fact,

if local

economic development officials really wanted to take a supplyside approach to developing the original EZ, then one possible
incentive may have been to eliminate all state and local taxes
on EZ certified firms,

including taxes on business profits.

But, once again, making an area attractive based upon
low costs of doing business is not enough to encourage
economic growth.

If this were true, then Mississippi would be

the fastest growing state in the U. S.

Yet it is well known

that it is one of the poorest states in the country.

Thus,

one policy implication of this study is that tax incentives
and/or low tax rates alone are not enough to revitalize an
impoverished area.

This has been known for quite some time

(Schmenner, 1982), but local economic development officials,
in their rush to start an EZ program, ignored this important
principle of economic development.
Instead, other things must be done to make an area ready
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for economic growth.

An educated and skilled workforce is an

advantage, as well as amenities that make the quality of life
in an area good.

To have accomplished this in the original

EZ, innovative educational policies and crime prevention
programs would be necessary, and these programs would probably
have been very costly.

It would also have meant cultivating a

workforce in an area where a generation of adults have grown
up without steady work, if any work at all.

In this type of

environment, creating a quality workforce would have been a
very expensive and a long-run undertaking with no certainty of
success.

To have pursued such policies in the 1980s and the

1990s may have also proven politically unfeasible, undoubtedly
reminding many people of the controversial programs of the
1960s and 1970s.
Interestingly in Britain, enterprise zone policy has
changed dramatically.

Midway through the Thatcher

administration, EZ designated areas were not only granted tax
and regulatory relief, but were also given Urban Development
Grants (UDGs) in order to help localities refurbish
infrastructure, rebuild roads and sewers, and build workforce
development centers.

Ironically, UDGs appeared in Britain as

UDAGS were being eliminated in the United States (Hambleton,
1996).

In the U. S., Empowerment Zones and Enterprise

Communities (EZ/EC) have been introduced as a replacement for
the Reagan era EZ programs for urban areas.

The EZ/EC concept

is the first real federal urban policy initiative undertaken
by the federal government since the 1970s.
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However, it is

very modest in its size and goals when compared to the urban
initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s.
to participate in the program.

Only selected cities get

One of the selling points of

the EZ/EC program is that it creates partnerships between
federal and local governments in carrying out EZ/EC policy, a
partnership that was missing from previous federal programs
where it was felt that Washington had too much control over
urban policy.

Like British policy, the EZ/EC initiative

relies upon a mixture of tax relief and federal expenditures
in order to try to revitalize distressed areas (Hambleton,
1996).

So far, there is little known about how well the EZ/EC

programs are working. Because it is limited to only a certain
number of cities, not all of urban America is benefiting-a
major criticism of the program.
One of the implications of studying Louisville and
Jefferson County's Enterprise Zone is that state and local
leaders have not done a very good job with regard to economic
development and to the removal of urban poverty and blight.
According to Rubin and Wilder (1996), this has not been an
uncommon experience with EZs across the U. S.

Poor planning,

monitoring, and implementation of EZs caused Rubin and Wilder
to conclude that no definite statement can be made as to
whether EZs have been successful throughout the U. S. over the
past two decades.

This dissertation adds to their conclusion

by confirming that many problems that plagued other EZs in the
U. S. also caused difficulties for Louisville's EZ.
So it seems that both federal and local government
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initiatives to solve urban problems have been criticized for
coming up short on solutions to poverty and urban
deterioration.

If the federal initiatives of the 1960s and

1970s did not work, and if the local government policies of
the 1980s and early 1990s did not assist urban areas, then one
cannot expect too much from the Clinton administration's EZ/EC
program because it attempts to use both levels of government
in only selected cities to address urban issues.

At best it

appears to be a half-hearted attempt to redevelop the most
economically depressed areas within cities.

Policy Recommendations and Suggestions for Further Research

I would like to put forth a simple yet bold proposal to
help Louisville and other U. S. cities help the urban
underclass.

Instead of creating programs that are targeted

toward areas and localities, perhaps the focus should be on
creating programs that are targeted toward certain groups of
people.

The tax incentives given by and the tax revenues

foregone by Louisville's EZ program may have been better spent
by creating a negative income tax for the poor.

In fact,

perhaps all local and federal government programs would be
more effective if this change in emphasis was considered
seriously.

Despite the controversy surrounding its current

and future funding, no one can deny that Social Security has
been a success in that the elderly now constitute the smallest
percentage of those living in poverty.

As far as an anti-

poverty program goes, Social Security has thus far been a
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success whereas other anti-poverty programs have not.

This is

probably because Social Security is targeted toward a
specified segment of the population rather than a specified
area or region of the country.
The idea of a federal negative income tax has been
around for some time (Samuelson, 1973, pp. 810-812).

It has

supporters who span the political and economic philosophical
spectrum:

from the likes of Keynesian economist James Tobin

to the libertarian and Monetarist economist Milton Friedman.
Other supporters have included Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon
and George McGovern.
European nations.

It has and still is used in various

Instead of a negative income tax, some have

suggested that it be called an "incentive-guaranteed-income H
plan (p. 811).

The closest thing to a negative income tax

that exists now is the earned-income tax credit (EITC).
However, negative income tax (NIT) proponents argue that the
EITC does not go far enough.
How would a negative income tax program work?

Those

individuals or families with no income receive a guaranteed
minimum income that is pre-determined.

Individuals or

households with an income level below some break-even level
receive payments, with the level of payment being related to
their level of income.

They are not taxed on their earnings,

but instead receive transfer payments to get them up to the
guaranteed minimum income level.

After an individual or a

family begins to earn income above their guaranteed minimum
income, they only then begin to make tax payments on their
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income, although the tax is progressive (i.e., to pay a great
amount of taxes they would have to earn a great deal more) .
For example, let us assume that the federal government
establishes that the guaranteed minimum income for a family of
four is $18,000 per year.

A family of four with no income

would receive $1,500 per month.

A family of four with an

income of $9,000 per year would receive a negative income tax
payment of $750 per month.

Once a family of four begins to

earn more than $18,000 a year, each dollar earned over $18,000
would be taxed at a tax bracket appropriate for that level of
income ..
Nobel-prize winning economist Paul Samuelson (1973)
writes:
"Yet how can these aids be given them [the poor]
so as not to deter their efforts and incentives?
Here is where the negative income tax provides a
great improvement over those welfare programs that
deprive people of all assistance the moment they
even get a poor job.
(And, of course, those on
assistance know this very well and are thus
deterred from trying to improve their position.)
..... [T] he formula for the negative income tax
is gauged to leave the poor with more income
after they have used their own efforts to raise
their private earnings by a thousand dollars,
or even by a dollar ....
The paramount advantages of the negative income
tax are many.
1. It can replace much of present welfare
assistance that destroys incentives.
2. It can help to equalize minimum levels
of well-being over all the diverse regions
of the United States.
3. It is less demeaning to the poor.
4. It can be simply administered by the
Internal Revenue Service."
(pp . 8 11-12) .
A guaranteed income and NIT plan could be paid for by
either reallocating money from current urban programs and
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anti-poverty programs to a NIT program, or by a modest
increase in gasoline taxes, or by doing both. 3D

This could be

done without increasing the federal budget deficit.

It would

be a fairer and more humane way of changing urban assistance
than by sticking to the old way of doing welfare (which was
abolished in 1996), or by handing over welfare programs to
state governments.

I cite the welfare debate because of its

importance to urban constituents.
The NIT would also do more to help the urban poor and
underclass than CDBGs, UDAGs, public housing, mass transit
systems or other programs which require state and local
middlemen to implement the policies of the federal government.
Bureaucratic "overhead" consumes a large portion of the costs
of these policies.

It is also a better alternative to

alleviating urban poverty than what some advocates think that
a national industrial policy would yield (Leigh, 1994).

Such

a policy would never work in the U. S. just as it has not
worked in various other nations.

Finally, if state and local

governments cannot do economic development correctly, what
makes one think that they can adequately provide assistance to
the urban underclass?
The NIT proposal has been criticized on many grounds.

30 American economists are quick to point out that Americans
pay very little for gasoline compared to their European
counterparts. When Presidential candidate Bob Dole proposed
reducing federal gasoline taxes, most economists retorted that
our gasoline taxes were in fact too low. Although a somewhat
regressive tax, a gasoline tax increase would generate a huge
amount of revenues in a short time period because short-run
demand (several years) for gasoline is very price inelastic
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1995, pp. 32-37).
207

To defend it in detail and to outline a plan for its
implementation would be beyond the scope of this dissertation.
However, with modern technology, computer monitoring, and bank
debit cards, it seems that now is the time that new research
should be done on the practical implementation of the NIT.
New pilot projects would be in order.

Some would argue that

the NIT proposal would make the IRS too large.

But the IRS

would only grow in proportion to, maybe perhaps less than in
proportion to, the amount by which other government agencies,
such as welfare programs, the Economic Development
Administration, HUD, etc., would shrink.
Even at the state level, the NIT could do much to help
Kentucky's urban poor and working poor in general.

Kentucky

now ranks number one as far as its tax burden on the poor
(Hawpe, 1996).

Poor people are taxed at a higher rate in

Kentucky than in any other state (Multistate Tax Commission,
cited in Hawpe, 1996).

No wonder there is so little incentive

to work for those people with low skills and low educational
levels.

Instead of experimenting with EZs, perhaps Kentucky

and other states with income taxes should try pilot NIT
programs.
If one took the roughly $217 million used in Chapter 8
as the conservative cost estimate for EZ program costs and
divided this amount by 13 (for FYs 1983-84 to 1995-96), an
average of $16,692,308 per year could have been paid to
qualified, low-income households in the original EZ.

These

are the households that were supposed to have been helped by
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KRS 154.45, but never really were.

According to Table 6, in

1990, 64.4% of all households in the original EZ were below
poverty level.

This percentage of the total occupied housing

in the original EZ, 4,173 in Table 2, means that 2,687

(= .644

x 4,173) households lived below poverty in 1990 in this area.
Had $16,692,308 been given to these households in the form of
a negative income tax, then the average income of each
household would have risen by $6,212, assuming that all
households were the same and had the same needs.

Adjustments

in NIT payments would have to be made in order to account for
variations in household size and earnings.

This additional

$6,612 in income to each household would have raised average
household income in the original EZ from around $11,132 in
1990 to over $17,000 per household.
Although this increase in income would not make the
residents of this area middle class, at least it would give
them the additional income needed to perhaps stimulate some
new business activity in the area.

Such additional income

could also be used to take vocational education or community
college classes.

Perhaps it would also allow some families to

become first-time home buyers.

If this occurred, perhaps the

neighborhood revitalization envisioned in KRS 154.45 would
finally become a reality .
•
Critics can argue that these poor households would not
know what to do with the additional money, and that the money
would probably be squandered on drugs, alcohol and other
illicit activities.

My response would be that such socially
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deviant behavior is already occurring in this area.

The extra

income would be an incentive for those who want to better
their lives.

Those who would use the NIT to engage in illegal

activities would lose benefits and suffer the consequences of
their illegal or socially undesirable pursuits.
Others will say that such a plan is purely
redistributive and only makes welfare a bigger problem.

If

one considers all the other welfare programs and agencies
eliminated by adopting a NIT, the costs of welfare could
actually go down, not up.

Also, there are incentives built

into the program to encourage participants to earn more money.
This is not to say that the NIT will solve all the
problems of the urban poor and urban areas.

Public safety and

education will still have to be promoted vigorously in
Louisville and other urban areas as a way to help solve our
problems.

Better education is important for the urban poor to

gain upward mobility.

However, at least adopting the NIT

would get the federal, state and local governments out of the
business of local economic development.

The NIT would allow

state and local governments to concentrate on the services
that they are supposed to do--public safety, education,
sanitation, and other basic services.

Constitutionally, these

are the only areas on which they should be concentrating.
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154.45-001

CONSERVATION AND STATE DEVELOPMENT

412

gages, leases. assignments. loans. and all other matters relating to ita fie
nancial operations. Copies of the audit shall be distributed to all memben
of the board, the Governor, and the Kentucky Legislative Research Com.
mission and shall be made generally available to the public for inspection.
(Enact. Acts 1990, ch. lOS, § 18, effective March 20, 1990.)
Compiler'. Nota. ThiI MCCion wu for·
medy compileci u KRS 154B.134.
SUBCHAPTER

45.

ENTEIlPRISE ZoNE DEVELOPMENT

154.45-001. Purpose of Enterprise Zone Program. - The General
AsIIembly hereby finda and declares that the purpose of the Enterprise Zou
Program is to revitalize economically depressed areas of the state. It is the
intent of the General Aaaembly to achieve this purpose -by. adhering to the

~~lathe quality ofure of individuals that ~ide withm~~-~

prise lOne by providing employment opportunities. job training. and neiP·

borhood improvement programs;

(2) Encourage economic activity by auiatiDg and maintaining exiIting
buain. .

within an enterprise zone;

--", -

Encourage economic activity by stimulating the influx of new bUlinIU within an enterprise zone; and
(4) Eliminate blighted and deteriorated area. within an enterprise zane
that feature chronic abandonment or demolition of residential or-cammercia1struc:turee or property. (Enact.·Acta 1982, ch. 131. § 1. effective July
15,1982; 1986, ch. 30, § 1. effective July 15. 1986; 1992, ch. 35t § I, effec.
tift July 14, 1992.)
(3)

.....Ier'. Not.. Th1a MdioD wu for-

a.iJ compiled

u KBS IM.650.
K.-...try Beada • BIIr. TobIrwce. The
Impe.s of Kentucky. PiwelDt Couiitaaon
UpcID B...... Growth • DeniopmeDt, Vol.
_
61. No. 3. SWIUII8I' 1981 Ky. Beach •

s.r2L

JreetnekJ Law .JoanaaL Kentucky Law

s.n."

Whit.IIide, TUUioD, 71 Ky. U. 479

(1-.a3l.
H~ K-tgcky Law Rniew. Nota.
, . . . tM Ecaaomic Cb.a1JeDpi of tM
ElIIW- - tM Kentucky Coutitation aDd
Hay. Y. The State Paopeny aDd BuildiDp
Cc-mi"ion of Kentucky, 15 N. Ky. 1.. BeY.

6CI (1988).
0pbU0u of A~ G......a. Public'.
. . . . in monitoring tM adiYitiei of Enter..... ZoDe Authority to cIetermiDe if the buli·
. - cercified for the _
quality for the
. . . .tI . . . . . by Yinae of their inYelto
.... ud &be number of jobI u.., claim to
c:r.&e. 0\ItweicbI thole bllRn
• int.enlt
In m.intaininl &be conftdentiality of inforIIIUioD relatiq &0 capital inftlUDenti aDd
~ 6rar- fOr bllpn
II located in
......,.n.1OMI; tbenlan. to &be atat &bat
tM ........ iDformacion doeI DOt relate to

tM buain
' PIftOIIAl fin,"";,' ..... bat
-.Iy rea.u their c:HDp1iance wida U. , .
quinmeDte for Clftific:etlon UIIIIIIr KI8
IM.46410(7), Iach iDformatioD 1haaW.... '
erb' be dilClo-d under IUbdiYilioD-UXa) of
KIS 61.818. OAG 81·105.
Lbni&atioD.&be beDefiti under &be .....
priIIa _
pnIInIIl &0 teD ana ....... b,autbority do. • faa .... .
Itama on the. anu, daJiDI
b...&ta &u, ...n. to other anulilDilariy
litaatecl; Iince aDique beDefiti an pnm.w
to de.ipated anu baYiq no na&anl aDd
reuoaabl. bail to cI.i.Itiquiah th8m fraIII
otMi' Iimilariy lituated anu, a.nG IiDae tM
leptIation in qu.tioD euaapca .naiR __
trial from &be ~tiOD of r.....t Ia... &be
l"'Uon it both local aDd.pecial in cbanI>
tar, aDd thlll Yiolati.. ot MCtionI69 ud eo III .
U. ConaUtutioD of ~
&be
following .......
orlpeCial
...
t.iaaa 69
COIUItiama.: ...
MCIioft,
IM.45-02O,
15YM30.
IM.~, IM.46470, ud
furtMrmore, aldlourh 11-. '
1991, ch. 35) eMCCed by U. Alllmhly, mabI n~

u. .............

,.. • ..-w
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cbaDPI to VariOUI proviaiona in the enterpriIe zone .t.awt.el the Attorney General'. of-

fiee did not find that it affected the coDCluaion
of anconatitutionality. OAG 92-86.

154.45-010. Definitions for KRS 154.45-020 to 154.45-110. - Mused
ill KRS 154.45-020 to 154.45-110, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) «Authority" means the Enterprise Zone Authority of Kentucky;
(2) "Enterprise zone" means an area designated by the authority to be
eligible for the benefits of KRS 154.45-020 to 154.45-110;
(3) "Establishment" means a single physical location where business is
condueted or where services or industrial operations are performed;
(4) "Existing business" means a person, corporation. or other entity enPled in the active conduct of a trade or business at a location within the
enterprise zone prior to the date the authority designated the area as an
eDterprise zone;
(5) '1..«al government" means a city, county, urban-county government.
. or charter county government;
(6) "New business" means a person. corporation. or other entity who wu
DOt engaged in the active conduct of a trade or buainess in the enterprile
lODe prior to the date the authority designated the area as an enterprile
moe. aud who becomes engaged in the active conduct of a trade or buain. .
within the enterprise zone after the date the authority designated the area
u an enterprise zone;
(7) "Qualified business" means an existing business or new business that
baa been certified by the authority to have at least fifty percent (5~) of its
employees performing substantially all of their services within an enterprise zone and meeting one (1) ot the following ~teria:
(a) With a new business employing at least twenty-five percent (25..,) of
the business', employees from the tarpted workforce; or
(b) With an ezisting busin... creating new activity within the enterpriIIe
zaae of not less than a twenty pen:ent (2~) increue in the number of
employees or by a twenty percent (2~) increase in capital investment
within eighteen (18) months from the date of application for certification as
a qualified business. Busineaaea that are certified baaed upon an iDcreue
in employees ahall employ at least twenty-five percent (25..,) of the new
employees from the targeted workforce.
. (8) "Qualified employee" means an employee of a qualified buain8ll; aud
(9) "Targeted workforce" means Kentucky residenta:
Who re&ldi WltbiJi an enterpnae zone;
(b) Who have been unemployed for at least ninety (90) days or who have
received public asaiatance benefits, baaed on need and intended to alleviate
poverty, for at least ninety (90) days prior to employment with a qualified
business.
(e) For the purpoae of this 8UbsectiOn. "Kentucky resident" meaJii -a 'perIOD who has resided in the Commonwealth for at least ninety (90) days.
(Enact. Acta 1982, ch. 131, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 30, f 2,
effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, § 2, efrec:tive July 14, 1992.)
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IDIriy c:oaqriled u KRS 154.8515.
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pn. 1.0118 Authority to cIetenDiu iCdIe buR·

cmifiacl for the _
qaalily Cor the
beaefitl received by virtu of tbair ~
meaia and the number of joba they claim to
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quiremenca for cenification under "Ib.. ~
(5) (now (7» of thia ledion. such infonnauea
sboald properly be dilCloeed under I\I.bdhi.
liOll UXa) of KBS 61.878. OAG 91.1015.

employment figures for buailUllMS located in
ent.erprile zona therefore. to the enent that
the requated information doe. not relate to
the buain....' penonal financial data. but
awnly reflec:&l their compliance with the re-

154.45-020. Application for designation as enterprise zone - m.
terloca1 governmental agreement - Application to amend bo1lDdaries of existing zone - Joint applications. - (1) A local gDVe!'llDlellt
may, by act of the local legislative body. designate an area within itsjuria.
diction to be an economically depressed area. The local government
then make written application to the authority to Jiave the area declared to .
be an enterprise zone. The application shall include a description of tba
location of the area and other information the authority may require.
(2) Two (2) or more local governments may. by an act of each reapecti..
legislative body. designate an area within their collective jurisdictiou to be
an economically depreued area. After each local government baa RiMd..,.
the proper ordinances designating the area to be economically dept II i f .'
the purpoae of applying to the authority for designation sa an &ntezpz"'"
zone, each legislative body shall enter into an interlocal govemmental
agreement. The agreement ahall be governed by the provisions of the IDt,e.
local Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300, and shall include:
(a) The establishment of a joint board to administer the enterprise ".. ~
that shall be comprised of repte&6ntatives from each local govemment;
(b) A statement establiahing the joint board for the life of the en~

IDa,

mae;

.

..

...

.'

I

.

. ....

(e) A statement establiabing u.nifortD local incentives that ahall be ~
fered by each local government;
",".
(d) A ltatement establishing financial aupport by each local govemJIIeDt
for the administration of the joint board; and
.
(e) Other requirements that may be establiahed by the authority. ..
(3) A local government with an existing enterprise zone may apply to tba
authority to amend the boundaries of the emting zone for the purpose of
joining with other local governments. A local govermnent applying to craIa ~
jurisdictional boundaries to amend the area of an enterprise zcme shall ..
comply with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section and KBS
154.45-030.
(4) Upon approval olthe interlocal governmental agreement pumJallt to
KBS 65.210 to 65.300, two (2) or more local governments may make writt8Il
application to the authority to have the area declared an enterprise r.oD8._
The application shall include a deacription of the area and other inform&!"
tion the authority may require.
(5) Upon receipt of an application, the authority ahall review the application to determine if the area described in the application qualifies .to be
delignated an enterprise zone.
.
(6) The authority shall complete its review within one hundred twmt:r
(120) days of receipt of the application, but may enend this time period 8D
additional smy (60) days if neceaaary. If the authority denies the application, it shall inform the local government of the fact in writing along with
reaIOns for the denial. (Enact. Acta 1982, ch.. 131, § 3, effective July 15,
1982; 1986, ch. 30, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, § 3, effed:i..
July 14, 1992.)
..•
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Compiler. Note.. Thia eeeUon
Cor- from t.he operation oC generalla.., t.he ~
154.660.
latioo ia bodl local ADd apecial in c:Jww:t..
K.....cky Law oloanud. Kentucky Law aud tbuniolatiYe of eeeUoaa69 aud 60 olt.he
Wbi. . . . . Taut.ioD, 71 Ky. U. "79 Coutitutioo of Keotuckr, tbenian. t.he fol.
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oC t.he beDe6ta under t.he enWl'priae tiaaa 69 ADd 60 of t.he .tata coDititutioD: KBS
. . . . pnIII'UIl to taD ana aeJ.ctaci by t.he
15U5-OO1. tbi8 ..aioD.
IM."'-030•
......,n-aooe aUibarity doea in W:t cooCer a IM.~. IM.<&s-oso. IM.~O. aDd
ataUIa OD u.. .,..., deoJiDr bene- IM..c5-09O; funberman. althoqb Ho.a
&be7 receive to otb8r ana aimilarly aitu- sm 66. (Ada 1992. ch. 35) eaactad by the
. .... aioce unique beMfita .,.. pnrrideci to 1992 GeDlnl A...mbly, makea DIm OCII
dlliPAtad ana hana. 110 Da&aral aDd rea- cbaapI to yarioua ' pr'OYiaioaa, in .&,be .......
.-able buia to ~ &bam from other . pn. ... ata&uW &be Att.onIeJ
01·
..uarlJ aituatad .,..., aDd ai.acI &be ..... fica dicl . . 6ad that it a&cted t.he CODd__
la&ioD in queItiaD eumpta certain.u.mcta of an"'MtitatioDa1ity. OAG 82-86.'

IID8riY compiled .. KRS
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1&4.45-030. Boundary changes effective upon written app~ of

p&hority - Content. of application - Requirement. lor a1liharity'8
approvaL - (1) A local govemment may make written applicatiOD to the
authority for purpoaee of amending the bcnmdaries of an aiatiDg 6DteiptUe
ICIIl8. A bouDd.ary change to an emtiDg enterprise lODe shall ~ become
eB"ective until after written approval baa beeD granted by the autboriiy.
(2) A local government applying to the authority far an amendment to
the boundaries o( an emtiDg enterpriae zone shall certify in WritiDg the
followiD& information:
~ .;
(a) 'l11e propoeecl area (or amendment is contiguous to the uiatiDI lODe;
(b) The propoeecl area (ar amendment iDdependently meeta the requirementa eatabliahed. by KBS IM.46-OW; aDd
(c) A liatmnent documenting the reuon.a the local guftI'DJDeIlt fa ..tiDe to amend the boundariea o( ita emtiDg enterpriae zone. A detailed map
abDwing origiDal boundary liDeI aDd propoeecl boundary !iDe ~ abaD
be attached to the applicatioD.
(3) Prior to granting approval for amending the boundariea of an a:iatiDg enterprise zone, the authority ahall verify and document in writiq die
(ollowing:
.
(a) How amending the boundaries o( the eziatiDg zone will comply with

the goala established pumwlt to KRS 154.45-001;
(b) The local pvermnent'l commitment and incentives to be o6nd to
support. the expanded eDierpriae zone;
(e) If' twa (2) or more local governmenta are involved, that each local
government baa met the requirementa o( KBS 154.45-020;
(d) The local government's attempt to utilize available buildiDp aDd
properties within the eziating zone; and
(e) Unforeeeen c:ircwnstaDcea or overriding economic Cactora that haft
occurrecl aiDce the designation o( the original &ODe that neceaaitate .nwnd·
iDg the boundaries o( the eDating zone. <Enact. Acta 1986, ch. 30, I .,
effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, § 4, effective July 14, 1992.)
Coep"1er'. N.... ThJa ..aiaIl .... for.

A....,

..my compiled .. KBS
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tatian ia both local and .pec:ial in character.
and thua violative of aec:tiona 69 and 60 or the
Conatitution or Kentucky; therefore. the (01·
towing aectiou are UDCOnatitutionai local or
apec:ial legialatioa in contraventioD or aeetiona 69 .nd 60 of the .tate conatitution: KRS
154046-001.
154.45-020.
tbia
section.
154.45-040. 154.45-050. 154045-070. aud
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154.45-090; furthermore. altbouth Boa. ,
BiD 66. (Ada 1992. ch. 35) eDadecl by the
1992 Geaeral Allembly. mabI DIIme!Iaa
clwage. &II YariOUI proYiaiou in the . . . .
pn. lODe atu_ the Att.omey 0.......... 01.
fiee diel Dot find that it a1fedeci the CODCiIlliaft
or uDCODltitutioDality. OAG 92-86.

154.45-040. Are.. eligible for deaigDation .. enterprise zone. - ,
Any area of a local government may be designated. an enterprise zane
that:
(a) Has a continuous bOundary; and '
(b) Is an area of pervuive poverty, unemployment, aDd economic m..
tress.
(2) An area meets the requirements ohubsection (l}(b) ofthia section m
(al Tlie average rate of unemplOyment ill: the area for the moatl'eCellt'eighteen (IS) month period Cor which data iI 'available was at least one aDd
ODe-half Cl..1/I ) times the average national rateoCUDeIIlployment for'tJau .
eighteen (IS) month period; and
,
(b) At least seventy percent (70C11) of the residents liviDg in the area haft
incomes below eighty percent (SOCII) of the mediaD income oCthe ·resident.
of the local government requesting designation of an enterprise Zone; or ,.
(c) The population of all cenaua tracts in the area dec:reaaed by ten 'per-cent (1~) or more between 1980 and 1990 and the local go'geI'D!I1eDt I'e-" '
questing designation eatabliahea in writing, to the aatiaflction of the authority, that either:
1. Chronic abandonment or demolition of COIIIIIlercial or reaideDtial
sinlcturea uiIt in the area, or
2. Subatantial tax urearaps of COIIIIIlercial or residential 8~
ezist in the area. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 131, t 4, efl'ective July 15, 1982;
1992, ch. 35, § 6, effective July 14, 1992.)
(1)

Cowpller'. N.... Thla aeccioD wu formerly c:oaqIiiecl .. KBS 154.665.
K-tuetry Law oJoanaaL KaDtucky Law
Surrey. Whit.aicla. TuaciOD. 71 K,. U. 471
(l18W3).
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rr.. tb8 .... _ _ fIl.-u lawa, the I.p. IaIiaD ia
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. . &baa Yialaliwfll...... 61 and 60 01 &be
Caaatimaia fIl ltetnrky; tbenCan. &be ... '

"local

Iowiac ...... are a",,,,,,,tjtuaonallocal..
apeaial .I"tim ill camra...... fIl ~

'

w.. 61 ... 60 fIltba atate couUtut:iaa: KI8
154Ai-GOl. 154..6020.

154.~

thia ~

tioa.l~

15Y60070.... 154.6010;·
Curtherman. alaboqb Houae BiD 68, (Ada
1992, ch. 35) enact.ecl by the 1992 a - . l
~y. aaa.. Dum OUI cbuapa to ......

o..~iIlthe..."... ...........
tbeA~o-..a·. . . . clicl . . 1ad thal
it aIiIct.ed the coaduaioD fIl UDcnnrtjtgtiee,L

.

ity. OAG 82-86.

IM.46-050. Number of enterprise zonHlimitecl- Preferred area
- Effect of revocation - Retention of cerd1lcation and eligibility for "
tu exemption after removal of daipatiou. - (1) In addition to the
seven (7) emting state enterprise lOnes, the authority may designate three
(3) additional state enterprise IOnes by December 31. 1988. In deciding
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which areas should be designated as enterprise zones the authority shall
give preference to:
• .
(a) Local governments that have ~ocumented the greatest commitment
to the goals established pursuant to KRS 154.45-001;
(b) Areas with the highest levels of poverty, unemployment, and general
cliJtress; and
(c) Areas that have the greatest support from the local government seeking designation, the community, residents, local business, and private organizations, taking into account the resources available to the local government.
,
' ,' .
(2) Designation of an ·area as an enterprise zone shall remain in effect
during the period beginning on the date of designation and ending on December 31 of the twentieth year following designation.
. . (3) The authority shall remove the designation of an area as an enter~ zone if the area no longer meets the criteria for designation as lei out
in KRS 154.45-020 to 154.45-110 or by administrative regulation adopted.
b1 the authority pursuant to KRS 154.45-020 to 154.~1l0. The authority
aball establish by administrative regulation a procedure for revocatiOn of
the designation of an enterprise zone. The authority shall eD.BUnl that local
. pvemments shall be notified in writing oftbe authority's intent.aDd raIGDI for considering revocation of the designation. The authority ahall . .
tabliah a reaaonable time frame within which the local government may
correet the problema cited by the authority to avoid revocation of the enterpriM zone design8tion.
' , ,c · . " ",
(4) A local government that baa.had an enterprise zone designation revoked shall be prohibited from applying for future enterprise zone dMjIM" tiona for at least five (5) years. The authority may, by administrative replation. ezteDd the time frame that a local government is prohibited. from
~' participating in the enterprise zone propam.
.
(5) If the authority mobs the designation of an enterprise zcme. it aball
immediately begin reviewing the applications ofJoca1 govemmenta Illmg
aD enterpriae zone and designate a new area as an enterprise ZODe U IOOIl
u pouible.
(6) If the authority removes the designation of an area as an enterpriee
mile PUl'lUlUlt to this section. the qualified bUI;n_a. within the area aball
retain certification and ahall ~ eligible to receive taz eumptiona
panuant to KRS 154.45-090 until nec.uber 31 of the twentieth year from
the date of the original deaignation of the area .. an enterpriae rou.
;.-,
(Enact. Acta 1982, eh. 131, § 5, eft'ective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 30. t 5,
effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, § 6, effective July 14, 1992.)
Coepi""'. N..... TbJa MCUcm wu for.
awl,. compiled u KBS 15'-670.
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~'''' '. " i: ..

154.45-060

'

CONSERVATlON: ,AND STATE DEVELOPMENT

,~.

418

154.45-060. Enterprise Zone, Authority, of Kentucky ,- Mem-"
ship - Terma - Meetings - Compensation - Staff. - (1) For the
purposes of carrying out the provisions of KRS 154.45-020 to 154."-110
there is hereby created the Enterprise Zone Authority of Kentucky ~
ing of eleven (11) memben. The authority shall be appointed as folloWl: ou
(1) member appointed by the Governor from a list of three (3) penou ,
nominated by,the Labor,Management Advisory,Council; one (1) ' member
appointed by the Governor from a list of three (3) penoll8 nominated by tba
Kentucky League of Cities; one (1) member appointed by the Giivel:aor
from a list of three (3) penoll8 nominated by the Kentucky AlIIIOCiatioD of
Counties; one (1) member appointed b7 ~, ' (JOvernor ' who isqnaUfted to
represent the interesta of Kentucky's
'buaineu communitT,' 'em. (1)
member appointed by the GOvernor from ' a Jist of three (3) peI'IIODa .......
nated by the AFL-CIO of Kentucky; two (2) ' memben appointed by tb.
Governor to IeI"Ye at large; one (1) member appointed by the Go~ fmm _
a Jist of five ,(5) perions nominated bi. ,the eecretary oC the
fair
Economic DeYelOpment; the eecretary oftbe ~iDet Cor Ec:onomic,~
ment or his desigaee; the I8CI"etary of the Reftnae Cabinet or his deejp.;
aDd the secretary of the CahinetCot HUDWl ReIourc:eI or. his ,deejPM
(2) Authority memben sball Ilene a term oCfow (4) yean 8.Dd. eD:ept farthe secretary of the Cabinet Cor Economic Deftlopmeat., the aec:retUYot'tbt
Revenue Cabinet. and the eecretary of the CabiDet cOr Human R.ourc.,
aball not be eligible to 8Ucc:eed them-lveL
'
'
(3) The authority sball meet at leat Ccnir (., times per year. A.~ , ,
of the total authority membenhip shall be ~tA; d_pate ail. . u ' "
ID enterpriae ZOD8 and to certify WeiD..... u ,quaJjfied basiD
Ii 'n.
authority aball keep olicial mjnutM of'aU meetiDp. AU memben aUJJ
..... untillUdl time u their IU«IIBOn are quaUfied aDd appointAMl.,. .
member of the authority sball receive one hUDdred cIo1lan ($100), . . to
uceed twelve hUDdred dollan ($1,200) per calendar year, as c:ompen-tioD
far attendiDg official meetinp of the authority. Each member oC tba &IIthority shall be nimbuned for travel expelUlel attnaUy incurred in tba
dilcbarge of his dutiea on the authority.
'
.' , ,',
(4) The Cabiilet Cor Eamomic Development Iball aene as staa"fajr tba
authority and carry out the adminiatrative duties aDd fmu:tiOIl8 U ~
by the authority. (EDact. Ads 1982, ch. 131, f 6, e&c:tmt July 15, 1 _
1986, ch. 30, f 6, eft'ective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, f 7, etfective JUlj' 14,
1992.)
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114.45-070. ' nudo of authority. - The authority shall administer the

.

. , ODS

of KRS 154.45-020 to 154.45-110, and Ihall:

·

.

·

(1) EatabliBh by administrative regulation a proceu to monitor campti.

!izu:e by l~ governments and qualified buaineuea with the provisiOll8 of
. tb8 Enterpnae ·Zone Program;
: ,.. .' !:. .. :.. ~ . " . . --: , . , '. . , <~-" .•
-(2) Initiate contact and fully cooperate with the Revanue.C8biD8t; in the.
~ection of information to determine the fiacal impact of ent.arpriae . . .
tIS exemptions on state rennuee;
.
'
.
.
(3) Report. to the Geaeral Auembly no later than October.1 anm-ny

.

~

. . . . ..
'

Proiram;

(a) The'authority'. method of moni~-ru:.. the Enterprise Zcme
· . ) Information on the fiacal impact of entarpriae lODe tax eumptioDa on .
. ' . te revenues; "
.. " .
' . .." .". . i ,
. . ..
"
. (e) The authority'. methad of reriewiDg local.juCeDtive.; :.. l:-.~:.:;.F"..
(eI) Information on the number of qualified buIPn3ln. per zau;
. (e) Information 011 the number of ~ far .amendments to r.aae
boundaries aDd the. number of amendment. p-anted and dmi~ aDd
(0 Recommend.tiDDS requiring state 18lialative action;
.
• ('(4) Revoke designation of an area u an enterprile lODe punuant to th8 .
• iODS of KRS 154.45-050.
-(5) Prohibit the certification of buUner_ in an enterprile r.ane if th8
local government has been notified in ~tiDg by the authority of.the ....
thority'. intent to revoke the locallOftl'DJD8llt'l desipation u an em.prise ZODe. 'n1e prohibition of certific:ation oflmain"_ aball c:oniinue U1Idl
... &be authority ofticially revokes the locallOftl'lll1J8llt'1 enterprile r.aae ...
"lpation, or notifies the local pyernment in WI'itiDg that the prilbJ. .
cited by the authority have been corrected and the enterprile zone deejrtion shall not be revoked;
.
(6) Offer technical a.uiataDce aDd job traininga-.... nC8 to localpnrnL menta. qualified buaineaaee. and neighborhood enterprise elllOCietian c:aI'I»'
ratioDB; aDd
(7) AQreeeively review local incentives and commitments 011 an Innnal
buia. (Enact. Acta 1982, ch. 131, I 7, e&ctive July 15. 1982; 1986, c:h. SO,
I 7, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, I 8, eft'ective July 14, 1992.)
.:
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aDd thaa violative of MCtiona69 and 60 of the
ConatituUon of Kentucky; therefore. the Col·
Imlll MCtiona are uncolUlt.itutioDal local or
apecial letWation in contraYention of NCo
tiona 69 and 60 of the .tate colUlt.itution: KRS
1501,45-001.
1501.46-020.
1M.~.
1501.45-040. 1M.~. t.hiI lICtion. aDd

lM.~; furthermore. a1&.boqb ~
BUI 66. lAcY 1992. ch. 35) eua.t by tbe'.
1992 General Auembly. mau. n. . . . .
chanpe to varioua proviaiou in the _ _
pn. sou ltatutee the Attoney
at.
flce did not fiad that it afl'ec:ted the eoachIaiaa
of ulICODItitutionality. OAG 92-86.

a-u'.

,

~,. '

154.45-080. Muter buaineuliceue. - (1) The authority .hall ....
1iah and design for public display a master buaineaa license that ahal1 certify that the qualifying bUliness hal obtained all neces.ary state &pDq
permits, licenaea, certificates, approvals, registrations, chartera, or ..,.
other form ofpermiaaion required by law to engage in bu.inell in aD . . . . .
prise lOne.
. :~
(2) The authority .hall provide information and uaiatance to peI_
desiring to locate and engage in buainell in an enterpriae zone ~.
the state liceD", permits, certificates. approvala, registratiODl,~:
and any other forma ofpermiaaion requjred by law to engage in
~
the Commonwealth.
.
.
~..!.
. (3) Reaponaibility for determining if requeated liC8Dl8ll, permit.a, ~
cates. approvala, registrations, chartera, or other form of permi. . . .;
quired by law shall be issued to a qnaJjfted. buaines., shall remain with
&pncy legally authorized to issue the licenae. (Ezuu:t. Acts 1982. ch.
f 8, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 30, f 8, eft"ective July 15, 1988; 1
ch. 35, f 9, effective July 14, 1992.)

buri-_I·"
I

.. '

.

s

1~.

Tu adftDtag-. credlta, aDd aempdou'or quallfled:J.
buill. . . . - (1) A new bnainea. or an uiatiDg buainell certi&Icl .
.
bui.a of employee expansion, shall be eligible to receive the .tax ach"'qj
provided for in this section if the qualified buain.... maintains
age of targeted workforce employees required by KBS '&'V"It •.v'"V.&.'Y\.
eDtire time it is certified as a quaJjfted buainess in the En:t.lllril.
Program.
(2) Building materials used in remodeling. rehabilitation, or DeW
struction within an enterprise lODe aball be eumpt from &aiel 8IIIIl
tues provided for in KBS Chapter 139.
(3) New and used equipment and machinery purchued and -.-t-.
qualified butinea within an enterprise zone aball be uempt from
use taxes provided for in KBS Chapter 139. Equipment and machinery 1DIl7.
be moved in and out of an enterprise lODe {or buainess p~ only. lW1
addition, it may not become a permanent fi%ture at another locUioa aDd .'
may be only temporarily located elaewhere {or maintellllDCe. mecheni,...l
failure, or emergency short term replacement.
;
(4) ColDlllel'cial vehicles as defined in KBS 186.050, purchaaed aDd 1I.IId
by a qualified buainellll solely for bu.in. . pm POles. ,hall be eDIDPt.ftam
the motor vehicle uaage tax impoeed by KRS 138.460.
. r .' . ..: .! .. ~
(5) Motor vehicles not conaidered commercial vehicles purmuai to KBS
186.050, pun:haaed and used by a qualified bu.inell solely for bu&_ a,
purpoeea, aball be eumpt from the motor vehicle usage tax limited. t i
firIt twenty thouaand dollan ($20,000) oftha "retail price" of the vebicIa u
defined in KBS 138.450.

IM.45-100
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"'(6) Motor vehicles or motor trucks purchased by a qualified buaineu for
the purpose of being leaaed to a cuatomer for a period greater than niDety
) days shall not be exempt from the motor vehicle uaage taus provided

tor in KRS

138.460.
./
. ,(7) A qualified buaineu ahall be allowed a credit against the tax leVleC1
pursuant to KRS 141.040 equal to ten percent (10$) of wages paid to each
i IIDployee who has been unemployed for at leut niDety (90) days or who hu
f received public aaai8taDce benefits, buecl on need aDd inteDded to alleviate
~ ~rty, for at least ninety (90) days prior to employment with the q"eJjfted
•bulinell. up to fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500) per employee. AAy 1UlUIed
l:credit may be carried forward for up to five (6) yean.
.
t ..:(8) A local government may, by an act of the loca1legWative body,l~
f:1Il .d valorem tax rate of one-tenth of one cent ('.001) upon each ODe
hQDdred dollars ($100) of value on qualified property within an enterprile
. . . ·reprdleu of the rates provided for in KRS Chapter 132. (EJuu:t. Ada
'1982. ch. 131, § 9, e1fec:tive July" 15~ 1982; 1988, ch. 80,1 9, eft"eetift "ulJ
~J..6, 1986; 1986, ch. 431~ § 8~eff'ec:tive July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. l18,·f. 'I,
·effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 35, flO, e1featift July 14, 1992.)
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15U1-100. Neighborhood eatequUe ·eegci.tioa COI'pO~
: ll&ablilhmeni - CerdflcatioD - Lud oWlMld bY Iiate UId local
'
trDJll8llia to be '
to c~ - Ta uempdoa.
'(11 lDdiYiduaJ. residing in am enterprise ZOD8 may . .bUm a DeiPbgr...
.
enterprise UIIOCiation corporation. There ab.a1l be ODe (lj' carporaiiGn \
-:Iaf each geographic neighborhood areawhicb Ihall be defined by the iDDDr- .
. poratiJig relidena
"
.
(2) The incorporating residents ahall draft a charter and bylaw. for the
auoc:iation IUitable for doing bulineu in COl porat.e form. The c:h..arta' aDd
~., bylan shall deecribe the geographic neighborhood area to which the iDcart poratiDg association applies, the menner in which a 8tock in~ ill ~
, corporation shall be offered to each reaident of the neipborhoocl, c:nntam
provisions for amendment by a maJOrity of'lt«kholden. and .utbarDa . .
. corporation to engage in btWneu only within the particular zone in wIW:h
the neighborhood ana of the corporatiOlt 'is located.
l- ~ (3) The incorporating reaidenta ahall een4 to:all...ulents of the COIpGI'f"
, ,tion's neighborhood area:
.
' to

l

154.45-110
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(a) An explanation of the propoaed new corporation and their rights·in it:
(b) A copy of the corporate charter and bylaws; and
(c) An offer of the stock interest to which each particular resident i6
entitled without charge.
(4) The board of directors of the corporation may. upon approval of a
nuQority of the members of the locallegialative body of appropriate jurisdic·
tion, apply to the authority for certification &8 a neighborhood enterpriae
IIIOCiation corporation. The authority Ihall not grant the Itatua un1eu the
. corporation has complied with the requirements of this aeetiOD and other
requirements &8 may be adopted by the authority by ,dmin;wtrative replation. Upon granting certification, the authority shall place the COl potation'. charter and bylaws in a public file. The authority aball have power to
mob or IU8p8Jld certification, or any of the 18&.181 iuuecl UDder aubuction
(6) of this aection, if the corporation fails to continue to comply with the
requirements of this aection. The authority Ihall gift t«hn;cel ,_Renee
to zone remdents attemptiDg to etart COl poratioDL
.
(6) Ploperty within the neighborhood area of a certified CGqIOl'&tion that
is owned by the state or a local pV8rmDeDi and that it IUIC in CWieni ue
by the gOwnmumt Ihall be leued to the COIporation. The tenD of the 1. . .
aball nat be 1... than niDety-DiDe (99) yean and the CuUIJN!U!lt ofremal
feel under the lease ahall nat em:eed ODe dollar ($1). TIle leae may be
reaewed upon expiration if the corporation has continuoaaiy complied with
the requirements of this section.
(6) A certified corporation ahall be eumpt from state aDA local texaP.,
daring the life of the zone in wIW:h it ia 1ocated.. (Enact. Am 1982, ch. 13L
t 11. efIicti•• July 16, '1982; 1986, ch. 3D, f 11. e&d:iN July 15, 1988;
1992, ch. 35, f 11. e&ctive July 14. 1992.)
.

Compl...,. N..... TbIa ..............

awIJ ......... u KBS 166.700.

)[-' r'qr La. JOIUIIaI. ........, Law

)

Sanwy, Whl"'" Tuaaiaa. 71 K,. L.J. 411
(1112-83).

114.41-110. Datie. of Reveaae Cabmet - Report to General J...
..mJy 08 &cal Impact ofEaterpriM Zone Procram- -(1) The s..
Il1I8 CahiDet ahall initiate contact aDd fully cooperate with tba authority.in
the co11ection of information to det.ermiDe the fual impact of ent&pda
r.aae tu e:amptiona on state revenues.
(2) Report to the General Aaembly no later than ~ 1 UDually

~4b:=c:abinet'. method of maDitoriDg the En~ ; . . Program:
(b) Infarm.ation on the fual impact of enterprise zone tu uemptiODB on
state nmmU88; and
(e) JWmnmeDdationa requiring state legislative acdaa.

(3) The Revenue Cabinet shall by admiDistrative repletioD amend its
aeJea and use tu return to collect fiscal information on qulllW buuDMIM
within au enterprise zone for purpoees of reporting to the a-raI A.uem-

bly.

(4) The ReveDue Cabinet shall promulgate MmiDistratift replatiOM to
eatablilh a process for the COllectiOD of to iDCormatiOD relating to enterprise zone tu exemptions. (Enact. Acta 1986, ch. 30, f 12, e&ctift July 15.
1988; 1992, ch. 35, f 12, efrectift July 14, 1992.)
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C_piJer'. Noe-. Thla MCUon wu for..

;_..-l1 coaqIi1ed

u KBS lM.70S.

1&4.45-120. Cabinet for HWDaD Raoureetl to verify empioymeai..
iDformaiioD of qualified buaiDeuee. - 'I1le Cabinet for HUDUUl BeIOUf'C8S ahall verify employment information relating to the hiring requirementa of qualified buaineuee to eelect and maintain employees from tbI
tarleted workforce. The Cabinet for HUDUUl Reaoun:es ahall fully cooperatl
with the authority in the development of a IJBt;em to monitor emp1oymem'
iDformaiion supplied by qualified buaineuee. (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 35;'
t 13, effective July 14, 1992.)
I
8uBcBAPrD 50. hmUI'I'aAL DavnoPlDN':' 15UC)0020. Legiel·tive ftDdinp 01 fact Pa.rpo.e of KBS
15U0-020 to 15U0-030. - (1) It ia hereby fCJUJUi. det.ermmed. and dec:Jared as alegillative finding of fact that the pura1 welfare of the c:itoiaa
or the Commonwealth ia directly related to the economic and ~
~ aftilable to them, aDd it is the legitimate buain_ of the
KPiuCkJ atat.e guvemment to pl'VYide to the mazimum at.eDt prwttcehJe,
die impetus for and uaiItaDce to economic deftlopment in the Com.....
.-lth through the provision of monetary uaiItaDce to ;nclutrial eDtiti.
Car industrial improYemeDt projec:ta which will clireetly aDd pro.j1nateJy
c:aue the improvement and retention 41 iDduatry and empluymeui in the

Qmnnonwealth..
"
(2) It is hereby further fcnmd, det.ermmed. aDd declared as a .....tm
fIDeIing of fact that the impro.&WeDi and __DaD of manufac:tariDa, pr-.
-mg, aDd • .-mbUng facilitle. wiD pniijmeteJy reeu1t in:
(a) The c:reatioD or let.eDtion of ~ opportmaitieI; or '
'
(b) The c:reation or retention ofta Ib.eua. to the CoIlUllDD..utb. .. a
taiDg entity, which would DOt be availaWe to the citizeDa of the CoiDman.-lth or received by the CollUllDDwealth but for the impIo...... and
retention of the facilitle. and which cr-.tiaD or retention of ~
oppGI tunltle. or tax reY6Ilu.. are hereby fouDcI. determined aDd. decIand to
Clllllliitut.e receipt of n1u by the Common..uth for the mouetaI7 .....
tuce which it may provide punnwat to KBS IM.60-020 to IM.60-G30 to
iDcI1IItriaI entitle. UDcIertaJdng iDdUltrial imptOvemeDt projecta 10catecI in

thia .tate.
(3) It ia the ~ of KBS IM.6C).()20 to IM.60-030 to pzomota and
fOlter the piDfal employment, buain _ . aDd economic deftlopmeDi oppiartuDiu. and pnera1 welfare of the citbeDa and residents of the Ccprnnnn..
ftIlth which will reault in the alleviation or pretention of ~t
ucI the pural stability of the 6CDDOIDJ oCEeniacky. Thia pQipa. will be
ICCOIDPHebed by the c:reatioD of the authority to eubl. the ComIl'*"IIwealth
to provide monetary UIiItaDce to incIuatria1 entiti... for the iwpto. . . .t
! ucI reteDtion of iDdUltrial manufacturiDg, pnnujng, or alll8!D bJi D, &ciIitiel in the Commonwealth which, in ream.. will create or retain ......,.
mst uppoItunitle. for citizeDa of the Comm·DWa.ith or will c:reate arretain tax menueL '!be authority granted by KBS IM.50.020 to 1M.J0.030
ucI the ParpcI •• to be accompHebed by KRS 1M.60-020 to 1M.60-030 are
ba'eby declarec1 to be public pui'pOI8I for which public moner ~ be upended. <Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 308, I 2, efFective July 13, 1990.)
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